E. Said to him Abayye, “Is it not stated concerning this, said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Yohanan, `These are the words of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon [30a] cited anonymously?' But sages say, `Two persons may slaughter one sacrifice.'”
F. And in accord with the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon we should make a distinction in an instance where the one person who slaughtered wore two garments [Jastrow: scarves]. The first garment should not become unclean and the second garment should become unclean.
G. But [in response to Raba at C] we are interested in the invalidation of the cow and we are not interested in the proper preparation of the cow.
A. R. Idi bar Abin posed an objection: [If he slaughtered an animal that was supposed to have been brought as a Passover-offering and had leaven in his possession] during the festival — for its own sake [as a Passover-offering] he is free of liability [because it is the wrong time and the sacrifice is invalid]; not for its own sake, he is liable [for offering a sacrifice with leaven on Passover because it functions as a peace-offering]. And we argued concerning this: the basis [for the liability] is that he did it not for its own sake, but had he done it with no specification, he would be free from liability.
B. But why should he be free from liability? The Passover-offering [if brought] during the rest of the days of the year counts as a peace-offering. We derive from this that the Passover-offering [if brought] during the rest of the days of the year, its [designation] must be actively removed from it.
C. And said R. Hiyya bar Gamda, “This [opinion] was promulgated by the fellowship and they said, what are we dealing with here? It is an instance where the owners had been defiled by corpse-uncleanness and were put off until the second Passover [celebration, a month later]. Had he slaughtered it with no specification, it would have gone [as a sacrifice] for its own sake. And this one [is the case of an offering whose designation as a Passover-offering] must be actively removed. Lo, in any other case [the designation] need not be actively removed.”
D. [Let us apply this now to our concern.] If you say, “We call it `slaughtering' from the start to the finish,” it becomes invalid from the start of the act of slaughter. But if you say, “We do not call it `slaughtering' until the finish [of the act],” as soon as he slaughtered the first bit it was disqualified from being a Passover-offering. And the remainder of what he slaughters, he slaughters as a peace-offering.
E. Said to him Abayye, “Let us grant that he disqualifies it from the status of Passover-offering. But is it disqualified from serving for the monetary purposes of [procuring an offering for the second Passover by redeeming it before he completes the act of slaughter and using the money]?”
F. And if you say it must be subjected to appraisal and estimation [before it can be redeemed so it is technically impossible to do what E suggests], behold, it was taught on Tannaite authority, If he slaughtered two [organs] or the major part of two [organs] and she is still convulsing, lo she is like a live animal in all respects [Note: this is not found in M. but cf. Tosafot who believes this relates to M. ul. 9:1].
A. Said R. Judah said Rab, “He who slaughters in two or three places [on the neck] his act of slaughtering is valid. And when I said this to Samuel he said to me, `You must have an act of slaughter that is well-defined and here you do not have it [in this kind of cut, cf. b. ul. 19b, 1:3 II.5 B].'”
B. And even R. Simeon b. Laqish reasons that you must have an act of slaughter that is well-defined. For said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “On what basis do we say that you must have and act of slaughter that is well-defined? As it says, `Their tongue is a deadly arrow; it speaks deceitfully' (Jer. 9:8).” [The verse says literally `an arrow that slaughters' implying that like an arrow, the act of slaughter must be one straight cut (Rashi).]
A. R. Eleazar posed the objection [based on this teaching]: If two persons are holding knives and slaughtering, even if one is [cutting] above and one is [cutting] below, the act of slaughter is valid [M. 2:2 B].
B. Why is this the case? Behold we do not have an act of slaughter that is well-defined. Said to him R. Jeremiah, “Our teaching deals with [the case of] one knife and two people [holding it, making one cut].”
C. Said to him R. Abba, “If this is the case then what about what was taught in connection with this: They are not concerned that perhaps one or the other will render the animal terefah? If you say that we are dealing with a case of two knives and two persons, then this statement makes perfect sense. What might I have said? Let us be concerned that perhaps they rely on one another [to perform the greater part of the act of slaughter]. And this one does not perform the greater part of the act and this one does not perform the greater part of the act. It makes the point to tell us that we are not concerned about this.
D. “But if you say that we are dealing with a case of one knife and two persons, this statement that They are not concerned that perhaps one or the other will render the animal terefah [makes no sense]. It should say, They are not concerned that perhaps one or the other will press [during the act of slaughter].”
E. Said to him R. Abin, “Teach it, They are not concerned [30b] that perhaps one or the other will press [during the act of slaughter].”
A. R. Abin posed this objection [based on this teaching]: If he slaughtered the gullet below and the windpipe above, or the gullet above and the windpipe below, the act of slaughter is valid.
B. Why is this the case? Behold we do not have an act of slaughter that is well-defined.
C. He posed the objection and he answered it: [We are dealing with a single] act of slaughter on a slant like a quill.
A. There was a cow that was slaughtered in two or three places. R. Yitzhak bar Samuel bar Marta came up and took from the best cuts of meat [of this animal]. Said to him R. Zira, “Our master has taught that our teaching [refers to a case of slaughter with] two knives and by two persons.”
A. Said R. Judah, said Rab, “If he thrust the knife between the organs and he severed it [the bottom organ and removed the knife and cut the top organ as normal, Rashi], it is invalid. [If he thrust the knife] under the hide [and then cut the organs], it is valid.”
B. What novel point does this make for us? It was already taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah: Or [after properly cutting one organ], [he] thrust the knife into the second [of the organs] and tore it [from below to above] — R. Yeshebab says, "It is carrion." And R. Aqiba says, "It is terefah" [M. 2:4 D-F].
C. If we had only the Mishnah, I might have reasoned it was the case [that it was invalid] if he slaughtered the bottom [organ first] and the top [organ second]. For he did not perform the act in the manner prescribed for slaughter. But if he [thrust the knife in and] did the top and then the bottom as is the practice for a valid act of slaughter, it would make sense to say this is perfectly acceptable. It makes the novel point [that it is invalid].
D. [If he thrust the knife] under the hide [and then cut the organs], it is valid [A, above]. The House of Rab say, “[If he thrust the knife] under the hide, we do not know [the ruling].”
E. They posed a question according to the House of Rab who said, “[If he thrust the knife] under the hide, we do not know [the ruling]” — if he [thrust the knife and slaughtered] under a cloth [that was wrapped around the neck of the animal (Cashdan)] what is the law? Under the matted wool [of the neck of the animal], what is the law? These questions stand unresolved.
F. R. Pappa posed the question: If he thrust [the knife and slaughtered] a small part of the organs [having already slaughtered properly the major part, Rashi], what is the law? The question stands unresolved.
The exercise in Mishnah-criticism at I.1 here parallels that of the Talmud to Mishnah 1:1. II.1-5 seek scriptural authority and logical support for the correct place in the body to slaughter an animal. This substantial passage on such an obvious issue comes close to sounding like a parody of the familiar critical processes. III.1 supplies a scriptural basis for Mishnah's rule. No. 2 pursues a secondary issue raised first in no. 1. IV.1-2 are secondary expansions. V.1-2 return to Mishnah's primary concern. Nos. 3-4 round out the discussion. VI.1 takes up the next operative consideration in the criticism of Mishnah. Nos. 2-3 pose questions based on no. 1.
VII.1 continues the analysis of Mishnah. No. 2 poses a secondary question. VIII.1-2 pursue the criticism of Mishnah and reject one potential contrary parallel to its operative principle. Nos. 3-4 raise objections based on logical inferences from other rules. IX.1 explores the ostensible internal redundancy of the Mishnah-text. X.1 presents an independent related unit. Nos. 2-3 develop discussions based on Mishnah's operative considerations but range far from our topic. XI.1 expands Mishnah's interest with a secondary rule. No. 2 relates this back to the Mishnah-text as a contradiction and resolves it. Nos. 3-4 follow on this line of inquiry. No. 5, cited in the name of the same authorities as no. 1, continues the criticism of Mishnah and concludes with two issues that are not resolved.
A. He who slaughters [cuts through] two heads [of cattle] simultaneously — his act of slaughter is valid.
B. [If] two people hold the knife and effect an act of slaughter [of a single beast], even if [one holds the knife at] the upper [end], and one at the lower, their act of slaughter is valid.
A. [If] one chopped off the head with a single stroke, it is invalid.
B. [If] one was engaged in the act of slaughter and chopped off the head with a single stroke,
C. if the knife is [as long again as] the width of the neck, it is valid.
D. [If] one was engaged in the act of slaughter and chopped off two heads simultaneously,
E. if the knife was [as long again as] the width of the neck of one [of them], it is valid.
F. Under what circumstances?
G. When [the slaughterer moved the knife] forward but not backward, or backward but not forward.
H. But if he moved it forward and backward,
I. however short [the knife],
J. even with a scalpel,
K. it is valid.
A. What is the source of these assertions? Said Samuel, “Scripture said, `Their tongue is a deadly arrow; it speaks deceitfully' (Jer. 9:8).”
B. The House of R. Ishmael [says to derive it from], “Then he shall kill [the bull before the Lord; and Aaron's sons the priests shall present the blood, and throw the blood round about against the altar that is at the door of the tent of meeting]” (Lev. 1:5); “Then he shall kill” can mean only he shall draw [it back and forth and not chop it].
C. And so it says, “[King Solomon made two hundred large shields] of beaten [šwt=drawn out] gold; [six hundred shekels of gold went into each shield]” (I Kings 10:16). And it says, “Their tongue is a deadly [šwt] arrow; it speaks deceitfully” (Jer. 9:8).
D. What is the purpose of the second citation? [The first should suffice.] If you should want to say that “beaten [šwt=drawn out] gold” means that it was woven of gold [š-wt=of thread, and is no proof] then come and take note [of the second verse], “Their tongue is a deadly [šwt] arrow” (Jer. 9:8).