Come and take note: [69a] This is the general principle: Something that is part of its [the dam's] body is prohibited. Something that is not part of its body is permitted [M. 4:1 G]. What does Something that is not part of its body encompass? does it not encompass this very matter? No. It encompasses [the case of] an animal with uncloven hooves in the womb of the cow. And this is in accord with the view of R. Simeon.
E. For even though R. Simeon said, “A foetus with uncloven hooves that is the offspring of a cow is prohibited [I.2 G],” this concern applies to an instance where it emerged to see the light of day. But as long as it remains in the womb of the mother it is permitted.
A. R. Hanania posed a question: If the offspring [of a peace-offering] put forth its limb while [the mother was] in the Temple court, what is the law? Do we reason that since [the Temple court] is an enclosure for Holy Things, it serves as such for this [offspring] as well [and when the mother is slaughtered, the offspring is rendered permitted]? Or perhaps [we reason] what with regard to this case [the Temple court] does not serve as an enclosure. For the enclosure for an offspring [with regard to the effectiveness of slaughter for the mother upon the offspring] is its mother.
B. Said to him Abayye, “According to your logic you should have posed a question regarding Lesser Holy Things in Jerusalem. Why did you not pose a question regarding Lesser Holy Things in Jerusalem? For the enclosure for an offspring [with regard to the effectiveness of slaughter for the mother upon the offspring] is its mother.”
C. Ilfa posed a question: If the offspring put out its limb between [the actual slaughter of] one organ [of the neck] and the other, what is the law? Do we reason that the [slaughter of the] first organ combines with that of the second organ to render it clean of the status of carrion? Or do we not [reason in this manner]?
D. Said Raba, “It may be derived from an argument a fortiori. If the first organ effectively [combines in an ordinary instance] with the second to render it permitted for eating, does it not effectively [combine in our case] to render it clean of the status of carrion?”
E. R. Jeremiah posed a question: What is the law with regard to taking into account the seed [of the offspring that had put forth its limb and that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother in determining the status of the progeny]? What is the situation? If we say that it went and mated with a normal cow, why specify this case that has a prohibited limb that it put out of the mother's womb? Why not consider also even the more general case of an offspring that was born alive [with no protruding limb] after the slaughter of the mother?
F. For said R. Mesharshayya, “According to the view of those who say we take into account the seed of the father [in determining the status of the progeny], if an offspring that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother mates with a normal cow, there is no redress for the offspring.”
G. It is not necessary [to raise this issue because our case is where] it mated with an offspring that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother, just like [the father] itself. What [is the law]? [Do we say] each limb [in the parent] produces the equivalent [in the offspring]? Then he can cut it off [i.e., cut off the limb of the offspring equivalent to that of the parent that was outside its mother when it was slaughtered] and it is permitted [i.e., the rest of the animal]. Or perhaps [we say] the seed [of the parents] is mixed together [in the offspring]?
H. He responded and said, “It is obvious that the seed is mixed together. For if not then a blind one would give birth to a blind offspring and a lame one would give birth to a lame offspring. Rather it is obvious that the seed is mixed together.”
I. So this is how we should phrase the question: Does not an ordinary animal result from the [elements in the seed of the father] of forbidden fats and blood [mixed together with all the other genetic materials] and it is permitted [to eat an ordinary animal]? Here too [where the father is an animal born alive after the mother was slaughtered and while it had a protruding limb, it] should it make no difference [if the forbidden substance is mixed together with the rest of the seed]? Or perhaps we say that two prohibited elements [are acceptable] but that three prohibited elements are not?
J. And in accord with whose view do we say this? If in accord with the view of R. Meir, then we do have the prohibition against forbidden fats and blood. But we do not have the prohibition against [the animal born alive after the slaughter of the mother with the limb that] protrudes. And if it is in accord with the view of R. Judah then we do have the prohibition against [the animal born alive after the slaughter of the mother with the limb that] protrudes. But we do not have the prohibition against forbidden fats and blood.
K. For it was taught on Tannaite authority: “[The prohibition of the sinew of the hip] applies to the foetus, and its fat is prohibited,” the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says, “It does not apply to the foetus. Its fat is permitted [T. 7:2 A-B].”
L. But [on the contrary in general] we do state that all [that derivatives] of elements [that are prohibited] are [themselves] permitted. So here is how we should phrase the question: [With regard to an offspring whose foot was protruding and was born alive after the slaughter of the mother], what about drinking its milk? Is not [taking from an animal] ordinary milk like [taking] a `limb' from a live animal and still it is permitted? In this case too it should make no difference. Or perhaps there [in the case of milk from an ordinary animal], there is redress for its prohibition [as a `limb' from a live animal] through slaughtering. Here there is no redress for its prohibition through slaughtering. [It remains prohibited.] The question stands unresolved.
A. [If] one cuts off part of the offspring which is in its womb [M. 4:1 D]. What is the basis in Scripture for this rule? As it is written, “Every animal that parts the hoof and has the hoof cloven in two, and chews the cud, among the animals, you may eat it” (Deut. 14:6). [It repeats,] “animal” and “among the animals” to include the offspring [under the rules].
B. But on this basis they should be able to make a substitution with it. Why then was it taught on Tannaite authority, They do not substitute limbs for foetuses or foetuses for limbs, or limbs and foetuses for whole beasts, or whole beasts for them [M. Tem. 1:3 A-B]?
C. Rather said Scripture, “Every animal” to include the offspring [under the rule, that is, it is included in this rule but they are not identical with regard to the rule of substitution].
D. If this is the case then even if one cuts off from the spleen or the kidneys it also [should be permitted based on this verse]. Why then was it taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, [If] one cuts off part of the offspring that is in its womb — it [what is cut off] is permitted to be eaten. [If he cut off] part of the spleen or kidneys [of the beast itself], it is prohibited to be eaten [M. 4:1 C-E]?
E. Scripture said, “[You may eat] it.” [You may eat it] whole but not if it is missing parts.
F. But on this basis [consider the following]: One who slaughters a beast and finds inside it [a foetus] the shape of a dove, it should be permitted! Why then [does it say]: Said R. Yohanan, “One who slaughters a beast and finds inside it [a foetus] the shape of a dove, it is prohibited to eat it.”
G. [69b] It must have split hooves. And there are none here.
H. But on this basis consider the case of a foetus with uncloven hooves in the womb of a cow. Let it be prohibited. Lo, taught the House of R. Ishmael in accord with R. Simeon b. Yohai, “[Every animal that parts the hoof and has the hoof] cloven in two, [and chews the cud], among the animals, you may eat it” (Deut. 14:6).
I. R. Shimi bar Ashi said, “It is invariably as you stated earlier. And that question you raised [in B] that they do not substitute [limbs for foetuses or foetuses for limbs, or limbs and foetuses for whole beasts, or whole beasts for them] in accord with whose view is this [a question]? In accord with R. Simeon's view. For he juxtaposes the laws of substitution with those of tithes. What is the case regarding tithes? [The obligation to tithe] does not apply to limbs and foetuses. Similarly [the rules of] substitution do not apply to limbs and foetuses.”
J. And on what basis do you say this? As it was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah, Said R. Yosé, “Is it not so that in the case of animals that have been consecrated, he who says, `The foot of this is a burnt-offering' — the whole beast is a burnt-offering? Also, when he will state, `The foot of this is instead of that' — the whole of it should be a substitute in its stead [M. Tem. 1:3 D-E].” To whose view does he [Yosé] respond? If you say that it is to [the views of] R. Meir and R. Judah, do they hold this [contrary] view?
K. But lo, it was taught on Tannaite authority, You might infer that one who says, `This is the foot of a burnt-offering' that the whole beast will become a burnt-offering. It comes to teach us [in the verse], “[If it is an animal such as men offer as an offering to the Lord,] all of such that any man gives to the Lord is holy” (Lev. 27:9). [This implies some] “of all” will become holy, but not that “all” of it will become holy.
L. You might infer that [in such a case the animal] will revert to being unconsecrated. It comes to teach us [in the verse], “is.” [That implies] it will retain its status [b. Tem. 11b].
M. Lo, what then is the procedure? “Let the [animal] be sold for the purpose of bringing burnt-offerings. And its monetary value will be available unconsecrated purposes excluding the value of the limb,” the words of R. Meir. And R. Judah, R. Yosé, and R. Simeon say, “What is the basis for the rule that one who says, `This is the foot of a burnt-offering' that the whole beast becomes a burnt-offering? It comes to teach us [in the verse], `is.' That [word] includes all of it.”
N. In accord with whose view is this stated? If you wish to maintain that it is in accord with the view of R. Meir or R. Judah, do they hold in accord with this view? But rather it must be in accord with the view of R. Simeon. No [this need not be the conclusion]. R. Yosé [in the M. cited in J] expressed his own view [and not in accord with any other Tanna].
I.1 analyzes the reasoning of the rules of Mishnah. I.2 extends the inquiry and aligns the rules of Mishnah with a Tosefta-text and additional Tannaite and Amoraic materials. I.3-5 compare the premises of our Mishnah paragraph with intersecting premises of different rules. I.6 then translates the process of Mishnah-criticism into a quest for a statement of a legal premise. I.7 extends and explores Mishnah's premises and principles by proposing a series of theoretical cases. II.1 seeks the scriptural basis for the rule of Mishnah and then aligns the rules with those of other Tannaite authorities.
A. A beast producing its firstborn that is in hard labor —
B. one cuts off the limbs [of the offspring] one by one and throws them to the dogs.
C. [If] the greater part of it came forth, lo, this is to be buried.
D. And it [beast] is free of [the law of] the firstling.
A. It was stated: If one third [of a firstborn animal] came forth and he sold it to an idolater and then another third came forth — R. Huna said, “It is holy.” Rabbah said, “It is not holy.”
B. R. Huna said, “It is holy.” He reasons that it is retroactively holy. As soon as the major part came forth, the matter is clarified retroactively that from the start it was holy. And the one who bought [the first third], bought nothing.
C. Rabbah said, “It is not holy.” He reasons that from this point onwards [after the major part comes forth] it is holy. And the one who bought [the first third] made a perfectly good purchase.
D. And they each are consistent with their own views elsewhere. For it was stated: If one third [of a firstborn animal] came forth through a caesarian section and two thirds through the womb [in a normal birth] — R. Huna said, “It is not holy.” Rabbah said, “It is holy.”
E. R. Huna said, “It is not holy.” R. Huna is consistent with his view. For he said it is holy retroactively. And the first major portion [of the animal to come forth] does not come through the womb [by a normal birth process].
F. Rabbah said, “It is holy.” Rabbah is consistent with his view. For he said that from this point onwards it is holy. And the majority [of the animal] does come forth through the womb.
G. And it is necessary to state both cases. For if we had been instructed in this one [the latter, we might argue that] in this one R. Huna stated matters because it is a lenient rule. But in that one [the former] that is a stricter rule, it would make sense to say that he agrees with Rabbah. [Rashi explains otherwise.]