Talmud - Daf Yomi - Bavli Hullin 2 and 3 - Translation of Tzvee Zahavy

                                                                 1:1 A-D

                A.            (1) All may slaughter,

        (2) and their act of slaughter is valid,

                B.            Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor

                (C.           lest they impair [the fitness of the carcass] through their act of slaughter).

                D.           But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, with others watching them — their act of slaughter is valid.

I.1

A.            [The Mishnah presents us with a contradiction.] All may slaughter, [implies that they may do so] to begin with. And their act of slaughter is valid, [implies that they may not do so to begin with but if they already performed the act of slaughter] after the fact [their actions are deemed proper].

B.            Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi, “Does every use of the word All [imply they may do so] to begin with? Consider [the case in M. Temurah 1:1], All effect a valid substitution [i.e., substitute a beast for one they have first designated as a sacrifice and the second beast enters the status of the originally consecrated one] — all the same men and women.”

C.            Here too does that [language] imply they may do so to begin with? But lo it is written, “[If it is an animal such as men offer as an offering to the Lord, all of such that any man gives to the Lord is holy.] He shall not substitute anything for it or exchange it, a good for a bad or a bad for a good” (Lev. 27:9-10).

D.            In that case the reason the Mishnah states it in these terms [All...] is to inform us not that a person may substitute [one beast for another] to begin with, but if he already did substitute, the substitution is effective and the person who does so incurs the penalty of forty stripes.

E.            Rather [consider the case in M. Arakhin 1:1], All pledge the Valuation [of others] and are subject to the pledge of Valuation [by others], vow [the worth of another] and are subject to the vow [of payment of their worth by another]. Here too [does the language imply that he may do so] to begin with? But lo it is written, “But if you refrain from vowing, you will not incur guilt” (Deut. 23:22). And it is written, “It is better that you should not vow than that you should vow and not fulfill it” (Qoh. 5:5).

F.             And it was taught on Tannaite authority, “Better than both alternatives that he does not vow at all,” the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says, “Better than both alternatives that he makes a vow and pays his vow.” And even R. Judah stated his opinion in a case of one who says, “Behold this one [item I designate holy].” [2b] But if he said, “Behold I take upon myself [a vow],” he does not [approve of making such a vow to begin with].

G.            So does this mean that every use of the language All... does not imply that he act to begin with [in the prescribed manner]? Rather [consider these cases], All are obligated in [the law of living in] the Sukkah; All are obligated in [the law of wearing a garment with] fringes [b. Arak. 3b]. Here too [does the language not imply that he act in the prescribed fashion] to begin with? But is it not stipulated [specifically in these instances], All are obligated [implying that they are obliged to begin with]?

H.           Rather [you may derive that the language All... implies an obligation to begin with] from the following case, All may lay hands, both men and women [b. Men. 93a]. Here too does not [the language imply that they do so] to begin with? But lo it is written, “You shall lay your hand [on the head of the offering], and it shall be acceptable [in your behalf as atonement for you]” (Lev. 1:4). [This implies that they do so to begin with.]

I.              Yes, there are cases where the language All... implies [they may perform an obligation] to begin with and cases where the language All... implies [if they already performed an act] after the fact [their actions are deemed proper].

J.              But what of the use of the language All... here [in our Mishnah]? Does it imply [they may perform the] obligation to begin with and thus present us with a contradiction [with the latter text of the Mishnah]? Or perhaps it implies that after the fact [if they performed the action it is deemed proper and hence it] does not present us with a contradiction?

K.            Say to him [who suggests the latter], “I then have a problem with the language [of the Mishnah], And their act of slaughter is valid. Since it taught, And their act of slaughter is valid, implying after the fact [this is the case], it is logical to assume that All... implies that they may do so to begin with. For if it implied to the case after the fact [of those who already performed the action], why would we need two [stipulations in the Mishnah that if they performed the action it is valid] after the fact?”

L.            Said Rabbah bar Ulla, “This is what the Mishnah taught: All may slaughter, even an unclean person may slaughter an unconsecrated animal.”

M.           An unclean person may slaughter an unconsecrated animal — why must this be specified [it is obvious]? [Because it applies to a case of] an unconsecrated animal that was prepared in accordance with the purity necessary for a consecrated animal. [And the authority behind our Mishnah] assumes that an unconsecrated animal that was prepared in accordance with the purity necessary for a consecrated animal, resembles a consecrated animal [with regard to all its requirements].

N.           What then should one [who is unclean] do [when slaughtering such an unconsecrated animal that was prepared in accordance with the purity necessary for a consecrated animal]? He should bring a long knife and slaughter with it so that he avoids touching the flesh. And he [who is unclean] should not slaughter a consecrated animal lest he touch the flesh [and render it unclean]. And if he did slaughter it and says, “I am certain that I did not touch it,” his act of slaughtering is valid.

O.            Except in the cases of a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor [who slaughtered an unconsecrated animal that was prepared in accordance with the purity necessary for a consecrated animal]. For even [when they slaughter] an ordinary unconsecrated animal, even after the fact we do not [accept their act as valid]. We fear they may have paused, pressed, or thrust [the knife when slaughtering the animal].

P.            But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter (M. 1:1D), to whom does this refer? If we presume that it pertains to a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor, it should have stated, But if they performed an act of slaughter.

Q.            Rather [it must pertain to a case of] an unclean person [who slaughtered] an unconsecrated animal. But lo we said that even to begin with he may slaughter.

R.            But rather [it must pertain to a case of] an unclean person who slaughtered a consecrated animal. [But in such a case we have already stated that if he said], “I am certain [that I did not touch the animal],” that is enough [of a basis for us to declare the act valid]. [It must pertain to a case where] he is not around for us to ask him [whether he touched the animal].

I.2

A.            This [rule regarding the procedures for] an unclean person who slaughtered a consecrated animal — whence do we derive it? We derive it from the following:

B.            All unfit people [e.g., the ten types listed at M. Zeb. 2:1] who [in behalf of the Temple cult] slaughtered [an animal designated for a sacrifice] — their act of slaughter is valid.

C.            For an act of slaughter [in general, not in the cult] is valid [when done] by non-priests, women, slaves, and unclean men—

D.            Even in the case of [their slaughtering] Most Holy Things.

E.            And [this is so] on the condition that the unclean people do not touch the meat [M. Zeb. 3:1 A-D].

F.             Here [in our text] is the primary source [of the ruling]. There [in M. Zeb.] since the Mishnah taught regarding the other unfit persons, it taught regarding the unclean person who slaughtered a consecrated animal.

G.            But if you wish [we can argue that] there [in Zeb.] is the primary source [of the ruling] because there they deal with [the rules for] Holy Things. Here [in our text the reference to this case is incidental] since they taught regarding an unclean person who slaughtered an unconsecrated animal, they taught also regarding an unclean person who slaughtered a consecrated animal.

I.3

A.            This unclean person — how did he become unclean? If we say that he became unclean from contact with a corpse [thus unclean as a “father” or primary source of uncleanness], the Torah stated, “[Whoever in the open field touches] one who has been killed by a sword” (Num. 19:16) [3a]. Lo, the sword is equivalent to the corpse [in the degree of uncleanness it acquires]. So a person who has the status of primary source of uncleanness [who is slaughtering an animal] will impart uncleanness to the knife [he is using] and the knife will proceed to render the flesh of the animal unclean.

B.            Rather, let us say that he became unclean through contact [in the first degree] with a dead creeping thing [that is unclean as a father of uncleanness. Then he would not render the knife unclean as a primary source of uncleanness and the flesh would not be rendered unfit.]

C.            Or if you prefer [another possibility], let us say that the person did become unclean [as a primary source] through contact with a corpse. But the case in question may be one where he examined a reed and [found it to be sharp enough and] slaughtered with that. For it was taught on Tannaite authority, With anything do they slaughter [M. ul. 1:2 B] — even with a flint, even with glass, even with the point of a reed [T. 1:5]. [Unlike a knife, a reed will not become unclean as a primary source of uncleanness.]

D.            Abayye said, “Interpret the Mishnah as follows: All may slaughter even a Samaritan. Of what circumstance do we speak? When an Israelite was standing over him [supervising his actions]. But [if the Israelite was] coming and going [and not constantly supervising him] he is not permitted to slaughter. And if he did slaughter, they cut off an olive's bulk of meat and offer it to him. If he eats it, then others are permitted to eat from [animals] he slaughtered. And if he does not eat it, then others are forbidden to eat from [animals] he slaughtered.”

E.            Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor [M. 1:1 B] — even after the fact you are not [permitted to eat from animals they slaughtered because we fear] lest they paused, pressed or thrust [the knife, invalidating their act of slaughter].

F.             But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, [with others watching them — their act of slaughter is valid [M. 1:1 D]]. To which [case does this statement apply]? If you say that it applies to [the case of] a deaf-mute, imbecile and minor, then it should have [phrased matters], “But if they performed the act of slaughter” [rather than, “But all of them...”].

G.            Rather it must refer to [the case of slaughter by] a Samaritan. But lo we said that when an Israelite is standing over him he may slaughter even to begin with. There is a contradiction [in the M.].

H.           Said Raba, “[In the case of a Samaritan who slaughtered when an Israelite supervising him was coming and going, did we say] to begin with he may not [slaughter]? But lo it was taught on Tannaite authority, He who leaves a gentile in a store, even though he is going out and coming in all the time — it is permitted [M. A.Z. 5:4 E-G].

I.              “There is it taught He may leave? [The phrase] He who leaves is taught, implying after the fact [this is acceptable, but to begin with it is not sanctioned].

J.              “Rather derive the matter from this case [of one in a condition of cleanness, who prepared wine belonging to a gentile, and leaves it in his domain, in a house opened to the public domain, in a town where all the residents are gentiles, and he sets up a guard to watch the wine]: And the guard need not sit there and watch [the room all the time]. Even though he comes in and goes out, [the wine] is permitted [M. A.Z. 4:11 E-F].”

K.            Rather Raba said, “Teach the matter as follows: All Slaughter, even a Samaritan. In what case? When an Israelite [supervising him] is coming and going. But if one came and found that he did slaughter, they cut off an olive's bulk of meat and offer it to him. If he eats it, then others are permitted to eat from [animals] he slaughtered. And if he does not eat it, then others are forbidden to eat from [animals] he slaughtered.

L.            “Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor [M. 1:1 B] — even after the fact you are not [permitted to eat from animals they slaughtered because we fear] lest they paused, pressed or thrust [the knife invalidating their act of slaughter].

M.           “But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, [with others watching them — their act of slaughter is valid [M. 1:1 D]]. To which [case does this statement apply]? If you say that it applies to [the case of] a deaf-mute, imbecile and minor, then it should have [phrased matters], `But if they performed the act of slaughter' [rather than, `But all of them...'].

N.           “Rather it must refer to [the case of slaughter by] a Samaritan. But lo we said that when an Israelite is standing over him he may slaughter even to begin with. There is a contradiction [in the M.].”

O.            R. Ashi said, “Teach the matter as follows: All Slaughter, even an apostate Israelite. An apostate in what respect? One who eats carrion to satisfy his craving. And this accords with the teaching of Raba. For Raba said, '[If] an Israelite apostate who eats carrion to satisfy his craving [slaughters an animal] [3b] one may examine a knife and give it to him [to use for slaughtering]. And you are permitted to eat from [animals] he has slaughtered. But if he did not examine the knife and he gave it to him, he should not slaughter. And if he did slaughter, then one should examine the knife afterward. If you find the knife is undamaged, then you may eat from the animals he slaughtered. And if not, you may not eat from the animals he slaughtered.

P.            “Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor [M. 1:1 B] — even after the fact you are not [permitted to eat from animals they slaughtered because we fear] lest they paused, pressed or thrust [the knife invalidating their act of slaughter].

Q.            “But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, [with others watching them — their act of slaughter is valid [M. 1:1 D]]. To which [case does this statement apply]? If you say that it applies to [the case of] a deaf-mute, imbecile and minor, then it should have [phrased matters], `But if they performed the act of slaughter' [rather than, `But all of them...'].

R.            “Rather it must refer to [the case of slaughter by] an Israelite apostate. If he examined the knife and gives it to him, lo we said, he may slaughter to begin with. Rather it must be that he did not examine the knife [first]. If the knife is around, let it be examined now [after]. And if the knife is not around, what difference does it make if others were watching him? Perhaps we are dealing with a case of one who slaughters with a defective knife. [Accordingly] there is a contradiction [in the M.].”

S.             Rabina said, “Teach the matter as follows: All Slaughter, all experts may slaughter. [This implies that] experts [may slaughter] even if they are not professional. This is the case if we know about him that he can recite the laws of slaughtering. But if we do not know about him that he can recite the laws of slaughtering, he should not slaughter. And if he does slaughter they examine him. If he does know to recite the laws of slaughtering, we are permitted to eat from [animals] he slaughtered. And if not, then we are forbidden to eat from [animals] he slaughtered.

T.            “Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor [M. 1:1 B] — even after the fact you are not [permitted to eat from animals they slaughtered because we fear] lest they paused, pressed or thrust [the knife, invalidating their act of slaughter].

U.            “But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, [with others watching them — their act of slaughter is valid [M. 1:1 D]]. To which [case does this statement apply]? If you say that it applies to [the case of] a deaf-mute, imbecile and minor, then it should have [phrased matters], `But if they performed the act of slaughter' [rather than, `But all of them...'].

V.            “Rather it must refer to [the case of slaughter by] one who is not an expert. [But we said] it is enough if they examined him. [It is a case where] he is not present for them to examine him.”

W.           And there are those who say Rabina said, “Teach the matter as follows: All Slaughter, all experts may slaughter. [This implies that] professionals [may slaughter] even if they are not experts. This is the case if he slaughtered in our presence two or three times and he did not faint. But if he did not slaughter in our presence two or three times, he should not slaughter lest he faint. And if he does slaughter and says, 'I am certain that I did not faint,' [the animal] he slaughtered is proper.

X.            “Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor [M. 1:1 B] — even after the fact you are not [permitted to eat from animals they slaughtered because we fear] lest they paused, pressed or thrust [the knife, invalidating their act of slaughter].

Y.            “But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, [with others watching them — their act of slaughter is valid [M. 1:1 D]]. To which [case does this statement apply]? If you say that it applies to [the case of] a deaf-mute, imbecile and minor, then it should have [phrased matters], `But if they performed the act of slaughter' [rather than, `But all of them...'].

Z.            “Rather it must refer to [the case of slaughter by] one who is not a professional. [But we said] it is enough if he said, `I am certain....' [It is a case where] he is not present for them to examine him.”

AA.        Rabina and Rabbah bar Ulla did not accord with [the opinions of] Abayye and Raba and R. Ashi because contradictions [were raised against their views from the phrase in the Mishnah], And all of them.

BB.          All of them did not accord with Rabbah bar Ulla. According to the version [of his teaching] that says here [in our text] is the primary source [of the ruling], you could argue that on the contrary there [in Zeb.] is the primary source [of the ruling] because there they deal with [the rules for] Holy Things.

                                                                       

CC.         According to the version [of his teaching] that says there [in Zeb.] is the primary source [of the ruling], here because they taught a case of an unclean person [who slaughtered] an unconsecrated animal, they also taught [for the sake of completeness] a case of an unclean person who slaughtered a consecrated animal. [But this makes no sense.] They did not need to teach even [the rule] of an unclean person who slaughtered an unconsecrated animal. [The principle is]: unconsecrated produce that was prepared in accord with the purity rules for Holy Things is not to be treated like a Holy Thing [b. Nid. 71b].

DD.        All of them did not accord with Rabina. According to the version [of his teaching] that says experts may slaughter, non-experts may not, [we find a principle that contradicts this:] The majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts [b. ul. 12a]. And according to the version [of his teaching] that says professionals may slaughter, non-professionals may not, [we have a principle that contradicts this]: We do not worry that he will faint.

EE.          Raba does not accord with Abayye because of the contradiction [raised above]. Abayye does not hold like Raba. There [in the case of a gentile and his wine] he does not touch [the wine, see H-N above]. Here [in the case of Samaritan who slaughters] he touches [the animal to slaughter it and may render it unfit].

FF.          R. Ashi does not accord with either of these views [of Abayye or Raba]. He holds the view that Samaritans converted out of fear of the lions.

GG.         Abayye does not accord with R. Ashi. He does not accept Raba's reasoning [that an Israelite apostate may slaughter if someone examines the knife].

HH.        But why does Raba not accord with his own teaching [as R. Ashi suggests at O]? [His statement responds to] the words of Abayye, but he himself does not accept that reasoning.

I.4

A.            Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: [Meat from an animal] slaughtered by a Samaritan is permitted. In what circumstance? If an Israelite was standing over him [to supervise]. But if one came and found that he did slaughter, they cut off an olive's bulk of meat and offer it to him. If he eats it, then others are permitted to eat from [animals] he slaughtered. And if he does not [eat it], then others are forbidden to eat from [animals] he slaughtered [above, I.3 K].

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