G. And R. Aha bar Jacob [11a] [will respond to this that F speaks of] an instance where a there is a row of people [standing between the house and the priest and one turns to the next in sequence] and they say that [the character of the spot] stays the same.
I.22
A. What is the basis for this matter that the rabbis stated, “Go according to the majority?” As it is written, “Turn aside after a multitude” (Ex. 23:2).
B. For a majority in front of us [that can be counted], such as the case of nine shops [that sell proper meat in same vicinity as one that sells unfit meat (b. Pes. 9b)] or of a Sanhedrin [where we can count the votes of the judges], we do not need [to state that we follow the majority]. Where do we need to [state it]? For a majority that is not in front of us [i.e., a statistical majority], such as the case of a boy and a girl [who married while minors in order to fulfill the obligation of the levirate marriage. We may presume in accord with the statistical majority that neither will be sterile and the marriage will result in an offspring, cf. b. Yeb. 61b.]
C. What is the basis for this principle? Said R. Eleazar [a mnemonic is given], “We derive it from the [rule regarding] the head of a whole burnt-offering.” For Scripture states, “And he shall ... cut it into pieces” (Lev. 1:3). You shall cut it [the animal] into pieces, and not the pieces [i.e., the organs of the animal] into pieces [to examine them for defects]. And should we not suspect that perhaps the membrane of the brain was punctured [rendering it terefah]? Is it not [then proven that we make no inspection because] we say that we go according to the majority? [The majority of animals have no defects in the organs.]
D. Why draw this conclusion? Perhaps he splits open [the animal's skull] and inspects it [for defects]. And if you argue [he cannot do this] on the basis of the principle: you shall cut it [the animal] into pieces, and not the pieces [i.e., the organs of the animal] into pieces [to examine them for defects] — this [applies to a case where] he severed [a limb] entirely. But [in a case] where he cleaves it without detaching, we do not apply the principle.
E. Mar the son of Rabina said, “We derive [the rule that we follow a statistical majority] from the [implications of the prohibition against] breaking a bone of the paschal-offering.” For Scripture stated, “And you shall not break a bone of it” (Ex. 12:46). And should we not suspect that perhaps the membrane of the brain was punctured [rendering it terefah]? Is it not [then proven that we make no inspection because] we say that we go according to the majority? [The majority of animals have no defects in the organs.]
F. Why draw this conclusion? Perhaps he places a burning coal on [the skull] and it burns through and he examines [the membrane]. As it is taught on Tannaite authority, He who chops up its sinews, [horns, or hooves,] or he who burns its bones — he has not [transgressed the prohibition against] breaking a bone [in the paschal-offering] [T. Pisha 6:7]. [We have no proof from this case.]
G. R. Nahman bar Yitzhak says, “We derive [the rule that we follow a statistical majority] from [the implications of the rule regarding] the fat tail [of a sheep].” For the Torah says, “He shall offer its fat, the fat tail entire, [taking it away close by the backbone]” (Lev. 3:9). And should we not suspect that perhaps the spinal cord was severed [when he removed the tail]? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
H. And if you say [by way of argument] that he cuts it below [the place where it would be rendered terefah, this is not possible because] “close by the backbone,” says the Torah, [implying he cuts it in] the place where the kidneys are located [i.e., high enough to render it unfit if he severs the spine].
I. Why draw this conclusion? Perhaps he cuts open [the tail] and inspects it. And if you say [he can not do so] because [Scripture states], “entire,” that applies only to a case of one who cut it completely through. But [in a case] where he cleaves it without detaching, we do not apply the principle.
J. R. Sheshet the son of R. Idi said, “We derive the principle from the case of broken-neck-heifer.” For the Torah says, “Whose neck was broken” (Deut. 21:6). When she [the animal] is whole [it is valid]. And should we not suspect that perhaps she was terefah? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
K. But if you say [by way of objection] what is the difference with regard to the law [whether the animal is terefah]? Lo, say the house of R. Yannai, “Atonement (Deut. 21:8, they will be absolved) is written concerning it. [This implies the animal must not be terefah] like holy things [i.e., other sacrifices].”
L. Rabbah bar Shila said, “We derive [the principle] from the [implications of the] case of the red cow.” For the Torah says, “It shall be... slaughtered... shall be burned” (Num. 19:3-5). Just as its slaughtering must take place when it is intact [not terefah], so its burning must take place when it is intact. And should we not suspect that perhaps she was terefah? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
M. But if you say [by way of objection] what is the difference with regard to the law [whether the animal is terefah]? The Torah refers to it as a sin-offering [and it must not be terefah] [cf. Num. 19:9].
N. R. Aha bar Jacob said, “We derive [the principle] from [the implications of] the case of the scapegoat.” For the Torah says, “He shall take the two goats...” (Lev. 16:7). [This implies] that the two must be identical [i.e., that neither may be terefah]. And should we not suspect [11b] that perhaps one of them was terefah? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
O. But if you say [by way of objection] what is the difference with regard to the law [whether the animal is terefah]? Lo [we have the principle that] the lot only designates that an animal goes to Azazel if it is an object that is fitting [to have been sacrificed] to God.
P. And if you say [by way of objection] that they inspect it [after throwing it off the cliff to see if the animal was terefah], lo it was taught on Tannaite authority: It did not reach half way down before it became torn limb from limb (b. Yoma 67a). [An inspection would not be effective under the circumstances.]
Q. R. Mari said, “We derive [the principle] from the [implications of the] case of `Whoever strikes father or mother'” (Exod. 21:15). For the Torah says you should put him to death. But should we not suspect that perhaps it was not his father [that he killed, i.e., that his actual father was someone else]? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority? And the majority of [a woman's] acts of intercourse are with her husband.
R. Why draw this conclusion? Perhaps the circumstance was that his father and mother were confined in a prison [where the mother could have intercourse with her husband only and there is no question of the majority of instances]. Even so [we could invoke the principle that] there is no certain guardian against promiscuity. [Even in prison she might have had relations with someone else. Hence our case does show that we follow the majority.][Cashdan: MS M omits the last phrase and accordingly Mari's argument is rejected.]
S. R. Kahana says, “We derive [the principle] from [the implications of] the case of one who kills a person.” For the Torah says you should kill him. But should we not suspect that perhaps he [the victim] was a terefah [i.e., a person with a terminal condition. One who kills such a person is not punished with the death penalty.] Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
T. But if you say [by way of objection] that we may examine him [to see if in fact he had such a condition], lo, this is a desecration [of the body through the autopsy and is forbidden].
U. But if you say [by way of further objection] that on account of the risk to this one's life [i.e., the killer will be subject to the death penalty] we should [be permitted to] desecrate [the body of the victim], should we not suspect that perhaps at the place the sword [that killed him entered the body] there was a perforation [indicative of a terminal condition and because of the wound it would be impossible to detect it]?
V. Rabina said, “We derive [the principle] from the [implications of the case of] conspiring witnesses.” For the Torah says, “Then you shall do to the false witness just as the false witness had meant to do to the other” (Deut. 19:19).
W. But should we not suspect that perhaps [if they had conspired to have someone put to death] that person that they had testified [falsely] about was a terefah [i.e., had a terminal condition, as above]? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
X. But if you say [by way of objection] that we may examine him [to see if in fact he had such a condition], lo, it was taught on Tannaite authority, Be-Rabbi says, “If they had not yet executed him [i.e., the person against whom the witnesses had conspired], they [the witnesses] are executed. If they already executed him, they [the witnesses] are not executed.”
Y. R. Ashi said, “We derive [the principle] from the [implications of the definition of the proper act of] slaughtering itself.” For the Torah says you may slaughter and eat.
Z. But should we not suspect that perhaps at a place where there was a puncture he slaughtered? Is it not [then proven that we make no such assumption because] we say that we go according to the majority?
AA. Said R. Ashi, “I reported this teaching to R. Kahana. And R. Kahana reported it to R. Shimi. And he said to him, `Perhaps where it is possible [to examine the animal], it is possible [that we do require that they examine it]. And where it is not possible, it is not possible.'”
BB. For if you do not say this, then according to R. Meir who supposes that we should take into account the minority of cases [did he suppose the same in this case]? [If so then] did he not [ever] eat meat?
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