Talmud Bavli Hullin 15a-b - translation by Tzvee

V.            For it was taught on Tannaite authority, R. Judah says, [15a] “All lamps made of metal may be carried about except for a lamp that was lit on the Sabbath itself [in violation of the prohibition].” But perhaps that case is different because he shifted it [to become a restricted object] with his actions. [Cashdan: in our Mishnah it becomes a restricted object by itself with the commencement of the Sabbath. That case should be less strict, “And if by some means it comes about that the animal is fit for eating it should be permitted.”]

W.           Said R. Ashi, “[The view of R. Judah regarding the animal slaughtered on the Sabbath at A is in accord with the view of] R. Judah regarding cooking [on the Sabbath].”

X.            For it was taught on Tannaite authority, “One who cooks on the Sabbath — if inadvertently, one may eat [the food he cooked]; if deliberately, one may not eat the food [one cooked],” the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says, “If inadvertently, one may eat it at the conclusion of the Sabbath; if deliberately, one may never eat it.” R. Yohanan Hasandlar says, “If inadvertently, one may eat it at the conclusion of the Sabbath — others [may eat it] but not him [i.e., the one who cooked it]; if deliberately, one may never eat it — neither him nor others.” [In our Mishnah's case of inadvertent slaughter the rule is in accord with Judah that it may be eaten after the Sabbath.]

Y.            [An objection is raised:] But why not support [an interpretation of the Mishnah that he slaughtered on the Sabbath] deliberately and in accord with the view of R. Meir? No you cannot have concluded that. For it has been taught that this [ruling in our Mishnah] is comparable to the [ruling for the] Day of Atonement. What is the rule with regard to the Day of Atonement? It is the same whether [one slaughtered] inadvertently or deliberately, one does not eat it. Even here [in the Mishnah's case] it is the same whether [one slaughtered] inadvertently or deliberately, one does not eat it.

Z.            But how can you uphold the view that [the Mishnah refers to a case of one who slaughtered] inadvertently and in accord with the view of R. Judah? But lo, even though he [thereby] becomes liable for his life, is what is taught [in the Mishnah, implying that it is a case of deliberate action].

AA.        Here is how you should state matters: Even though he would be liable for his life if he had done it deliberately, here because he does it inadvertently, his act of slaughter is proper.

BB.          But why not support [an interpretation of the Mishnah that one slaughtered on the Sabbath] and in accord with the view of R. Yohanan Hasandlar who said it makes no difference whether one slaughtered inadvertently or deliberately, [in either case] one does not eat it?

CC.         R. Yohanan Hasandlar differentiates [who may eat it] after the conclusion of the Sabbath between the one [who slaughtered it] and others. Our Tanna teaches, his act of slaughter is valid, without differentiating between the one [who slaughters] or others.

II.1

A.            A Tanna taught before Rab, He who cooks on the Sabbath — [if one did so] inadvertently, he may eat [the food that was prepared]; [if one did so] deliberately, he may not eat [the food] [M. Ter. 2:3 D-E]. And Rab silenced him.

B.            On what basis did Rab silence him? If you say it was because he reasoned in accord with the view of R. Judah and the Tanna taught in accord with the view of R. Meir, [this makes no sense]. Because [even if] he reasoned in accord with the view of R. Judah, would he then silence one who taught in accord with the view of R. Meir?

C.            And furthermore: did he indeed reason in accord with the view of R. Judah? But lo, said R. Hanan bar Ammi, “When Rab taught his disciples he taught in accord with the view of R. Meir. And when Rab expounded on the Sabbath in public he taught in accord with the view of R. Judah on account of the ignorant (Cashdan: the stricter view as a precaution).”

D.            And if you say that the Tanna [in A] taught before him in public, would all those assembled pay heed to the Tanna? [No.] They would pay heed to the amora [repeating the view of Rab]!

E.            Said R. Nahman bar Yitzhak, “The Tanna taught before Rab concerning he who slaughters: He who slaughters on the Sabbath — [if one did so] inadvertently, one may eat [the meat]; [if one did so] deliberately, one may not eat [the meat].”

F.             He said to him, “What is your opinion? It is in accord with R. Meir. On this point — R. Meir permitted only with regard to one who cooks [on the Sabbath] because [even when raw, the food] is fit to be chewed. But in the case of he who slaughters [the animal inadvertently on the Sabbath, before it is slaughtered] is not fit to be chewed. [Accordingly, Meir] does not [permit its use].”

G.            But lo, our Mishnah deals with he who slaughters [on the Sabbath]. And [in I.1 A above] said R. Huna, “R. Hiyya bar Rab [above: Abba] interpreted [the rule] in the name of Rab, `[The meat] is prohibited to be eaten for that [Sabbath] day.'” And his associates proposed to say that [this view corresponds with] that of R. Judah. But [this implies that] lo, according to the view of R. Meir it is permitted!

H.           In what circumstance would R. Meir permit? [15b] In a circumstance where there was someone ill present while it was yet day [on Friday. Hence the animal was suitable for use on the Sabbath.] If so [i.e., that these were the circumstances] on what basis would they prohibit [the use of the animal] according to the view of R. Judah? [For someone who was ill he surely would permit its use.] [It could be explained as follows:] in a circumstance where there was someone ill and he recovered [on the Sabbath day. Thus the animal was not restricted in its use at the commencement of the Sabbath. The only concern is the use of an animal slaughtered inadvertently on the Sabbath day. According to Judah we prohibit. According to Meir we do not.]

I.              And this accords with the following: said R. Aha bar Ada, said Rab, and some say, said R. Yitzhak bar Ada, said Rab, “He who slaughters for one who is ill on the Sabbath, [the meat] is prohibited to a healthy person. He who cooks for one who is ill on the Sabbath, [the food] is permitted to a healthy person.”

J.              What is the basis for this view? This [food prior to being cooked] is fit to be chewed [even when raw]. This [meat prior to the slaughter of the animal] is not fit to be chewed.

K.            Said R. Pappa, “There are some instances where one slaughters [an animal on the Sabbath and it is] permitted [to be eaten even by a healthy person]. For instance, where there was someone ill present while it was yet day [on Friday. Hence the animal was suitable for use on the Sabbath.] [And there are some instances where] one cooks [for someone who is ill on the Sabbath and it is] prohibited [to a healthy person]. For instance, where he cut a gourd [for the person who was ill].”

III.1

A.            Said R. Dimi from Nehardea, “This is the law: He who slaughters for one who is ill on the Sabbath, it is permitted to be eaten uncooked by a healthy person.”

B.            What is the basis for this view? Since it is impossible to obtain an olive's bulk of meat without slaughtering [this one animal], when he slaughters it, he intends it to be for the sake of the person who is ill. [But] he who cooks for one who is ill on the Sabbath — it is prohibited to be eaten by a healthy person [because] we decree against it lest he increase [the amount he cooks] for the healthy person.

   I.1 clarifies the status of the meat slaughtered on the Sabbath that Mishnah declares “valid.” The Talmud tries to align it with a view of Judah. This leads us first into a sustained analysis of the principle of clarification (B-J). Then it takes us to the idea of preparation of objects for use on the Sabbath and items restricted in their use on the Sabbath. W-CC correlate Mishnah's rules to those that regulate the use of food cooked on the Sabbath. II continues the exploration of parallels between slaughter-laws and rules for cooking on the Sabbath. III concludes with a rule that contrasts the two subjects.

                                                                 1:2 A-G

A.            He who slaughters with [the smooth edge of] a hand sickle, with a flint, or with a reed —

B.            his act of slaughtering is valid.

                C.            All slaughter.

                D.           And at any time do they slaughter.

                E.            And with anything do they slaughter,

F.             except for (1) a scythe, and (2) a saw, and (3) teeth, and (4) a fingernail,

G.           because they [do not cut but tear the windpipe and] choke [the animal].

I.1

A.            He who slaughters [implies that if they already performed the act of slaughter] after the fact, yes [their actions are deemed proper]. [But] to begin with, no [their actions are not deemed proper].

B.            This makes sense with regard to a [serrated] hand sickle because he perhaps will cut with it in the opposite direction [and tear the organs]. But regarding a [smooth] flint or a reed, [does it make sense to say that] to begin with he may not [slaughter with them]?

C.            We may raise an objection [from the following]: With anything do they slaughter [M. ul. 1:2 E] — even with a flint, even with glass, even with the point of a reed [T. ul 1:5 A-B]. There is no contradiction. This one [T.] is a case where they are detached [from the ground and even to begin with you may use it] and this one [M.] is a case where they are attached [to the ground so only after the fact is it permitted].

D.            For said R. Kahana, “He who slaughter with something that is attached to the ground — Rabbi declares it unfit and R. Hiyya declares it fit.” On this point R. Hiyya declared it fit only after the fact. But [if he slaughtered with such an object] to begin with, he did not [declare it fit in that case].

E.            With which view does the Mishnah concur? According to the view of R. Hiyya and [in the case they already slaughtered] after the fact.

F.             And lo, that which was taught on Tannaite authority, With anything do they slaughter — whether it is something joined to the ground or detached from the ground, whether one passed the knife over the throat or passed the throat over the knife, and one thereby slaughtered [the beast his act of slaughter is valid] [T. ul. 1:5 C-E], in accord with whose view [is this teaching]? [This concurs] neither with the view of Rabbi nor that of R. Hiyya.

G.            If it concurred with the view of R. Hiyya [we would say that] after the fact, yes [the act of slaughter would be valid]. But to begin with, no [we would not permit this]. And if it concurred with the view of Rabbi [then we would say] even after the fact [we would not permit this procedure].

H.           It is consistent [to hold the opinion that it concurs with the view of] R. Hiyya and even [valid to slaughter in this way] to begin with. And the fact that they dispute in the circumstance where he [slaughtered and it was already] after the fact, indicates to you the power of the view of Rabbi [to invalidate].

I.              And concerning the Mishnah that says, He who slaughters [and implies that if they already performed the act of slaughter] after the fact, yes [their actions are deemed proper]. [But] to begin with, no [their actions are not deemed proper]. In accord with whose view [is this teaching]? [This concurs] neither with the view of Rabbi nor that of R. Hiyya.

J.              If it concurred with the view of R. Hiyya, then even to begin with it would be valid. And if it concurred with the view of Rabbi then even after the fact also it would not [be valid]. It is consistent to say that it concurs with the view of R. Hiyya. And even to begin with [it is valid]. And the Mishnah that teaches, He who slaughters, concurs with the view of Rabbi.

K.            There is then a contradiction between one view of Rabbi and the other [i.e., in M. he rules it is valid after the fact and in the dispute with Hiyya he rules it is not valid (Cashdan)]. There is no contradiction. In one case [where he declares it invalid, the circumstance is that the object] was attached from the outset. And in the other case [where he says it is valid, after the fact, the circumstance was that the object] was at first detached and then reattached [to the ground].

L.            And on what basis do we say that it makes a difference to us whether it was attached from the outset or it was first detached and then reattached? For it was taught on Tannaite authority, “He who slaughters with a spinning blade, his act of slaughter is valid; [he who slaughters with an object] attached to the ground, his act of slaughter is valid. He who lodged a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his act of slaughter is valid. If a sharp stone was jutting out from a wall, or if a reed was growing up from it, and he slaughtered with it, his act of slaughter is invalid.”