Talmud Bavli Hullin 32a-b - translation by Tzvee

B.            [32a] If another animal was slaughtered [unintentionally] along with it — according to R. Nathan the cow is invalid [by definition] but the other animal is valid [even lacking intention for the act]. According to the rabbis the cow is valid [because he had no distracting intention] and the other animal is invalid [because he had no intention to slaughter it]. But this is obvious.

C.            We need to state this [to clarify the case of the red cow] if another animal was slaughtered along with it according to the view of R. Nathan. It could have made sense to say that the Torah says, “[And you shall give her to Eleazar the priest, and she shall be taken outside the camp] and slaughtered before him” (Num. 19:3). She shall be slaughtered and not she and a companion animal. And what is the circumstance? For instance if he slaughtered two red cows at the same time. But if he slaughtered it together with an unconsecrated animal, I might think to conclude, no, [it does not invalidate]. It comes to make this point.

D.            If he cut a gourd along with it [i.e., the red cow], all hold the view that this is invalid. It a gourd was cut [unintentionally] along with it, all hold the view that it is valid.

I.1 identifies the operative principle of the Mishnah-passage: intention for the act of slaughter. It deals with a contrived redundancy in the Mishnah-text to clarify a point further. II leaves Mishnah in its wake, opting to explore the principle of intention further. The long and well-crafted unit makes contact with our Mishnah-text only at II.3 A. III.1 sets up another case to further clarify Mishnah's principle.

                                                                2:3 Q-W

                Q.           [If] the knife fell and one raised it up,

                R.            [or] if his clothing fell and he picked them up,

                S.            [or if] he was whetting the knife, [or if] he became weary,

                T.            [and he therefore interrupted the act of slaughter], and his fellow came and [completed the act of] slaughter —

                U.            if the delay was sufficient for an act of slaughter [cutting of two organs],

                V.            it is invalid.

                W.           R. Simeon says, “[That is the rule] if the delay was sufficient for examining [the knife].”

I.1

A.            What does it mean, “sufficient for an act of slaughter”? Said Rab, “Sufficient time to slaughter another animal.”

B.            R. Kahana and R. Assi said to Rab, “Do you mean sufficient time to slaughter another beast, where a beast is concerned and sufficient time to slaughter another bird, where a bird is concerned? Or do you mean sufficient time to slaughter another beast, even where a bird is concerned [i.e., a longer time and a more lenient ruling]?”

C.            He said to them, “I was not friendly enough with my uncle [R. Hiyya] to ask him about this.”

D.            It was stated: said Rab, “Sufficient time to slaughter another beast, where a beast is concerned and sufficient time to slaughter another bird, where a bird is concerned?” And Samuel said, “Sufficient time to slaughter another beast, even where a bird is concerned [i.e., a longer time and a more lenient ruling].”

E.            And so too when Rabin came [he said] R. Yohanan said, “Sufficient time to slaughter another beast, even where a bird is concerned.”

F.             R. Haninah said, “Sufficient time to bring another animal and slaughter it.” Does “to bring” mean from anywhere in the world? If so, you have established an arbitrary rule.

G.            Said R. Pappa, “[A pause for as long as it would take to slaughter an animal that] stands ready to be cast down [to be slaughtered] is the case in point between them. [According to Haninah if he paused that long it would be valid; according to Yohanan if he paused that long it would be invalid.]”

H.           They said in the West in the name of R. Yosé b. R. Haninah, “[The pause we refer to is an interval of] sufficient time to lift it up and cause it to lie down and slaughter it. For a small animal [that interval it takes to do all that to] a small animal. And for a large animal [that interval] for a large animal.”

I.              Said Raba, “If he slaughters [one animal] with a dull knife even all day long it is valid [i.e., as long as he does not pause his cutting motions].”

J.              Raba posed the question, “Pauses [during the act of slaughter] — what is the rule about combining them together?” And should we not answer this based on his own rule [just stated above at I]? [Not necessarily.] There it could have been the case that he did not pause [even though he was slaughtering all day long].

K.            R. Huna the son of R. Nathan posed the question: if he paused while cutting the minor portion of the organs [having already cut the major portion] what it the rule? This question stands unresolved.

II.1

A.            R. Simeon says, “[That is the rule] if the delay was sufficient for examining [the knife] [M. 2:3 W].” What does sufficient for examining mean? Said R. Yohanan, “Sufficient time for examination by a sage.”

B.            If so you have established an arbitrary interval. [In different circumstances it may take more or less time to find a sage.] Rather it means sufficient time for examination by a butcher [who is there slaughtering] who is a sage.

I-II directly clarify Mishnah's rules.

                                                                     2:4    

                A.            [If] one slaughtered [cut through] the gullet and tore open the windpipe,

                B.            or slaughtered [cut through] the windpipe and [afterward] tore open the gullet,

                C.            or slaughtered [cut through] one of them and waited until [the animal] died,

                D.           or [after properly cutting one organ], thrust the knife into the second [of the organs] and tore it [from below to above],

                E.            R. Yeshebab says, “It is carrion.”

                F.             And R. Aqiba says, “It is terefah.”

                G.           A general principle did R. Yeshebab state in the name of R. Joshua, “Whatever is invalidated while it is being slaughtered is deemed carrion. Whatever is subject to an act of slaughter which is proper, but which some other matter caused to be invalidated, is terefah.”

                H.           And R. Aqiba concurred with him.

I.1

A.            [If] one slaughtered... And R. Aqiba concurred with him. They raised the contradiction: These are the terefah [carcasses] among cattle: [32b] (1) one in which the gullet is pierced, (2) and one in which the windpipe is torn [M. 3:1 A-B]. [Our Mishnah rules that these are carrion. Why does that Mishnah rule they are terefah?]

B.            Said Raba, “This is not a valid contradiction. Here [the case is] that he slaughtered [the gullet] and then he tore [the windpipe and it is carrion]. There he tore [the windpipe] and then he slaughtered [the gullet and it is terefah].”

C.            Where he slaughtered [the gullet] and then he tore [the windpipe], it becomes invalid through the act of slaughter. Where he tore [the windpipe] and then slaughtered [the gullet], it is as if something else [beside the act of slaughter] caused it to become invalid.

II.1

A.            R. Aha bar Huna raised an objection to Raba, [If] one slaughtered [cut through] the gullet and tore open the windpipe, or slaughtered [cut through] the windpipe and [afterward] tore open the gullet... it is deemed carrion. Why not say, “[Or he tore open the gullet] having already slaughtered the windpipe?”

B.            He said to him, “There are two answers. One, it would be the same as the first. And furthermore, lo, it was taught on Tannaite authority, and afterward.”

C.            But said Raba, “These are the forbidden [cases]” is what should have been taught. Some of them are carrion and some of them are terefah.

D.            And we should take account also of the case of Hezekiah. For said Hezekiah, “If he cleaved the body in two [lengthwise, Rashi] — it is carrion [b. ul. 21a].”

E.            And should we not take account also of the case of R. Eleazar. For said R. Eleazar, “If the thigh [bone] was removed and the cavity is discernible — it is carrion [and renders objects unclean even while it is still alive] [ibid.].” [Rashi interprets that only flesh was removed, because if the bone was removed it would be deemed terefah.]

F.             What cases of carrion are taught? Those that do not render unclean while still bearing signs of life. But those cases that do render unclean while bearing signs of life [such as the two just mentioned] are not taught.

III.1

A.            [Refer back to I.1] R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Here [in our M.] we deal with one who slaughtered in the same place where there was a gash. Here [in chapter 3] we deal with one who slaughtered not in the place where there was a gash. Where he slaughtered in the same place where there was a gash, it is rendered invalid through the act of slaughter [and is carrion]. Where he slaughtered not in the same place where there was a gash, it is as if something else [beside the act of slaughter] caused it to become invalid.

B.            And did R. Simeon b. Laqish say this? But lo, said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “If he slaughtered the windpipe and afterward the lung was punctured, it is valid.” It seems [logical to conclude that after the windpipe is cut] it is as if [the lung] was placed in a basket. [A damage to the lung is of no consequence at that point.]

C.            Here too [in the case of one who slaughters an animal that had a gash in the windpipe] it should be as if [the lung] was placed in a basket. [The act of slaughter should be of no consequence and the animal should be carrion.]

D.            But said R. Hiyya bar Abba, said R. Yohanan, “This is not a valid contradiction [between our Mishnah and chapter 3]. There [the Mishnah in chapter 3 represents the view of Aqiba] prior to his retraction. Here [the Mishnah represents the view of Aqiba] after his retraction. And the [original rule in the] Mishnah was not removed.”

III.2

A.            Reverting to the body of the prior text: said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “If he slaughtered the windpipe and afterward the lung was punctured, it is valid.” Said Raba, “R. Simeon b. Laqish said this only with regard to the lung because the function of the lung is dependent upon the windpipe. But with regard to the intestines, he did not [rule along the same lines. Hence if the gullet was slaughtered and then the intestines were punctured, this would be considered a damage of significance to the animal. However, Rashi interprets that the case is where the intestines were punctured after the windpipe was cut. This seems self-evident.]”

B.            R. Zira raised an objection: after [slaughtering one organ and] the signs appeared of a defect that would render the animal a terefah, and you permitted this, what difference does it make if the defect is in the lung or in the intestines? And R. Zira retracted his objection.

C.            For R. Zira posed this question: if the intestines were punctured [during the act of slaughter] between [the cutting of] one organ and the other, what is the rule? Do you say that the [slaughter of the] first organ combines with the second so as to remove the animal from the category of carrion? Or do you say that it does not?