Talmud Bavli Hullin 38a-b - translation by Tzvee

B.            [38a] “If it lows, or makes an excretion, or twitches its ear, lo this is considered to be jerking.” [Any of these is enough of an indication that the animal is still alive. He did not rule in accord with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel that it is invalid unless it jerks a foreleg or hind leg, M. 2:6 B.]

C.            He said to them, “Did Abba [i.e., Rab] require it to twitch its ear?” [This is a big expectation (Rashi).]

D.            For I [Samuel] say, “Any [movement at all] that is not one of the motions caused by the death itself [is a sufficient sign of life to render valid the act of slaughter of an animal at the point of death].”

E.            What are these motions caused by the death itself? Said R. Anan, “Mar Samuel explained it to me. If its foreleg was bent back and it stretched it forth, this is one of the motions caused by the death itself. If it was stretched out and it bent it back, this is not one of the motions caused by the death itself.”

F.             What new point does this make? It was taught in the Mishnah: A small beast which put forth its foreleg and did not withdraw it is invalid, for [this is] only [a token of] its expiring [J-K]. Lo [this clearly implies that] if it withdrew it, it is valid.

G.            If you derived the rule from the Mishnah, I would have reasoned [it is valid] only in the specific case where it bent it back and stretched it out and bent it back again. But where it was stretched out and it bent it back, it is not [valid]. It comes to make the novel point.

II.3

A.            They raised an objection: R. Yosé says, “R. Meir used to say, `If the animal lows during the act of slaughter, this is not a valid form of jerking.'” (T.'s version: R. Yosé says, R. Meir did rule: “If it expired  coincidentally within the time of slaughter, it is valid” [T. 2:11 B].)

B.            R. Eleazar b. R. Yosé says in his [Yosé's] name, Even if it excreted or if it twitched its tail, this is not a valid form of jerking.” (T.: R. Eleazar b. R. Yosé says in his [Yosé's] name, “That which rolls its eyes, and that which produces excrement at the moment of slaughter is valid” [T. 2:12 A].)

C.            There is a contradiction between one ruling regarding lowing and another. There is a contraction between one ruling regarding excreting and another. [Cf. II.2 B, Rab's view.]

D.            There is no contradiction between one ruling regarding lowing and another. This one [Rab] is where the animal's voice is strong [so it is a valid sign]. This one [above] is where the animal's voice is soft. There also is no contradiction between one ruling regarding excreting and another. This one [above] is where the animal excretes weakly. This one [Rab] is where the animal excretes forcefully [so it is a valid sign].

II.4

A.            Said R. Hisda, “These jerking [motions] about which they spoke, they refer to [motions in the animal] at the end of the act of slaughter.”

B.            What does “at the end of the act of slaughter” mean? Even in the middle of the act of slaughter. But it excludes [motions the animal makes] at the beginning of the act of slaughter.

C.            For did not R. Hisda say, “Based on what do I draw this conclusion? As it was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah, A small beast which put forth its foreleg and did not withdraw it is invalid [J]. When is this? If you say it is at the end of the act of slaughter, just how long do you expect it to go on living? Rather no, it must be [even] in the middle of the act of slaughter.”

D.            Said to him Raba, “It consistently must be referring to the end of the act of slaughter. For I say, `If any animal does not do this at the end of the act of slaughter, then it is evident to us that its soul was taken from it before this time.”

II.5

A.            R. Nahman bar Yitzhak said, “These jerking [motions] about which we spoke, they refer to jerking [motions] in the animal at the beginning of the act of slaughter.”

B.            Said R. Nahman bar Yitzhak, “Based on what do I draw this conclusion. As it was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah, Said R. Simeon, `Also: He who slaughters by night and at dawn arises and finds the walls full of blood — it is valid, for [the blood] has spurted.' And [his opinion is consistent with] the reasoning of R. Eliezer. And said Samuel, `We taught this refers to the walls of the area [of the neck proper] for the act of slaughter.'

C.            “It is consistent if you say that [the rule refers to] the beginning of the act of slaughter, then this makes perfect sense [i.e., we have evidence that the blood spurted]. But if you say [the rule refers to] the end of the act of slaughter, should we not suspect that perhaps at the beginning of the act of slaughter the blood spurted [and the later evidence we have from discovering the blood at dawn is of no consequence at all].”

D.            But perhaps spurting is a different [sign of life from the other motions and signs that have been specified]. It is more potent. [Hence even if it occurs at the beginning of the act of slaughter it is valid.]

E.            But is it more potent [than the other signs]? Lo it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, R. Eliezer says, “It is sufficient [for it to be valid] if [the blood] spurts forth [C].” [The language of the statement (it is sufficient) suggests that it is not self-evidently more potent.] [It means that it is] a weaker sign than those required by Rabban Gamaliel [both foreleg and hind leg (Rashi)] and a stronger sign than those required by the rabbis [either foreleg or hind leg or tail].

F.             Said Rabina, said to me Sama bar Hilkai, “The father of Bar Abubram, some say it was the brother of Bar Abubram, raised this contradiction, `And according to the view of the rabbis is this [spurting] a more potent [sign of life]? Lo it was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah, And sages say, `[It is invalid] unless it jerks a foreleg or a hind leg [G].'” [It says “unless” suggesting that they respond to a prior view.]

G.            To which view does the rule of the rabbis respond? If you say they respond to the view of Rabban Gamaliel [M. 2:6 B], it would need to be phrased, “As long as [kywn] it jerks.” Rather it obviously responds to the view of R. Eliezer [M. 2:6 C]. But if it is more potent, then why does it use the language “unless”? [We may derive the conclusion that spurting is no more potent a sign and even so it is effective if it occurs at the beginning of the act of slaughter (Rashi).]

II.6

A.            Raba said, “These jerking [motions] about which we spoke, they refer to jerking [motions] in the animal at the end of the act of slaughter.”

B.            Said Raba, “Based on what do I draw this conclusion? As it was taught on Tannaite authority, [38b] “When a bull or sheep [or goat is born, it shall remain seven days with its mother; and from the eighth day on it shall be acceptable as an offering by fire to the Lord]” (Lev. 22:27). [The words] “or sheep” exclude a cross breed [of a lamb and a goat]. [The words] “or goat” exclude [a goat that] looks like [a lamb]. [The words] “is born” exclude an animal born through a caesarian section. [The words] “seven days” exclude an animal that did not yet live the minimum time. [The words] “its mother” exclude an orphan.

C.            What is the circumstance regarding this case of orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then she died [this makes no sense]. Do we expect her to live on forever? Rather it must be that she died and then gave birth to the offspring. But this is already excluded by the words “is born.”

D.            Rather it is obvious that [we are dealing with a case where at the time it gives birth] this one [the mother] goes on to die and this one [the offspring] goes on to live. This is consistent if you say that we must have [the mother] alive at the end of the birth. For this reason we need a verse to exclude [an orphan]. But if you say that we do not need to have [the mother] alive at the end of the birth, what do we need [the words “its mother” to exclude an orphan]? It is excluded [by the words] “is born.”

E.            Said Raba, “The law follows in accord with this Tannaite teaching, A small beast which put forth its foreleg and did not withdraw it is invalid [M. 2:6 J]. And in the case of the hind leg: [if] it put it forth but did not withdraw it, [or] withdrew it but did not put it forth, it is valid. Under what circumstances? In the case of a small beast [vs. M. ul. 2:6 I]. But in the case of a large beast, whether in the case of the foreleg or the hind leg, [if] it put it forth and did not bring it back, or brought it back but did not put it forth, it is valid. Under what circumstances? In the case of a beast. But in the case of fowl, even if it jerked only the tip of the wing or the tip of the tail, it is valid [T. 2:12 B-I].

F.             What novel point does this make? It is all taught in the Mishnah! A small beast which put forth its foreleg and did not withdraw it is invalid, for [this is] only [a token of] its expiring [M. 2:6 J-K]. [This implies] a foreleg, yes, a hind leg, no; a small animal, yes, a large animal, no. It is needed to teach us the law regarding fowl because that is not taught in the Mishnah.

I.1 discusses Mishnah's first operative consideration and examines at length its logical and scriptural basis. II.1 analyzes a phrase in Mishnah No. 2 clarifies Amoraic views on the application of the rule of Mishnah No. 3 spells out more of Mishnah's terms and at last invokes the pertinent Tosefta-passage.

                                                                     2:7

                A.            He who slaughters [a gentile's beast] on behalf of a gentile —

                B.            his act of slaughter is valid.

                C.            And R. Eliezer declares [it] invalid.

                D.           Said R. Eliezer, “Even if he slaughtered it so that the gentile might eat from its midriff [and an Israelite consumes the rest], it is invalid.

                E.            “For the unstated intention of a gentile is [deemed to be] for the purpose of idolatry.”

                F.             Said R. Yosé, “It [the proposition of A-B] is an argument from the less to the greater:

                G.           “Now if in a situation in which intention invalidates, namely, in the case of Holy Things, all matters follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the rites [required in the offering],

                H.           “in a situation in which [improper] intention does not invalidate, namely, in the case of unconsecrated things, is it not logical that all matters should follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the act of slaughter?”

I.1

A.            These Tannaite authorities [in A-C] hold in accord with R. Eliezer the son of R. Yosé. For it was taught on Tannaite authority, Said R. Eliezer b. R. Yosé, “I heard [the rule] that the owner can invalidate the offering [by harboring wrongful intent].” How is it? The first Tanna reasons if I did hear that he thought [to offer it to idolatry], then yes, [it is invalid]. But if not, then no [it is not invalid]. I do not say that the ordinary intention of an idolater is to [slaughter for the sake of] idolatry.

B.            And R. Eliezer reasons that even though I did not hear that he thought [to offer it to idolatry,] I do say that the ordinary intention of an idolater is to [slaughter for the sake of] idolatry.

C.            And R. Yosé comes along to tell us that even though he did hear that he thought [to offer it to idolatry, it makes no difference because] we do not say that this one thinks [to invalidate] and this other one performs the service [that is thereby invalidated].

D.            Another version: The dispute is in a case where they did hear that he thought [to invalidate]. The first Tanna reasoned that when do we say [the principle applies] that this one thinks [to invalidate] and this one performs the service [that is thereby invalidated]? Only in the case of [service] inside the Temple. But outside the Temple we do not say [the principle applies]. We do not derive [any principle regarding the validity of acts] outside the Temple from [the rules that regulate acts] inside the Temple.