Talmud Bavli Hullin 68a-b - translation by Tzvee

Bavli Hullin Chapter Four Folios 68A-78A

                                                                     4:1

                A.            A beast that was in hard labor, and its offspring put its hoof out and withdrew it —

                B.            [when the dam is properly slaughtered], it [the offspring] is permitted to be eaten. [Not being deemed born, it is not a living beast that itself must be slaughtered before being eaten.]

                C.            [If] it put forth its head, even though it withdrew it, lo, this is [deemed] as fully born.

                D.           [If] one cuts off part of the offspring that is in its womb —

                E.            it [what is cut off] is permitted to be eaten.

                F.             [If he cut off] part of the spleen or kidneys [of the beast itself], it is prohibited to be eaten.

                G.           This is the general principle:

                (1) Something that is part of its [the dam's] body is prohibited.

                (2) Something that is not part of its body is permitted.

I.1

A.            Said R. Judah, said Rab, “And the limb itself [that the animal put out and withdrew] is prohibited.” What is the basis for this? Because Scripture said, “You shall not eat any meat that is mangled by beasts in the field” (Exod. 22:31). As soon as the meat [of the limb] went outside of the confines [of the womb] it became prohibited.

B.            It was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah: A beast that was in hard labor, and its offspring put its hoof out and withdrew it — [when the dam is properly slaughtered], it [the offspring] is permitted to be eaten [M. 4:1 A-B]. Is it not the case that this [rule granting permission] refers to the limb? No it may refer to the [entire] offspring. If it pertains to the offspring, why specify that it withdrew it? Even if it did not withdraw it, it also [should be permitted to eat the animal]. The same conclusion pertains even if it did not withdraw it. But because it was necessary to teach in the latter text of the Mishnah, [If] it put forth its head, even though it withdrew it, lo, this is [deemed] as fully born [M. 4:1 C], it taught also in the former text of the Mishnah that it withdrew it.

C.            And what novel point does the latter text of the Mishnah make? As soon as the its head goes forth [from the womb] that is considered the birth of the animal. [However, consider that] it was taught on Tannaite authority, Who is a firstborn in respect to inheritance and not a firstborn in respect to the priest? He who comes after an untimely birth whose head emerged alive, or [after] a nine-month-old birth the head of which emerged [but which was] dead [M. Bekh. 8:1 E-F]. The basis for this rule is that his head emerged [and the offspring was] dead. Lo, if his head emerged [and the offspring was] alive, those that come after it [in birth] are not deemed firstborn in respect to inheritance either.

D.            And if you [wish you may say that it is consistent to] maintain that we were instructed [of the rule there] in respect to human [birth] and that we derive the novel point [here] in respect to the [birth of] beasts, because we cannot deduce [the rule] for humans from [the rule] for beasts, because beasts have no entrance-way [to the womb]. And we cannot deduce [the rule] for beasts from [the rule] for humans, because [the emergence of] a human's face is decisive [in determining the emergence of the head]. Lo, it also was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah: An afterbirth, part of which emerged, is prohibited to be eaten. It is a token of [the birth of] an offspring in a woman, and the token of [the birth of] an offspring in a beast [M. 4:7 E-F]. [The rules for humans and beasts are parallel.]

E.            If you wish to say that it is consistent to maintain that [the stipulation] it withdrew stated in the former text is specific to that case [and not stated on account of the rule of the latter text, then we could maintain that] it was taught in the latter text on account of [the fact that it was taught] in the former text. But if you wish to say that neither is [the stipulation of it withdrew] specific to the former text nor is [the stipulation of it withdrew] specific to the latter text, why then must I teach it at all?

F.             No [this is not the correct line of reasoning]. It is consistent to say that [the rule granting permission applies to] the offspring. And [it accords with the view] stated by R. Nahman bar Yitzhak, “It was only necessary [to state the rule so as to render permitted for eating] the place of the incision [in the limb of the animal].” Here also [we may say], “It was only necessary [to state the rule so as to render permitted for eating] the place of the incision [in the limb of the animal].”

I.2

A.            Come and take note: A beast that was in hard labor, and its offspring put its hoof out and withdrew it — and afterward he slaughtered its mother, it [the offspring] is permitted to be eaten. If he slaughtered it mother and afterward it withdrew it, it is prohibited to eat it [cf. T. 4:3 B].

B.            If it put is hoof out and he cut it off, and afterward he slaughtered its mother, what was outside [the mother at the time it was slaughtered] is unclean and prohibited. What was inside [the mother at the time of slaughter] is clean and permitted. [If] he slaughtered its mother and afterward cut it off — [68b] “the meat [of the offspring] is in the status of that which has touched carrion [namely, the hoof, which, located outside the womb, is unaffected by the slaughter of the mother],” the words of R. Meir. And sages say, “[It is in the status of that which has] touched terefah that has been slaughtered. [After the act of slaughter, the animal, including the hoof, no longer has the status of carrion. However the hoof takes on the status of terefah and renders unclean the rest of the animal through contact with it.][M. 4:4 A-E].”

C.            It was taught on Tannaite authority in respect to this in the first text of the Mishnah: A beast that was in hard labor, and its offspring put its hoof out and withdrew it — [when the dam is properly slaughtered], it [the offspring] is permitted to be eaten [M. 4:1 A-B]. Is it not the case that this [rule granting permission] refers to the limb? No it may refer to the [entire] offspring. If it pertains to the offspring, then consider the latter text: If he slaughtered its mother and afterward it withdrew it, it is prohibited to eat it. And if this refers to the offspring, why is it prohibited. It should be in accord with the view stated by R. Nahman bar Yitzhak, “It was only necessary [to state the rule so as to render permitted for eating] the place of the incision [in the limb of the animal].” Here also [we may say], “It was only necessary [to state the rule so as to render permitted for eating] the place of the incision [in the limb of the animal].” [See I.1 F.]

D.            Is this the case? But lo when Abimi came from Be Huzai, he came and brought this Mishnah with him: “[Based on his inference from Deut. 14:6 where the words hoof and hooves are stated —] If it withdrew a hoof, you may eat it. If it withdrew hooves, you may eat it.” What then is the explanation? “If it withdrew a hoof, you may eat” — [means you may eat] the hoof. No. [It means,] If it withdrew the hoof, you may eat the offspring.

E.            If it refers to the offspring then why does it specify that it withdrew it? Even if it did not withdraw it, it also [should be permitted to eat the animal]. Said R. Nahman Bar Yitzhak, “It was only necessary [to state the rule so as to render permitted] the place of the incision [in the limb of the animal].”

F.             But lo, two texts are brought to bear upon this issue. What then [should we infer]? One [to teach us the rule] for the limb and one [to teach us the rule] for the place of the incision? No. One [to teach us the rule] for the place of the incision and one [to teach us the rule] for a the case of a foetus with uncloven hooves in the womb of the mother [that it is permitted].

G.            And this accords with the view of R. Simeon. For said R. Simeon, “A foetus with uncloven hooves that is the offspring of a cow is prohibited.” This concern applies where it emerged [from the womb] to the light of day. But if it is yet in the womb of the mother, it is permitted.

I.3

A.            [Said] Ulla, said R. Yohanan, “And the limb itself it permitted.” Said R. Judah to Ulla, “But lo, Rab and Samuel both said, `The limb itself is prohibited.'” He said to him, “Who will give us the dust of Rab and Samuel so that we may fill our eyes with it. [We are not worthy enough even to sit at their feet as students.]”

B.            But this is what R. Yohanan said, “All [the rules] were subsumed in the general rule, `Therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by beasts in the field' (Exod. 23:31). When Scripture specified the rule for the sin-offering that went beyond its enclosure [in the Temple] and returned [back within], that it is prohibited, [only the prohibition] for the sin-offering did Scripture specify. But for all other concerns [of cases where the object went beyond its enclosure and then returned], once it returned it is permitted.”

I.4

A.            They posed a question: “Therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by beasts in the field” (Exod. 23:31). What does this come to teach [by stating “terefah”]? Because we maintain regarding second tithes and first fruits, that even if they go beyond their prescribed enclosures [in Jerusalem] and return, they are permitted, you might wish to infer that even this [case of an offspring that put its hoof out and withdrew it] is the same. It comes to teach us [that it is not by adding], “terefah.”

B.            How do you derive this inference? Said Rabbah, “It is like a terefah [in this way]. What is the rule for a terefah-animal? Once it is deemed terefah, there is no way after that to permit it. So even the flesh [of a limb] that went beyond its enclosure [in the womb], there is no way after that to permit it.” This question raised concerning the view of Ulla is a decisive question [to refute this view].

I.5

A.            Said the master: Because we maintain regarding second tithes and first fruits, [that even if they go beyond their prescribed enclosures in Jerusalem and return, they are permitted, I.4 A] — where do we maintain this? As it is written, “You may not eat within your towns the tithe of your grain or of your wine or of your oil, or the firstlings of your herd or of your flock, or any of your votive offerings which you vow, or your freewill offerings, or the offering that your present” (Deut. 12:17). [You may deduce that,] “Within your towns” that is where you should not eat it. But if they [these offerings] go beyond their prescribed enclosures and return, they are permitted.

I.6

A.            In the West [Israel] they taught as follows: Rab said, “Limbs can be born [on their own].” And R. Yohanan said, “Limbs cannot be born [on their own].” What is the matter of the dispute between them? The dispute between them is the matter of whether to prohibit the lesser part of the limb that is inside the animal [where the major part of the limb already emerged].

B.            Regarding this [dispute] they posed a question: According to the authority who says, “Limbs cannot be born [on their own],” [what if] the offspring put out its limb and withdrew it and then again put out [another part of] its limb and withdrew it until it had done this for the major part [of the limb]. What is the law? Do we say, lo the major part [of the limb] did go out? Or perhaps since it withdrew [the limb], it has been withdrawn [in respect to its legal status]?

C.            If you wish to say, since it withdrew [the limb], it has been withdrawn [in respect to its legal status], [then consider the case where] the offspring put out its limb and he cut it off and then again it put out [another part of] its limb and he cut it off until it had done this for the major part of the animal. What is the law? Do we say, lo the major part has emerged [and the animal was born]? Or perhaps we must have a major part [emerge] at one time [to result in birth]?