[85a] Rather [the case must be] where there is a doubt whether [the person who blows the shofar] is a man of a woman. And R. Yose is consistent with his view elsewhere. For he said that a person who is certainly a woman also may sound the shofar. [Accordingly there is not question about this case of doubt while the question remains about the law in a case of doubt for a koy.]
L. For it was taught on Tannaite authority: The sons of Israel may lay their hands [on the sacrifice]. But the daughters of Israel may not lay their hands. [The verse is: “He shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him” (Lev. 1:4).] R. Yose and R. Simeon say, “Women are permitted to lay their hands [on the sacrifice].” [And for Yose the principle may be extended to instruct us that women may sound the shofar.]
M. Said Rabina, “But according to what the rabbis said [that a woman cannot sound the shofar] there is another form of refutation [in this logical argument]. What is the case regarding the sounding of the shofar? Where it is certain [that it is the festival], it overrides the Sabbath in the Temple. What can you say regarding the covering of the blood where there is no case at all [that overrides the Sabbath]?” [The cases are therefore not comparable.]
N. [Consider again the previous text at F]: Answered [R. Hiyya the son of] R. Eleazar Haqqappar Beribbi, “Now the distinctive reason that circumcision [in a matter of doubt] does not override the festival [is that when it is certainly required it does not override the nights of festivals]. Is it just on festival nights that circumcision is not practiced? Is it practiced on other nights? [No.] Rather [this is how you should state the matter]: What is the case regarding circumcision? It is not practiced at night as it its during the day. What can you say about the covering of the blood? It is practiced at night just as it is during the day.
O. [Repeating G]: Said R. Abba, “This is one of the matters to which R. Hiyya did say there is no answer, and R. Eleazar Haqqappar Beribbi supplied the answer.”
I.1 identifies the premise and logic of the rule of Mishnah in a sustained inquiry. II.1 explores a second level of issues. III.1-4 add related insight on the value of moderation. The unit concludes citing the relevant Tosefta-text and exploring its premises.
6:2
A. (1) He who slaughters [a wild beast or a bird] and it turns out to be terefah,
B. (2) he who slaughters for the purpose of idolatry,
C. (3) he who slaughters an unconsecrated [wild animal or bird] inside [the Temple] or consecrated ones outside [M. 5:1],
D. (4) a wild beast and a bird which are to be stoned —
E. R. Meir declared liable [for the covering up of the blood] [M. 5:3].
F. And sages declare free [of the liability].
G. (1) He who slaughters [a wild beast or a bird] and it is made carrion by his own deed,
H. (2) he who pierces [the windpipe],
I. (3) he who tears out [the windpipe],
J. is free [of the obligation] to cover up [the blood].
I.1
A. Said R. Hiyya bar Abba, said R. Yohanan, “Rabbi concurred with the words of R. Meir regarding the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day. And he repeated it here attributing it to the sages. And [he concurred with the words] of R. Simeon regarding the obligation to cover the blood. And he repeated it here, attributing it to the sages.”
B. On what basis did R. Meir [rule as he did] regarding the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day? Said R. Joshua b. Levi, “He derived it from the common use of the word `slaughter' [in our case and in the case of sacrifices that were] slaughtered outside [the Temple].” [The verses are: “If any man of the house of Israel kills (i.e., slaughters) an ox or a lamb or a goat in the camp, or kills (slaughters) it outside the camp” (Lev. 17:3). And whether the mother is a cow or a ewe, you shall not kill (slaughter) both her and her young in one day” (Lev. 22:28).] What is the case there? We consider an improper act of slaughter to be a valid act of slaughter. So too here an improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter.
C. And R. Simeon on what basis [did he dispute this view]? Said R. Mani bar Patish, “He derived it from the verse, [When Joseph saw Benjamin with them, he said to the steward of his house, `Bring the men into the house], and slaughter an animal and make ready, [for the men are to dine with me at noon'] (Gen. 43:16). What is the case there? It is a proper act of slaughter [that he instructed them to perform]. So too here it must be a proper slaughter [to be deemed a valid act].”
D. And why does R. Meir not derive [the same conclusion] from, “slaughter an animal”? [He does not because he holds the view that] we may deduce a conclusion from the common use of the word `slaughter' [št]. But we cannot deduce a conclusion from the use of 'slaughter' [št] based on the use of [a different root], 'slaughter an animal' [tb].
E. What difference does it make [that we have different terms here]? Lo, it was taught on Tannaite authority by the House of R. Ishmael: [The verse says], “And the priest shall come again [on the seventh day, and look; and if the disease has spread in the walls of the house] (Lev. 14:39)... Then the priest shall go [and look; and if the disease has spread in the house, it is a malignant leprosy in the house; it is unclean]” (Lev. 14:44). [The term] “come again” is common to [the term] “go” [as far as deducing conclusions regarding the rules].
F. [This objection based on the teaching of the house of R. Ishmael is not applicable to our circumstance.] Their concern applies where there is no identical term [to compare to in another verse for the purposes of making a deduction concerning the law]. But where there is an identical term, we must derive any inference from the [verse with the] identical term.
G. And why does R. Simeon not deduce a conclusion from the common use of the term in the verse concerning the slaughter of sacrifices outside the Temple [as in B above]? [He holds the view that] we deduce a conclusion from one [case of the slaughter of] an unconsecrated animal to another [such case]. But we do not deduce a conclusion from one [case of the slaughter of] an unconsecrated animal from a [case of the slaughter of] a consecrated animal.
H. But [does this not pose a difficulty then according to the view of] R. Meir? [He would answer], does not the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day apply to consecrated animals? This is the basis for what R. Hiyya said [in A], “Rabbi concurred with the words of R. Meir regarding the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day. And he repeated it here attributing it to the sages.”
I. On what basis did R. Meir [rule as he did] regarding the obligation to cover the blood? Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “He derived it from the common use of the word `pour' [in our case and in the case of sacrifices that were] slaughtered outside [the Temple].” [The verses are: “Any man also of the people of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, who takes in hunting any beast or bird that may be eaten shall pour out its blood and cover it with dust” (Lev. 17:13). “[... and does not bring it to the door of the tent of meeting, to offer it as a gift to the Lord before the tabernacle of the Lord, bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man]; he has shed (poured) blood; [and that man shall be cut off from among his people]” (Lev. 17:4).] What is the case there? We consider an improper act of slaughter to be a valid act of slaughter. So too here an improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter.
J. And [what will] R. Simeon [respond to this line of reasoning]? It is written, “That may be eaten.” [You cannot compare this to the case of a consecrated animal.]
K. And [what will] R. Meir [respond to this]? This [phrase] comes to exclude an unclean bird [from the obligation]. [But you can make other comparisons.]
L. And [what will] R. Simeon [respond to this]? What is the basis for excluding an unclean bird? It is because it is not permitted for eating. A terefah-bird also is not permitted for eating [but according to Meir it is still subject to the obligation]. This is the basis for what R. Hiyya said [in A], “Rabbi concurred with the words of R. Simeon regarding the obligation to cover the blood. And he repeated it here, attributing it to the sages.”
I.2
A. Said R. Abba [85b], “Not for every matter did R. Meir say that an improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter. R. Meir would agree that it does not render [the animal] permitted for eating. And not for every purpose did R. Simeon say that an improper act of slaughter is not a valid act of slaughter. R. Simeon would agree that it renders [the animal] clean of the uncleanness of carrion.”
B. Said the master, “[We learned], `Not for every matter did R. Meir say that an improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter. R. Meir would agree that it does not render [the animal] permitted for eating.' But this is obvious! Is an animal that is terefah permitted [to be eaten] on account of an act of slaughter?” No. It is necessary [to state the matter for clarification of the law in the case of] one who slaughtered a terefah-animal and found in it a live nine-month old foetus. You might have concluded that it makes sense to say that since R. Meir said, “An improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter,” that the slaughter of the mother will be effective [for the offspring] and it will not need its own act of slaughter. It makes the novel point [that, “It does not render the animal permitted for eating”].
C. But is this a proper line of reasoning? Lo, did not R. Meir say, “A live birth from a [properly] slaughtered animal needs [its own act of] slaughter.” [It is surely obvious that his view would be that the offspring needs its own act of slaughter in the case of a live birth from an animal that was itself subjected to an improper act of slaughter.] No. It is necessary [to state the matter]. For Rabbi reasons in accord with the view of R. Meir and he reasons in accord with the view of the rabbis.
D. He reasons in accord with the view of R. Meir who said, “An improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter.” And he reasons in accord with the view of the rabbis who said, “The act of slaughter of its mother renders it clean.” [Accordingly you might conclude] that the slaughter of the mother will be effective [for the offspring] and it will not need its own act of slaughter. It makes the novel point [that, “It does not render the animal permitted for eating”].
E. [Returning to Abba's statement at A]: “And not for every purpose did R. Simeon say that an improper act of slaughter is not a valid act of slaughter. R. Simeon would agree that it renders [the animal] clean of the uncleanness of carrion.” But this is obvious! For said R. Judah, said Rab, and some say that this was taught in a Tannaite teaching: Scripture stated, “And if from among any animal [of which you may eat dies, he who touches its carcass shall be unclean until the evening” (Lev. 11:39); “From among” implies] some of the animals render unclean and some of the animals do not render unclean. And which is it [that does not render unclean]? It is a terefah-animal that was slaughtered (b. 74a, V.1 C).
F. But it is necessary [to state the rule to exclude a case where] he slaughtered a terefah-animal and it was an unconsecrated animal [slaughtered] in the Temple court. For it was taught on Tannaite authority: He who slaughters a terefah-animal, and likewise he who slaughters [an apparently normal animal] and it is found to be a terefah, both of them unconsecrated animals [slaughtered] in the Temple court — R. Simeon permits them to derive from them benefit. And the sages prohibit. You might have concluded that it makes sense to say that since R. Simeon said they are permitted to derive from them benefit, it seems logical to conclude that this is not deemed an act of slaughter in any respect. It would make sense to maintain then that it [the slaughter] does not render it [the animal] clean from the uncleanness of carrion. It comes to make the novel point [that, “It renders the animal clean of the uncleanness of carrion”].
G. Said R. Pappa to Abayye, “Does R. Simeon reason in accord with the view that [the slaughter of] an unconsecrated animal in the Temple court [is prohibited] on the authority of the Torah?” He said to him, “Yes. For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon says, `Unconsecrated beasts that are slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are to be burned. And so: A wild animal that is slaughtered in the Temple courtyard' [M. Tem. 7:4 F-G]. This makes perfect sense if you say that [it is prohibited] on the authority of the Torah. That is why we decree [a prohibition] for a wild animal incidental to [the prohibition] for a beast. But if you say that [it is prohibited] on the authority of the rabbis [to begin with, then we have the following situation]. A beast [that is not consecrated is prohibited to be slaughtered in the Temple court] on what basis? [We decree against it] lest perhaps [this will lead to confusion and] they come to eat Holy Things outside [the Temple]. This itself would be a decree [of the rabbis]. Would we then go and establish [another] decree to extend this [original] decree?” [We would not. Hence, according to Simeon, since we do make a decree it must be that he holds the view that the original prohibition is based on the authority of the Torah.]
II.1
A. Worms infested the flax of R. Hiyya. He came before Rabbi [for advice]. He said to him, “Take a bird and slaughter it over the vat of water [that the flax is soaking in]. For they will smell the blood and leave the flax.”
B. Now how could act in accord with this advice? Lo, was it not taught on Tannaite authority: He who slaughters and needs to use the blood, he is liable to cover it. What must he do [to kill it in order to use the blood without covering it]? Either he stabs it or he rips out its organs [b. 27b].
C. When R. Dimi came [from Israel] he said [to use the blood without having to cover it], “Go and render it terefah,” is what he [Rabbi] said to him [Hiyya].” When Rabin came [from Israel] he said, “Go and stab it,” is what he said to him.
D. According to the authority [Dimi] who holds the view [that he told him], “Go and render it terefah,” why did he not tell him to, “Go and stab it?” And if you wish to maintain it is because he holds the view that, “The Torah did not prescribe the procedures of slaughtering for fowl” (b. 4a, vol. I, p. 28), [therefore] stabbing it is the same as slaughtering it [and he would be liable to cover the blood if he did this], but lo, it was taught on Tannaite authority: Rabbi says, “`As I have commanded you' (Deut. 12:21) — this teaches us that Moses was commanded concerning [the requirement to slaughter by cutting] the gullet and the windpipe [and the requirement to slaughter] the majority of one organ for a bird and the majority of two organs for a beast” [b. 28a, vol. I, p. 151]. [Accordingly, this cannot be the explanation.]
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