Talmud Bavli Hullin 40a-b - translation by Tzvee

2:8

                A.            He who slaughters (1) for the sake of mountains, (2) for the sake of valleys, (3) for the sake of seas, (4) for the sake of rivers, (5) for the sake of deserts —

                B.            his act of slaughter is invalid.

                C.            [40a] [If] two take hold of a knife and perform an act of slaughter,

                D.           one for the sake of any of the forenamed, and one for the sake of a valid purpose,

                E.            their act of slaughter is invalid.

I.1

A.            [In the cases specified in M. we say the slaughter is] invalid, yes, but not like sacrifices of corpses.

B.            And we raised this contradiction: He who slaughters (1) for the sake of mountains, (2) for the sake of valleys [M. 2:8 A]... He who slaughters for the sake of the sun, for the sake of the moon, for the sake of the stars, for the sake of the planets, for the sake of Michael, prince of the great host, and for the sake of the small worm [Shilshul] — lo, this is deemed to be flesh deriving from the sacrifices of corpses [T. Hul. 2:18].

C.            Said Abayye, “This is no contradiction. Here [in M. the case is where] he said [he was slaughtering] to the mountain. Here [in T. the case is where] he said [he was slaughtering] to the spirit of the mountain.”

D.            You may make an inference [further as follows]: that which is taught [in the other cases in T. is] analogous to the case of the [person who slaughters to] Michael, Prince of the great host [i.e., there he slaughters to the spirit, not the physical object]. You may derive this inference.

E.            Said R. Huna, “If the animal of his fellow was lying before idolatry, as soon as he slaughtered one organ he rendered it forbidden.”

F.             He reasoned in accord with the view of that which Ulla said in the name of R. Yohanan, “Even though they said that one who bows down to his fellow's animal did not render it forbidden, if he performed an act on it, he rendered it forbidden.”

I.2

A.            R. Nahman objected to R. Huna: He who slaughters a sin-offering on the Sabbath day outside the Temple for the sake of idolatry is liable to three sin-offerings.

B.            Now if you say that as soon as he slaughtered one organ he rendered it forbidden [as an animal that was slaughtered for the sake of idolatry], then he should not be liable for slaughtering outside the Temple. [40b] [When he cuts the other organ] it is as if he is cutting through dirt!

C.            Said R. Pappa, “Here we are dealing with a case of a sin-offering of a bird. [Cutting one organ suffices for the slaughter of a bird.] All the forbidden acts come at the same time.”

D.            Let us see. According to whose view did R. Huna state his teaching? According to Ulla. And Ulla stated that any act at all [of slaughter for the sake of idolatry suffices to render the bird forbidden. Hence by the time he slaughters the major part of the organ the bird is forbidden and that act of slaughter does not take effect].

E.            Rather it must be where he states that at the end of the act of slaughter the deed [of service to the idol] will take effect. [Then all the forbidden acts come at the same time.]

F.             If so why specify a sin-offering? Let us be instructed that it is any form of sacrifice. But said Mar Zutra in the name of R. Pappa, “In that case what are we dealing with? In an instance where half of the windpipe was defective [in a bird for a sin-offering] and he added to it any act [of slaughter] at all and completed it so that all the forbidden acts come at the same time.”

G.            Said R. Pappa, “If R. Huna had not stated, `[As soon as he slaughtered] one organ [he rendered it forbidden, I.1 E],' the case of a sin-offering would not have presented a problem. [We could have said that for Ulla, above at D], what does an `act' mean? It means a major act [of slaughter. But as it now stands we must infer that Ulla means any act at all.]”

H.           Said R. Pappa, “If R. Huna had not stated, `If the animal of his fellow [was lying before idolatry, I.1 E],' the case of a sin-offering would not have presented a problem. What is the basis for this assertion? [We have the principle that] his [animal] he can render forbidden. [The animal of] his fellow, he can not render forbidden. [And the sin-offering belongs to the priest. Accordingly when he performs the act of slaughter he becomes liable for serving idolatry but the animal does not become a forbidden object.]”

I.              But this is obvious! What might I have said? Because he acquires atonement [through the sin-offering], it is as if it is his. It comes to teach the novel point [that we do not treat it as his own and that any act at all does not affect it.]

I.3

A.            [A mnemonic is given.] R. Nahman and R. Amram and R. Yitzhak say, “A person cannot render forbidden that which does not belong to him.”

B.            They raised an objection: He who slaughters a sin-offering on the Sabbath day outside the Temple for the sake of idolatry is liable to three sin-offerings. [Cf. I.2 A.]

C.            And we concluded that [this refers to a case of] a sin-offering of a bird with half its windpipe defective. And the basis for asserting it [refers to] a sin-offering of a bird is that then [when he slaughters it] all of the forbidden acts come at the same time.