Talmud Bavli Hullin 41a-b - translation by Tzvee

[41a] But for any other sacrifice this would not be the case. [The forbidden acts would not all take effect with the same action.] And if [we hold the principle that] a person cannot render forbidden an object that does not belong to him, why specify that it refers to a sin-offering of a bird? It could refer even to a sin-offering of an animal. [Since he cannot render it forbidden, the animal remains a valid offering and he is liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple, on the Sabbath, and for idolatry.]

E.            [We must therefore hold the principle that] because he acquires atonement [through the sin-offering], it is as if it is his. [Then by his act he does render it forbidden. Hence we must conclude that the case is a sin-offering of a bird with half the windpipe defective.]

II.1

A.            Come and take note: [If] two take hold of a knife and perform an act of slaughter, one for the sake of any of the forenamed, and one for the sake of a valid purpose, their act of slaughter is invalid [M. 2:8 C-E]. In that case what are we dealing with? Where he [who performed the invalid act] has part ownership in it [the animal].

B.            Come and take note: He who imparted uncleanness [to the clean food of someone else], and he who mixed heave-offering into the produce of someone else, and he who mixed another's wine with libation wine — if he did so inadvertently, he is exempt [from punishment]. And if he did so deliberately, he is liable [M. Gittin 5:4 G-J]. Here also [it is the case] that he has part ownership in it. [The discussion assumes that you interpret the text of Mishnah that he actually poured another person's wine as a libation in accord with the view of Rab in b. Gittin 62b. Hence only if he had part ownership in the wine could he render it forbidden.]

C.            We have Tannaite dispute [relating to the issue of whether one can render forbidden things that do not belong to him]: An idolater who poured the wine of an Israelite but not before an idol [nevertheless] renders it forbidden. R. Judah b. Betera and R. Judah b. Baba permit it for two reasons. One reason, [we have a principle that] they only pour libations before idols [so this is not an act of libation]. And the other reason, for he [the Israelite owner] could say to him, `You have no power to render my wine forbidden to me against my wishes.'

D.            And R. Nahman, and R. Amram and R. Yitzhak say, “Even according to the authority who holds the view that a person can render forbidden that which does not belong to him, this applies only to a Samaritan [i.e., a gentile who actually wants to offer it to an idol]. But an Israelite [who does this to his fellow] has in mind only to cause him irritation.” [Cf. I.3 A.]

II.2

A.            Come and take note: [If] two take hold of a knife and perform an act of slaughter, one for the sake of any of the forenamed, and one for the sake of a valid purpose, their act of slaughter is invalid [M. 2:8 C-E]. In that case what are we dealing with? With an Israelite apostate.

B.            Come and take note: He who imparted uncleanness [to the clean food of someone else], and he who mixed heave-offering into the produce of someone else, and he who mixed another's wine with libation wine — if he did so inadvertently, he is exempt [from punishment]. And if he did so deliberately, he is liable [M. Gittin 5:4 G-J]. Here also [it is the case] that we refer to an Israelite apostate.

C.            Said to him R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi, “What is the law [in a case where] they warned him [that slaughtering an animal to an idol is a capital offense] and he acknowledged the warning [and went ahead and slaughtered it]?” [Is he considered an apostate?]

D.            He said to him, “You say that he accepted upon himself a warning that he was liable to the death penalty. [And nevertheless he performed the forbidden act!] There is no greater apostate than this person!”

I.1 cites Tosefta in contradiction to Mishnah and harmonizes the texts. No. 2 develops a partly related situation out of the foregoing materials and spells out its consequences. No. 3 explores another legal principle out of the same situation. II.1 clarifies the circumstances that Mishnah addresses. It extends the rule to an analogous case from another Mishnah-text. No. 2 states the consequent change in the status of a person who performs forbidden actions.

                                                                     2:9

                A.            They do not perform an act of slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] either into seas, or into rivers, or into utensils.

                B.            But one slaughters [so that the blood falls] into a dish filled with water, or, [when on board] a boat, on to the backs of utensils.

                C.            They do not slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] into a hole.

                D.           but one makes a hole in his house, so that the blood will flow down into it.

                E.            And in the market one may not do so,

                F.             so that one will not [41b] imitate the minim [in their ways].

I.1

A.            They do not perform an act of slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] either into seas: Why is it that they may not [slaughter so that the blood falls] into seas? Because we say, “He is slaughtering for the god of the sea.”[If he slaughters so that the blood falls] into a pool of water we also should say, “He is slaughtering to the image in the pool.”

B.            Said Raba, “We learned the rule with regard to water that was murky [so no image was visible].”

II.1

A.            They do not slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] into a hole [C]: But lo you stated, They do not slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] into a hole, at all. [They you stated in D that one makes a hole in his house.]

B.            Said Abayye, “The first text [C] refers to a hole in the marketplace.”

C.            Said to him Raba, “But lo, since the last text [E] taught, and in the market one may not do so, we may derive that in the first text we are not dealing with [a case of a hole in] the market.”

D.            Rather said Raba, “Here is how you should state matters: They do not slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] into a hole at all. And what should a person do if he wishes to keep his courtyard clean? He should designate a place outside of the hole and slaughter there and let the blood flow down to the hole. And in the market one may not do so, so that one will not imitate the minim [in their ways] [E-F].

E.            It was taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view of Raba: He who was travelling on a ship and he had no place on the ship to slaughter — he extends his hand outside of the ship and slaughters so that the blood flows down the sides of the ship.

F.             They do not slaughter [in such a way that the blood falls] into a hole at all. And what should a person do if he wishes to keep his courtyard clean? He should designate a place outside of the hole and slaughter there and let the blood flow down to the hole. And in the market one may not do so.

G.            Because it says, “You shall not follow their statutes (Lev. 18:3).” And if he did this, they must investigate him [to determine if he is a heretic].  (T.'s version of E-G: And if one has no place on a ship [in which to perform the act of slaughter in the way just now prescribed], one performs the act of slaughter [so that the blood flows over the sides of the ship and then] into the sea. And if one does not want to make his house dirty, he performs an act of slaughter [so that the blood flows] into a utensil or into a hole [M. ul. 2:9 C,D]. But in the market one may not do so, because he [thereby] carries out [the act in accord with] the rules of minim [M. ul. 2:9E]. And if he has done so, it requires examination [T. 2:19 D-G].)

I.1 elucidates the Mishnah-text. II.1 continues the close analysis of Mishnah and cites the pertinent Tosefta-passage.

                                                                    2:10

                A.            He who slaughters [an unconsecrated beast outside of the Temple] (1) for the sake of a burnt-offering, (2) for the sake of animal offerings, (3) for the sake of a suspended guilt-offering, (4) for the sake of a Passover-offering, (5) for the sake of a thank-offering —

                B.            his act of slaughtering is invalid.

                C.            And R. Simeon declares valid.

                D.           Two hold onto a knife and perform an act of slaughter, one for the sake of one of all the forenamed items, and one for the sake of a valid purpose —

                E.            their act of slaughter is invalid.

                F.             He who slaughters [an unconsecrated beast outside of the Temple] (1) for the sake of a sin-offering, (2) for the sake of an unconditional guilt-offering, (3) for the sake of a firstling, (4) for the sake of tithe [of cattle], (5) for the sake of a substitute offering —

                G.           his act of slaughter is valid.

                H.           This is the general principle [of A-B, F-G]: As to anything which is [offered as fulfillment of] a vow or as a freewill offering, he who slaughters it for the sake of its own name —

                I.             it is prohibited.

                J.             But as to anything which is not [offered as fulfillment of] a vow or as a freewill offering — he who slaughters it for its name —

                K.            it is valid.

I.1

A.            He who slaughters [an unconsecrated beast outside of the Temple] (1) for the sake of a burnt-offering, [(2) for the sake of animal offerings, (3) for the sake of a suspended guilt-offering]: Is a suspended guilt-offering [offered as fulfillment of] a vow or as a freewill offering?

B.            Said R. Yohanan, “Who is this in accord with?  It is in accord with the view of R. Eleazar who said, `A person any day he wishes may offer as a freewill offering a suspended guilt-offering.'”

C.            Is a Passover-offering [offered as fulfillment of] a vow or as a freewill offering? Lo the time of its offering is fixed.

D.            Said R. Oshaia, “The Passover-offering is different. It  may be set aside as an offering anytime during the year.” [If he slaughters it for its own sake it could be valid as a peace-offering.]

E.            Said R. Yannai, “They only repeated this regarding unblemished animals. But with regard to animals with blemishes it is clearly evident [that the animal cannot become a sacrifice. No matter what he says when slaughtering, it remains valid.]”

F.             And R. Yohanan said, “Even for blemished animals there are cases where he might put something over the blemish so that it will not be evident [that it has a blemish. And they will think that it can serve as a sacrifice.]”

II.1

A.            For the sake of a sin-offering [F]: Said R. Yohanan, “They repeated this only regarding someone who is not obligated to bring a sin-offering. But for someone who was obligated to bring a sin-offering it would make sense that he was acting [in slaughtering the animal] for the sake of his sin-offering.”

B.            But lo he did not say, “For the sake of my sin-offering [I do this].” [And reciting the formula is necessary for fulfilling his obligation.] Said R. Abbahu, “[It was the case] that he said, `For the sake of my sin-offering.'”

III.1

A.            For the sake of a substitute offering [F]: Said R. Eleazar, “They repeated this only regarding someone who does not have another sacrifice in his house [that he could exchange for this animal]. But if he does have another sacrifice in his house it makes sense that he substituted this one for it.”

B.            But lo he did not say, “For the sake of a substitute for my other sacrifice [I do this].” Said R. Abbahu, “[It was the case] that he said, `For the sake of a substitute for my other sacrifice.'”

IV. 1

A.            This is the general principle [H]: What does this phrase encompass under its rule? It encompasses [a person who slaughters an animal as] the burnt-offering of a nazirite. For what might I have said? Lo he did not vow [to be a nazirite]. [His act of slaughter would have no validity for that purpose.] But I could say that he vowed secretly.

B.            But as to anything which is not [offered as fulfillment of] a vow or as a freewill offering [J]: This encompasses the burnt-offering of a woman after childbirth. Said R. Eleazar, “They repeated this only regarding someone who does not have a wife. But if he does have a wife, it makes sense that he might be doing this for her sake.”

C.            But lo he did not say, “For the sake of the burnt-offering of my wife [I do this].” Said R. Abbahu, “[It was the case] that he said, `For the sake of the burnt-offering of my wife.'”