[75a] [We can avoid this objection by stipulating that the case here is one of] an act of slaughter that is dry [i.e., no blood spurts on the animal] and not in accord with the view of R. Simeon [M. 2:5 E].
G. Who is the Tannaite authority behind the rule [in E]: If it [the live birth from a slaughtered mother] passed through a river, it became susceptible to uncleanness [by virtue of the water]. If it went to a cemetery, it became unclean [by virtue of passing over graves]? Said R. Yohanan, “It is R. Yosé the Galilean.”
H. As it was taught on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon b. Eleazar says in the name of R. Yosé the Galilean, “It is susceptible to uncleanness as food and imparts uncleanness as food and requires preparation [to be susceptible to uncleanness].” Rabbi (the Talmud's version: sages) says, “It does not impart uncleanness as food, because it is alive, and that which is alive does not impart the uncleanness as food” [T. 4:6 B-C].
I. And R. Yohanan holds in accord with his view elsewhere. For said R. Yohanan, “R. Yosé the Galilean and the House of Shammai said the same thing.” R. Yosé the Galilean, as we just stated. The House of Shammai, as it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: Fish — from what point do they receive uncleanness? The House of Shammai say, “When they are caught.” And the House of Hillel say, “When they die.” R. Aqiba says, “If they could not live” [M. Uqsin 3:8 A-D].
J. What [case] between them [do they dispute]? Said R. Yohanan, “The dispute between them is [over the case of a fish that is] making fluttering motions [even though it is dead].”
K. R. Hisda posed a question: If tokens [of defects] that render and animal terefah appeared in a fish, what is the law? This will be a question according to the authority who holds the view that a terefah is considered to be alive and according to the authority who holds the view that a terefah is not considered to be alive [cf. above, b. 42a, M. 3:1 I.1 C-H].
L. This will be a question according to the authority who holds the view that a terefah is considered to be alive [as follows]. A beast has a lot of life [so even when it is terefah it still is considered alive]. But a fish does not have a lot of life [so if it is terefah] it is not [considered alive]. Or perhaps even according to the authority who holds the view that a terefah is not considered to be alive, this concern applies only to a beast that falls into the category of [a living thing that requires] slaughtering. But a fish that does not fall into the category of [a living thing that requires] slaughtering, it would make sense to say that it is not [considered to be alive]. The question stands unresolved. (Rashi has a variant reading.)
IV.2
A. If it aborted the foetus [what is the status of the fat of the aborted foetus]? R. Yohanan said, “Its fat has the same status of that of the beast [its mother].” And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Its fat has the same status of that of a wild animal.”
B. R. Yohanan said, “Its fat has the same status of that of the beast [its mother].” [Coming out of the womb of the mother and coming into] the air causes it to [take on the status of a beast]. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Its fat has the same status of that of a wild animal.” [Coming to complete term] in months causes it to [take on the status of a beast. And this one did not come to term].
C. There are those who say that in any case where it did not come to term in the expected number of months of gestation, it is as if nothing at all occurred. [The animal is deemed neither a beast nor a wild animal.]
D. [In accord with this view] they dispute in a case where he inserted his hand into the womb of the beast and tore off forbidden fat of a live nine-month-old foetus and ate it. R. Yohanan [would have] said, “Its fat has the same status as that of a beast. [Coming to complete term] in months causes it to [take on the status of a beast. And this one did come to term.]” And R. Simeon b. Laqish [would have] said, “Its fat has the same status as that of a wild animal. [Coming to complete term] in months and [coming out of the womb of the mother] into the air cause it to [take on the status of a beast. And this one did not come out.]”
E. R. Yohanan [could have] raised an objection to the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish, “In the same manner that, `the two kidneys with the fat that is on them' stated in connection with the guilt-offering [which must be a male] rules out from the category that [fat] of a foetus. So too in any instance it rules out from the category that of a foetus.” [The verses are: “And all its fat shall be offered, the fat tail, the fat that covers the entrails, the two kidneys with the fat that is on them at the loins, and the appendage of the liver which he shall take away with the kidneys” (Lev. 7:3-4).]
F. Now it makes perfect sense in accord with my view why we need a verse to exclude [the fat]. But according to you view, why do we need a verse [to exclude it]? He [would have] said to him, “The basis for my view [to begin with] is also this verse.”
G. And there are those that say [there is an alternative version of this matter]. R. Simeon b. Laqish [could have] raised an objection to the view of R. Yohanan, “In the same manner that, `the two kidneys with the fat that is on them' stated in connection with the guilt-offering [which must be a male] rules out from the category that [fat] of a foetus. So too in any instance it rules out from the category that of a foetus.”
H. Now it makes perfect sense in accord with my view why the Torah excluded [the fat]. But according to you view, let it be brought near [on the altar]! He [would have] said to him, “It is on account of it being [analogous to a substance that] is lacking in that it did not reach its prescribed term. [They must wait for seven days before offering it.]”
V.1
A. Said R. Ammi, “He who slaughters a terefah-animal and found in it a live nine-months' birth, in accord with the view of the one who prohibits [in the same case, but where the mother is not a terefah-animal, i.e., Meir in M. 4:5 D], he should permit [the slaughter and consumption of the offspring in this case, since the status of the mother has no bearing on the offspring]. And in accord with the view of the one who permits [in the same case, but where the mother is not a terefah-animal. i.e., sages in M. 4:5 E], he should prohibit [the slaughter an consumption of the offspring, since the status of the mother is applicable to the offspring].”
B. Raba said, “In accord with the view of the one who permits [in the same case, but where the mother is not a terefah-animal. i.e., sages in M. 4:5 E], he also should permit [the slaughter an consumption of the offspring]. Through four organs the Torah rendered [the offspring] valid.” [That is, either through the proper slaughter of the mother or through the proper slaughter of the offspring itself.]
C. Said R. Hisda, “He who slaughters a terefah-animal and found in it a live nine-months' birth, [75b] it must be slaughtered and it is liable to the priestly gifts of the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw (Deut. 18:3). But it if dies, it is clean of imparting uncleanness through carriage [i.e., that conveyed to one who carries it].”
D. Said to him Raba, “It must be slaughtered — in accord with whose view is this? In accord with the view of R. Meir [M. 4:5 C-D]. But it if dies, it is clean of imparting uncleanness through carriage — in accord with whose view is this? In accord with the view of the rabbis.
E. “And according to your logic, [consider the same objection to] that which R. Hiyya taught [in Tosefta on Tannaite authority]: He who slaughters a terefah-animal and found in it a live nine-month-old birth — it requires slaughtering and is liable for [priestly] gifts. And if it died, it is clean of imparting uncleanness through carriage, because the slaughter of its dam renders it clean [T. 4:8 A-B].
F. “It must be slaughtered — in accord with whose view is this? In accord with the view of R. Meir [M. 4:5 C-D]. But it if dies, it is clean of imparting uncleanness through carriage — in accord with whose view is this? In accord with the view of the rabbis.
G. Lo, this is not a contradiction R. Hiyya stated matters in the case where they found it had already died. But according to your reasoning [R. Hisda], it should be a contradiction.”
H. He [Hisda] said to him, “According to my reasoning it also is not contradiction. Through four organs the Torah rendered [the offspring] valid.” [That is, either through the proper slaughter of the mother or through the proper slaughter of the offspring itself.]
I. When R. Zira departed [to Israel] he found R. Assi sitting and stating this teaching (Rashi: Assi found Zira). He said to him, “Well put! And so too did R. Yohanan state the matter.” [He said,] “May we derive that R. Simeon b. Laqish disputed him?”
J. [We do not know because] he [Simeon b. Laqish] hesitated and was silent [at the time Yohanan stated his view]. And there is a version that he was drinking at the time and was silent.
VI.1
A. R. Simeon Shezuri says, “Even if [it grew to the] age of eight years and ploughs a field — the slaughtering of its mother renders it clean” [M. 4:5 F]. This is the same as the view of the first Tanna.
B. Said R. Kahana, “[The case of] where it walked away on the ground is a matter of dispute between them [i.e., between the first Tanna and Simeon].” [Sages would require slaughter in that instance on the authority of the rabbis.]
C. Said R. Mesharshayya, “According to the view of those who say we take into account the seed of the father [in determining the status of the progeny], if an offspring that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother mates with a normal cow, there is no redress for the offspring.”
D. Said Abayye, “All would agree that an animal with an uncloven hoof that was an offspring that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother is permitted. What is the basis for this view? People can identify anything that is unusual.”
E. Another version: Said Abayye, “All would agree that an animal with an uncloven hoof, that was an offspring of a cow with an uncloven hoof, that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother is permitted. What is the basis for this view? People can identify anything that is in two ways unusual.”
VI.2
A. Said R. Haninah, “The law follows in accord with R. Simeon b. Shezuri.” And so R. Simeon b. Shezuri would permit its offspring and the offspring of that offspring down through all the generations of offspring.
B. R. Yohanan said, “It [an offspring that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother] is permitted. Its offspring is prohibited.”
C. Ada bar Habo had an offspring that was born alive after the slaughter of the mother that a wolf attacked. He came before R. Ashi [for a ruling]. He said to him, “Go and slaughter it.” He said to him, “Lo said Ziri, said R. Hanina, `The law follows in accord with R. Simeon b. Shezuri.' And so R. Simeon b. Shezuri would permit its offspring and the offspring of that offspring down through all the generations of offspring. And even R. Yohanan stated matters only with regard to its [subsequent] offspring. But regarding it [the original offspring] he did not dispute [that it was permitted without any act of slaughter].”
D. He said to him, “R. Yohanan [held his own view but he] stated matters in accord with the words of R. Simeon Shezuri.”
E. But lo, said Rabin bar Hanina, said Ulla, said R. Hanina, “The law follows in accord with the view of R. Simeon Shezuri.” And not only that but in every place in our Mishnah that R. Simeon Shezuri taught, the law follows in accord with his view.
F. He said to him, “I reason in accord with this that was stated by R. Jonathan: The laws follows in accord with R. Simeon Shezuri with regard to and endangered person and the tithe of heave-offering of demai.”
G. An endangered person — as it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: At first they would rule: He who goes forth in fetters and stated, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife” — lo, they are to write and deliver [the writ of divorce to his wife]. They reverted to rule: [That is the rule] even in the case of one who went out on a voyage or set forth with a caravan. R. Simeon Shezuri says, “Even in the case of one who is on the point of death” [M. Tebul Yom 4:5 C-E].
H. Tithe of heave-offering of demai — as it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: [Regarding heave-offering of the tithe of demai that returned to its place [that fell back into the now-tithed demai-produce from which it was originally separated, thus rendering the entire mixture prohibited to a non-priest] — R. Simeon of Sezur says, “Even on a weekday he inquires of him [the vendor] and eats at his word” [M. Demai 4:1 K-M].
I-II explore various extensions of the rules of Mishnah. III-IV inquire into intersecting rules, based on the principles of the rule of Mishnah, cite complementary Tannaite rules and work through the problem in different ways. V.1 continues the inquiry into the premises of Mishnah. VI.1 reverts to the text and extends the rule of Mishnah. VI.2 further clarifies the position of Simeon b. Shezuri.
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