[86a] [The reason he told him to render it terefah is] he stated matters in the most efficient way. It was not efficient for him to say, “Go and stab it,” for that is not an act of slaughtering at all. But [in telling him], “Go and render it terefah,” it might have made sense to maintain that an improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter and it is necessary to cover the blood. It makes the novel point [that it is not necessary] in accord with R. Hiyya bar Abba.
F. And the authority who holds the view [Rabin] that he told him, “Go and stab it,” why did he not tell him, “Go and render it terefah?” And if you wish to maintain that it is because he holds the view that and improper act of slaughter is a valid act of slaughter, but lo, said R. Hiyya bar Abba, said R. Yohanan, “Rabbi concurred with the words [of R. Meir regarding the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day. And he repeated it here attributing it to the sages. And he concurred with the words] of R. Simeon regarding the obligation to cover the blood. And he repeated it here, attributing it to the sages” [I.1 A, above]. [Accordingly, this cannot be the explanation.]
G. [The reason he told him to stab it is] he stated matters in the most efficient way. It was not efficient for him to say, “Go and render it terefah,” because an improper act of slaughter is not a valid act of slaughter. But [in telling him], “Go and stab it,” it might have made sense to maintain [as at D above] that, “The Torah did not prescribe the procedures of slaughtering for fowl” (b. 4a, vol. I, p. 28), [therefore] stabbing it is the same as slaughtering it, and he should be liable to cover the blood. It comes to make the novel point [that there are procedures for the fowl], `As I have commanded you' (Deut. 12:21).
H. But how is it possible that worms infested his [Hiyya's] flax [A, above]? Lo, did not Rabin bar Abba say, and some say that is was R. Abin bar Sheba, “When the residents of the diaspora came up [to Israel] the meteorites, earthquakes, winds and thunderstorms ceased. And their wine did not sour and their flax did not suffer an infestation. And the sages attributed this to [the merits of] R. Hiyya and his children” (b. Suk. 20a).
I. Their merit helped protect the rest of the world. It did not work for them. And this accords with what R. Judah said in the name of Rab. For said R. Judah, said Rab, “Every day a heavenly echo goes forth and says, `The entire world derives its sustenance on account of [the merit of] Hanina [b. Dosa] my son [cf. b. Ta`an. 24b-25a]. And for Hanina my son [the ascetic] it is enough if he has a qab of carob from one Sabbath even to the next.”
I.1 aligns various views of Mishnah and sets forth a sustained inquiry into the scriptural and logical bases for the rule. I.2 takes up the premises of the preceding and explores them independent of the criticism of our Mishnah-text. II.1 has no bearing on the elucidation of the Mishnah until F relates the inquiry to I.1 A.
6:3
A. A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor who slaughtered, and others oversee them [M. 1:1] are liable to cover up [the blood].
B. [If they did so] all by themselves, they are free of liability to cover up [the blood].
C. And so with regard to the matter of, “It and its offspring:”
D. [if] they have slaughtered and others oversee them, it is prohibited to slaughter [the offspring] after them.
E. [If they did so] all by themselves,
F. R. Meir permits [one] to slaughter [the offspring] after them.
G. And sages prohibit.
H. But they agree that if one has slaughtered [the offspring after the deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor has slaughtered the dam], he does not incur forty stripes.
I.1
A. And for the rabbis what difference is there between the first text [of the Mishnah], where they did not dispute, and the last text [of the Mishnah], where they did dispute? In [respect to the ruling of] the first text if we say that they are liable to cover the blood, people will say that their act of slaughter is fine and will come to eat from what they slaughtered.
B. But from [the ruling] of the last text I also [would conclude] that because the rabbis say that it is prohibited to slaughter [the second animal] after they [slaughtered the first], people will say that their act of slaughter is fine and will come to eat from what they slaughtered.
C. [The cases are different.] In the [case presented in] last text people will say [he does not slaughter the second animal] because he does not need any more meat [and not because the act of slaughter for the first one was valid].
D. But then in the [case presented in] the first text people will say that [he covers the blood] to clean up his yard [and not because he is liable to do so].
E. [This may be true. But] if he slaughtered at a trash heap, will you be able to say this? Or if he sought a ruling [from a court as to whether he was liable to cover the blood and they ruled that he was liable] will you be able to say [that their act of slaughter in general is not fine]?
F. But then according to your logic in the [case presented in] the last text, if he sought a ruling [and was told not to slaughter the second animal] will you be able to say [that their slaughter in general is not fine]?
G. Rather it must be the case that the rabbis disputed the entire matter [both cases]. But they postponed until R. Meir had presented the whole matter and then they disputed his view.
H. Now the view of the rabbis makes perfect sense because it presents a stringency [in a case of doubt]. But what is the basis for the view of R. Meir?
I. Said R. Jacob, said R. Yohanan, “R. Meir used to declare one who ate from what they slaughtered liable on account of [eating] carrion.” What is the basis for this view? Said R. Ammi. “It is because the majority of their actions are flawed.”
J. Said R. Pappa to R. Huna the son of R. Joshua, and some say R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said to R. Pappa, “Why specify that a majority [of their actions are flawed]? Even if a minority [are flawed] it also would be the case [that we should declare the animal carrion]. For lo, R. Meir shows concern for the minority [b. 6a, vol. I, p. 37]. Now you combine this minority [of cases] together with the presumption [that the animal is forbidden for eating until it is properly slaughtered], and you have undermined the majority [of cases where they would perform a proper act of slaughter].”
K. For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: A child [who is unclean] who is found at the side of the dough and the dough is in his hand — R. Meir declares clean. And sages declare unclean, for it is the way of the child to slap [dough] [M. Toh. 3:8 A-D]. And we say what is the basis for the view of R. Meir. He reasons that the majority of children slap and a minority do not slap. And the dough itself retains a presumption of cleanness. You combine [86b] the minority together with the presumption, and you have undermined the majority.
L. [Carrying this reasoning further]: If they said that it is clean in a case of doubt with regard to uncleanness, they should accordingly say that it is permitted in a case of doubt with regard to a prohibition. [Therefore in our case, Meir permits them to slaughter the second animal, even though he shows concern for a minority of cases, and they might have slaughtered it properly, since we say that the majority of their actions are flawed and the presumption is that the animal is forbidden until slaughtered (Rashi)].
II.1
A. Rabbi taught in accord with the view of R. Meir. And Rabbi taught in accord with the view of sages. Which of these was his last [and definitive ruling]?
B. Come and take note: R. Abba the son of R. Hiyya bar Abba and R. Zira were standing in the market place of Caesarea near the door of the house of study. R. Ammi came out and found them there. He said to them, “Did I not instruct you that during the session of the house of study you should not stand outside lest there be those who need to know a tradition and there be trouble [because they cannot ascertain in your absence what is the tradition]?”
C. R. Zira went in. R. Abba did not go in. They were sitting and asking [in the session], “Which of these was his last [and definitive ruling]?” Said to them R. Zira, “I did not know [that this question was under discussion]. I could have asked the elder [R. Abba]. Perhaps he heard from his father and his father heard from R. Yohanan [which one was the definitive ruling]. For R. Hiyya bar Abba used to review his learning before R. Yohanan every thirty days.”
D. What was the outcome of the issue? Come and take note: R. Eleazar sent to the diaspora [to Babylonia], “Rabbi taught in accord with the view of R. Meir.” But lo, he also taught in accord with the rabbis. But it must be that you derive from this that this was his definitive ruling. We do derive this conclusion.
I.1 identifies the nature and premises of the dispute of Mishnah. II.1 turns to the second-level issue of what is the definitive rule that derives from the Mishnah?
6:4 A-D
A. (1) [If] one has slaughtered a hundred wild beasts in one place, a single covering up of the blood [serves] for all of them.
B. (2) [If one has slaughtered] a hundred birds in one place, a single covering up of the blood [serves] for all of them.
C. (3) [If one has slaughtered] a wild beast and a bird in one place, a single covering up of the blood [serves] for all of them.
D. R. Judah says, “[If] one has slaughtered a wild beast, he should cover up [its blood], and afterward let him slaughter the bird.”
I.1
A. Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: [“Any man also of the people of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, who takes in hunting any beast or bird that may be eaten shall pour out its blood and cover it in dust” (Lev. 17:13).] “Any beast” means any number of beasts, whether many or few. “Any... bird” means any number of birds, whether many or few.
B. Based on this they said, (1) [If] one has slaughtered a hundred wild beasts in one place, a single covering up of the blood [serves] for all of them. (2) [If one has slaughtered] a hundred birds in one place, a single covering up of the blood [serves] for all of them. (3) [If one has slaughtered] a wild beast and a bird in one place, a single covering up of the blood [serves] for all of them [M. 6:4 A-C].
C. R. Judah says, “[If] one has slaughtered a wild beast, he should cover up [its blood], and afterward let him slaughter the bird.” [M. 6:4 D]. As it is written, “Any beast or bird.”
D. They said to him, “Lo, it is written, `For the life of every creature is the blood of it; [therefore I have said to the people of Israel, You shall not eat the blood of any creature, for the life of every creature is its blood; whoever eats it shall be cut off]' (Lev. 17:14).”
E. What did they answer him? This is what the rabbis said to him, “This word `or' [as in `Any beast or bird'] is needed to separate [beast from bird, i.e., that you do not need to slaughter both to be liable to cover the blood.]” And R. Judah [hold the view that] we derive that they separate [beast from bird] from the words `its blood' in the verse. And the rabbis [hold the view that] the words `its blood' mean all blood [is forbidden]. As it is written, “For the life of every creature is the blood of it.”
II.1
A. Said R. Hanina, “R. Judah would agree that with regard to reciting a blessing [over the acts of slaughtering a beast and a bird, M. 6:4 D], that he recites only one blessing [even though the act of covering the blood interposes].”
B. Said Rabina to R. Aha the son of Raba, and some say R. Aha the son of Raba said to R. Ashi, “How is this different from [the ruling of the students of Rab]?” For R. Brona and R. Hananel, students of Rab, were sitting at a dinner. R. Yeba the elder was standing near them. They said to him, “Let us recite the blessing [after the meal].” Then they said to him, “Let us have something to drink.” R. Yeba the elder said to them, “This is what Rab said, `As soon as one says, Let us recite the blessing, [the meal is over and] it is prohibited for him to drink wine [unless he recites another blessing before drinking].'”
C. Here too, as soon as he gets involved in covering the blood, he is liable to recite another blessing [for his next act of slaughter].
D. But are these cases comparable? There [regarding the meal] it is impossible for him to drink [more wine] and to recite the blessing [over the meal] at the same time. Here [in the case of slaughtering] it is possible for him to slaughter with one hand and to cover the blood with the other at the same time.
I.1 establishes a scriptural basis for the rule of Mishnah. II.1 examines a second-level issue — regulations for reciting blessings over acts of slaughter and covering the blood.
6:4 E-G
E. [If] he slaughtered [a wild beast or a bird] and he did not cover up [its blood] and another person saw him, he [the other person] is liable to cover up [the blood].
F. [If] he covered up [the blood] and it became uncovered, he is free of liability to cover it up [again].
G. [If] the wind [blew dirt and] covered it up [and it became uncovered], he is liable to cover it up.
I.1
A. Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: “[He] shall pour out its blood and cover it with dust” (Lev. 17:13) [means] the one who pours it out should cover it. [If] he slaughtered [a wild beast or a bird] and he did not cover up [its blood] and another person saw him, on what basis is he [the other person] liable to cover up [the blood]? As it says, “Therefore I have said to the people of Israel” (Lev. 17:14). This is an admonition to all the people of Israel.
B. Another Tannaite teaching: “[He] shall pour out its blood and cover it with dust” (Lev. 17:13) [means] with what he poured it out he should cover it. He should not cover it [by kicking dust on it] with his foot. For he should not subject the commandments to derision. [Cf. T. 6:10.]
C. Another Tannaite teaching: “[He] shall pour out its blood and cover it with dust” (Lev. 17:13) [means] the one who poured it out should be the one who covers it.
D. Once [m`sh b] a person slaughtered and his associate went ahead and covered the blood. And Rabban Gamaliel declared him [the associate] liable to give him [the person who slaughtered] ten gold coins.
E. They posed a question: Was this compensation for [depriving him of] performing a commandment or of reciting a blessing? In what case is there a practical difference [between these alternative explanations]? In [the case of one who goes ahead and deprives his associate of] reciting the blessing over the meal. If you say it is compensation for the performance of a commandment, then it is one [commandment that he deprived him of fulfilling]. But if you say that it is compensation for the recitation of a blessing, then here there are four [blessings that he deprived him of reciting]. Which is it?
F. Come and take note: A certain Sadducee said to Rabbi, “The one who formed the mountains did not create the winds. And the one who created the winds did not form the mountains. For it is written, `For lo, he who forms the mountains, and creates the wind' (Amos 4:13).”
G. He said to him, “Fool! Look at the end of the verse, `[For lo, he who forms the mountains, and creates the wind, and declares to man what is his thought; who makes the morning darkness, and treads on the heights of the earth] -- the Lord, the God of hosts, is his name!' (Amos 4:13).”
H. He said to him, “Give me three days and I will return with a decisive refutation.” Rabbi sat and fasted for three days. When he was about to eat they said to him, “A Sadducee is at the gate.” He said, “They gave me poison for food” (Ps. 69:21).
I. He said to him, “Rabbi, I bring you good tidings. He [the other one] could not find an answer and he threw himself off the roof and died.” He said to him, “Do you wish to dine with me?” He said to him, “Yes.”
J. After they ate and drank he [Rabbi] said to him, “Would you prefer to drink the cup [of wine over which you will recite] the blessings? Or would you rather have forty gold coins?” He said to him, “I would rather drink the cup over which one recites the blessings.” A heavenly echo went forth and proclaimed, “The cup of wine over which one recites the blessings is worth forty gold coins.”
K. Said R. Yitzhak, “They still consider that family [of the opponent of Rabbi] among the greatest in Rome. And they call it the family of Bar Luianus.”
II.1
A. [If] he covered up [the blood] and it became uncovered, he is free of liability to cover it up [again] [M. 6:4 F]. Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi, “Why is this different from the obligation to return a lost object?” For said the master, “You shall take them back to your brother” (Deut. 22:1) [means] even a hundred times.
B. He said to him, “There, no exclusion is written in the verse. Here, an exclusion is written in the verse: `[And he shall] cover it with dust.'”
III.1
A. [If] the wind [blew dirt and] covered it up [and it became uncovered], he is liable to cover it up [M. 6:4 G]. Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah, said R. Yohanan, “They taught this matter only where it again became uncovered. But where it did not again become uncovered, his is exempt from the obligation to cover it.”
B. But who cares if it again became uncovered?Lo, the [obligation] was already deferred [when the wind covered it]. Said R. Pappa, “This means that there is no deferral for the performance of commandments.”
C. And how is this different from what was taught on Tannaite authority: One who slaughters, and the blood is absorbed into the ground, he is liable to cover the blood? That is where the outline [of the blood] is visible.
I.1 sets forth a scriptural basis for the rules of Mishnah and several further expositions of the verse in A-C. D-K moves to a second-level issue derivative of the primary consideration of the nature of the commandment to cover the blood. II.1 contrasts the premise of the Mishnah-paragraph with an intersecting premise of a different rule. III.1 engages in a brief criticism of the premise of the rule of the Mishnah.
6:5
A. Blood that was mixed with water,
B. if it has the appearance of blood,
C. one is liable to cover it up.
D. [If] it was mixed with wine, they regard it as if it were water.
E. [If] it was mixed up with blood of a [domesticated] beast [87b] or with blood of a wild beast, they regard it as if it were water.
F. R. Judah says, “Blood does not annul blood.”
6:6
A. Blood that splashes and that is on the knife,
B. one is liable to cover it up.
C. Said R. Judah, “Under what circumstances? When there is there only that blood. But [if] there is there blood other than that, he is free [of the liability] to cover it up.”
I.1
A. It was taught there in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: Blood that was mixed with water, if it [the mixture] has the appearance of blood, it is valid. [If] it was mixed with wine, they regard it as if it were water [and if the mixture is blood-color, it is valid]. [If] it [blood of Holy Things] was mixed with the blood of a beast or with the blood of a fowl [that were unconsecrated], they regard it as if it were water. R. Judah says, “Blood [under any circumstances] does not annul blood” [M. Zeb. 8:6].
B. Said R. Hiyya bar Abba, said R. Yohanan, “They taught this rule [of M. 6:7 A-C] only where the water fell into the blood. But where the blood fell into the water, as each [drop falls in] it is annulled.”
C. Said R. Pappa, “To the matter of covering the blood, this rule does [of B] not apply. [We have a principle that] you do not defer commandments.”
D. Said R. Judah, said Samuel, “With any reddish [mixture of blood and water] they may attain atonement [through its use in the sacrificial rite], and they may render [foods] susceptible to uncleanness, and they are liable to cover it [after slaughtering an animal].”
E. What novel point does this make? That they may attain atonement was taught elsewhere on Tannaite authority. That they are liable to cover it was taught elsewhere on Tannaite authority. We need [to stipulate the rule to teach] that they may render [foods] susceptible [with this mixture].
F. But it also [was taught on Tannaite authority that both liquids render susceptible]. [Accordingly] if it is deemed blood it surely renders susceptible. And if it is deemed water it surely renders susceptible.
G. No [this is not a valid line of reasoning]. We need to [stipulate it explicitly for a case where] he mixed it with rain water. [That renders susceptible only if subject to active intention that it be put on the foods.] But rainwater also will render susceptible because when he takes it and pours it [into the blood] he has demonstrated his intention [to use it].
H. No [this is not a valid line of reasoning]. [We may be dealing with a case where the mixture occurred by itself [i.e., the rain water fell into the blood]. [We need then to stipulate the rule, as E says, for this case.]
I. R. Assi of Nehar Bil says, “[This rule applies] to the clear liquid of the blood itself. [If it has the appearance of blood it can render foods susceptible to uncleanness.]”
J. R. Jeremiah of Difti said, “[One who drinks such liquid] is subject to the punishment of extirpation. And that is only where there is an olive's bulk of [congealed] blood [in with the clear liquid of the blood itself].”
I.2
A. In a Tannaite tradition it was taught: [A mixture of water with blood from a corpse] renders unclean in a tent as long as there is a quarter-log [of blood in the mixture].
B. It was taught there on Tannaite authority: Every liquid substance that exudes from a corpse is clean except for its blood. [And blood] as long as it is reddish in appearance, it renders objects unclean [that are together with it] in a tent [cf. T. Ahilot 4:9; T. Maksh. 3:15].
C. But is it the case that, Every liquid substance from a corpse is clean [except for its blood]? They raised a contradiction: The liquids [that exude from] the tebul-yom are like the liquids that he touches: [88a] these and those are not susceptible to uncleanness. All other sources of uncleanness, whether minor or major — the liquids that exude from them are like liquids that he touches: these and those are in the first remove of uncleanness, except for the liquid that [itself] is a Father of Uncleanness [M. Tebul Yom 2:1].
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