R. Zira said, “Leave out [of our discussion] the prohibition of [offering a sacrifice] at the wrong time. For Scripture [81a] has linked that [prohibition] to a positive commandment.” [That puts it into a different category of prohibition.]
F. What is the basis for this assertion? For Scripture stated, “[When a bull or sheep or goat is born, it shall remain seven days with its mother]; and from the eighth day on it shall be acceptable [as an offering by fire to the Lord]” (Lev. 22:27). “From the eighth day on” — yes [it is acceptable]. From before this time — no [it is not acceptable]. [That makes this into] a prohibition that derives from a positive commandment, that is deemed itself to be a positive commandment.
G. But do we not need this [verse] in accord with [the view of] R. Aptoriqi? For R. Aptoriqi raised in contradiction [the following]: It is written, “It shall remain seven days with its mother.” Lo, [this implies that] at night [after the seventh day] it is fit. And it is written, “From the eighth day on it shall be acceptable.” “From the eighth day on” — yes [it is acceptable]. From the night [before] — no [it is not acceptable].
H. Lo, what then is the case? At night [it is fit] to be sanctified. On the day [it is fit] to be accepted. It is written in another verse [along the same lines], “You shall do likewise with your oxen and with your sheep: seven days it shall be with its dam; on the eighth day you shall give it to me” (Exod. 22:30).
II.3
A. Said R. Hamnuna, “R. Simeon used to say, `The prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day does not apply to Holy Things.'” What is the basis for this assertion? It is based on the fact that R. Simeon said, “An act of slaughter that is improper, is not a valid act of slaughter.” [Above, II.1 B.]
B. [Any act of] slaughtering Holy Things is [by definition] an act of slaughter that is improper [and is therefore not a valid act of slaughter].
C. Raba objected: [With regard to the] prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day for animals that are Holy Things slaughtered outside — R. Simeon says, “The second one is subject to a prohibition.” For R. Simeon used to say, “Any [sacrifice slaughtered outside] that it is proper to bring after its specified time is subject to a prohibition [that incurs stripes] but is not subject to the punishment of extirpation.” And sages say, “Any act that is not subject to the punishment of extirpation is not subject to a negative prohibition [that incurs stripes].”
D. And what is difficult for us is the case of [both mother and offspring that were slaughtered on the same day] that were Holy Things outside [the Temple and the ruling is that] for [slaughtering] the second one he violates a prohibition. [But this is not logical on the following basis.] The first one he just killed [because the act of slaughter was not deemed valid]. The second one would have been accepted inside [as a valid sacrifice]. He therefore should be liable also to the punishment of extirpation [for slaughtering a Holy Thing outside].
E. But Raba said, and some say Kadi [said] that there is a lacuna in the text. And this is how you should teach matters: The case is [both mother and offspring that were slaughtered on the same day] that were Holy Things outside [the Temple and the ruling is that] according to the view of the rabbis for [slaughtering] the first he is subject to the punishment of extirpation. The second is rendered invalid but he is exempt from the prohibition against slaughtering outside. According to the view of R. Simeon, for [slaughtering] both of them he is subject to the punishment of extirpation.
F. If [he slaughtered] one outside and one inside, according to the view of the rabbis, for the first one [the act of slaughter is valid] and he is exempt from punishment. For the second one, it [the act of slaughter] is invalid and he is exempt [from punishment]. According to the view of R. Simeon, for the second he is subject to a prohibition.
G. And if you wished to conclude that the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day does not apply to Holy Things, then why is the second one subject to a prohibition? Should he not also be liable for the punishment of extirpation?
H. Rather said Raba, “Here is how R. Hamnuna stated matters. The punishment of stripes for slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day does not apply to Holy Things. Because as long as he has not sprinkled the blood, he has not rendered the meat permitted [for eating]. At the time that he slaughters [any warning he receives that the act he is about to perform is prohibited] is a warning subject to doubt. [Perhaps he will not sprinkle the blood.] And [we have a principle that] any warning that is subject to doubt is not a valid warning.”
I. And Raba is consistent with his view elsewhere. For said Raba, “If she [the mother] was an unconsecrated beast, and the offspring was a Peace-offering — if he slaughtered the unconsecrated beast and then slaughtered the Peace-offering, he is exempt [from violating the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day]. If he slaughtered the Peace-offering and then slaughtered the unconsecrated beast, he is liable.” [There is no longer a doubtful warning.]
J. And said Raba, “If she is an unconsecrated beast and the offspring is a Burnt-offering, there is no question that where he slaughtered the unconsecrated beast and afterward slaughtered the Burnt-offering that he is exempt. [81b] But even where he first slaughtered the Burnt-offering and then slaughtered the unconsecrated beast, he is exempt. Because the first act of slaughtering is not one that will lead to any eating.”
K. But [contrary to this, said] R. Jacob, said R. Yohanan, “The consumption [of meat] on the altar is deemed a valid act of `eating.'” What is the basis for this view? For Scripture stated, “If any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his Peace-offering is eaten [on the third day, he who offers it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to him; it shall be an abomination, and he who eats of it shall bear his iniquity]” (Lev. 7:18). The verse states matters [in emphatic terms that suggest] two acts of eating — whether the eating done by a person or the `eating' done by the altar — [that they are equivalent].
I.1 engages in a detailed analysis of the scriptural basis for the rule of Mishnah. This leads eventually to the citation of an intersecting secondary rule regarding the legal ramifications of the genetic relation of the sire to the offspring, a subject developed at I.2 I.3-4 move to a tertiary-level of discourse. I.5 returns to the primary thematic level citing a relevant Tosefta-text. In this long and tight composition, the framers make reference to the secondary premises [e.g., at F] and work through all the alternatives. I.6 cites a brief secondary expansion on the subject of the koy-animal. I.7 discusses a tertiary concern. II.1 engages in the familiar process of clarifying the authorship of Mishnah. II.2 presents an ostensible Tannaite contradiction to the rule of Mishnah. II.3 picks up on a principle evoked in II.1 and seeks to align the Tannaite premises.
5:3 A-I
A. (1) He who slaughters [a beast], and it turns out to be terefah,
B. (2) he who slaughters a beast for idolatrous purpose,
C. (3) and he who slaughters a cow [to be burned] for purification [water], and an ox which is to be stoned, and a heifer whose neck is to be broken [none of these is eaten] —
D. R. Simeon declares exempt [from punishment for violating the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on one day].
E. And sages declare liable.
F. (1) He who slaughters [a beast], and it is made carrion by his own deed,
G. (2) he who pierces [the windpipe],
H. (3) and he who tears out [the windpipe]
I. is exempt on account of violating the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on one day.
I.1
A. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “They taught this rule [that he is liable] only where he slaughtered the first one for idolatrous purposes and the second one for consumption at his table. But where he slaughtered the first one for his table and the second one for idolatrous purposes, he is exempt from punishment because of the principle that [with regard to his liability to punishment] the greater [violation] overrides the lesser [violation and cancels its punishment].”
B. Said to him R. Yohanan, “Even little schoolchildren know this. But there are times when even if he slaughtered the first for his table and the second for idolatrous purposes that he is liable. The case in question may be one where they warned him about the prohibition of slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day but they did not warn him about the prohibition of [slaughtering the animal for] idolatrous purposes.”
C. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Since where they warned him [about idolatry] he is exempt [from the punishment for the lesser violation of slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day], where they did not warn him [about idolatry], he is also exempt [from the lesser punishment].”
D. And they [Yohanan and Simeon] are consistent with their views elsewhere. For when R. Dimi came [from Israel] he said, “Those who inadvertently violated a prohibition [that had he violated deliberately he would have been] subject to the death penalty, and those who inadvertently violated a prohibition [that had he violated deliberately he would have been] subject to stripes, and [he violated] another act [involving a monetary payment] — R. Yohanan says he is liable [to pay]. And R. Simeon b. Laqish says he is exempt [from paying].”
E. R. Yohanan says is he liable because lo, they did not warn him [about the greater punishment]. And R. Simeon b. Laqish says he is exempt because since where they warn him [about the greater punishment] he is exempt, where they do not warn him, he also is exempt.
F. And it is necessary [to teach both rules in the cases of C and of D]. For if we had been instructed in this [first case, we would say that] in this case does R. Simeon b. Laqish state [that he is exempt]. But in the other it would make sense to say that he agrees with the view of R. Yohanan. And if we had been instructed in this [second case, we would say that] in this case does R. Yohanan state [that he is liable]. But in the other it would make sense to say that he agrees with the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish. It is necessary [to teach both rules].
II.1
A. And is [the slaughter of] a cow [to be burned] for purification [water] [M. 5:3 C] and act of slaughter that is invalid? But lo, it was taught on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon says, “A cow [for purification] renders foodstuffs and liquid unclean if there was [at least] a moment when it was fit” [T. Parah 7:9 A].
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