[79a] And in accord with the view of Hananiah [in L] it is written [both] “it” [masculine pronoun] that implies it is a male. And it is written “its young” [that implies] one [animal] whose young trails after it [i.e., the mother] a female. Therefore the rule applies to both males and females.
S. Said R. Huna bar Hiyya, said Samuel, “The law follows in accord with the view of Hananiah.” And Samuel is consistent with his view elsewhere. For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, “All offspring of a [female] horse, even though their sires are asses, are permitted [to mate] with one another... But the offspring of a [female] ass are prohibited [to mate] with the offspring of a [female] horse” [M. Kil. 8:4 C, E].
T. And said R. Judah, said Samuel, “These are the words of R. Judah who said that we do not take into account the seed of the sire [to determine the category of the offspring].” But sages say, “All the varieties of mules are one category.”
U. And who is the authority behind the view of sages? It is Hananiah who said, “We do take into account the seed of the sire.” And this one that is the offspring of a horse and a [female] ass or this one that is the offspring of an ass and a [female] horse, they are all one category. [This implies that the law follows in accord with Hananiah.]
I.2
A. They posed a question: Is it obvious to R. Judah that we do not take into account the seed of the sire? Or perhaps does he have some doubt about it? What difference does it make [with regard to the law]? [The difference is whether we] permit the offspring [of a female horse and an ass, i.e., a mule] to mate with [the species of] its mother. If you say that it is obvious [that we do not take into account the seed of the sire], then we should permit the offspring to mate with its mother. But if you say that he has some doubt, then we should prohibit the offspring to mate with the mother.
B. What is the law? Come and take note: R. Judah says, “All offspring of a [female] horse, even though their sires are asses, are permitted [to mate] with one another” [M. Kil. 8:4 C]. What is the situation? If you say that the sire of this one is an ass and the sire of that one is an ass, do you need to spell this out [that it is permitted]? Rather is it not the case that the sire of this one is a horse and the sire of that one is an ass. And it was taught that they are, “permitted [to mate] with one another.” It seems [logical to conclude] that it is obvious [that we do not take into account the seed of the sire in the determination of the offspring].
C. No. It is consistent to say that the sire of this one is an ass and the sire of that one is an ass. And what [about the objection that] was stated, “Do you need to spell this out?” [It was necessary to state the matter in accord with this reasoning]. What might I have maintained? The side [of the animal that derives from the] horse mates with [the side of the animal that derives from the] ass. Or the side of [the animal that derives from] the ass mates with [the side of the animal that derives from the] horse. It makes the novel point [that with regard to the law we do not suppose this to be the case].
I.3
A. Come and take note: A [female] mule that was in heat — they mate with it neither a horse nor an ass [but] only with its own species [T. Kil. 1:8 A-B]. And if you say that it is obvious [that we do not take into account the seed of the sire in the determination of the offspring], then why not mate it with the species of the mother? [They cannot do this because] they do not know what is the species of the mother.
B. But lo it was taught, “but only with its own species” [implying that they know the parentage]. This is how you should state matters: They mate with it neither a horse nor an ass — because they do not know its species.
C. So why do they not inspect its tokens [to determine the parentage]?For Abayye said, “If it has a thick voice, it is the offspring of a she-ass. if it has a thin voice, it is the offspring of a [female] horse.” And said R. Pappa, “If it has big ears and a short tail, it is the offspring of a she-ass. If it has small ears and a long tail, it is the offspring of a [female] horse.”
D. In this case what are we dealing with? [An animal that is] mute and mutilated [and accordingly they could not inspect its tokens to determine the parentage].
E. What is the result [of our inquiry begun at I.2 A]? Come and take note: For said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua, “All agree that it is prohibited [to mate] the offspring with [the species of] its mother.” We derive from this the conclusion that he [Judah] has some doubt [about whether we take into account the seed of the sire]. We derive it.
I.4
A. Said R. Abba to his servant, “When you hitch up the mules to the wagon, look for those that are alike [in their ears and tails] and hitch them up for me.” It seems [logical to conclude] that he reasons that we do not take into account the seed of the sire [79b] and that the [determination of parentage through these] tokens is based on the authority of the Torah.
I.5
A. Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: [The prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its offspring” applies to hybrid animals and to the koy. R. Eleazar says, "To the hybrid of a ewe and a goat — it applies. But to that of a koy it does not apply" [T. 5:1].
B. Said R. Hisda, “What is the [parentage of the] koy that is the subject of the dispute between R. Eliezer and sages? It is that offspring that comes out of the union of a goat and a [female] deer.”
C. What is the situation? If you maintain that a goat mated with a [female] deer and she gave birth and he slaughtered her and her offspring [on the same day] — lo, said R. Hisda, “All agree [in the case where] she [the mother] is a deer and her offspring is a goat, that he [who slaughters them on the same day] is free [of any liability for slaughtering the mother and offspring on the same day]. The [basis for this is the assumption that] Torah stated [the prohibition in the case of] a sheep and its offspring and not in the case of a deer and its offspring.”
D. Rather it must be maintained that a [male] deer mated with a female [goat] and she gave birth and he slaughtered her and her offspring [on the same day] — lo, said R. Hisda, “All agree [in the case where] she [the mother] is a goat and her offspring is a deer, that he [who slaughters them on the same day] is liable [for slaughtering the mother and offspring on the same day.] [The basis for this is the assumption that] the Torah stated [the prohibition in the case of] a sheep and any kind of offspring from it at all [including a deer].”
E. It is consistent to maintain that [the case is one where] a goat mated with a [female] deer. And she gave birth to a female offspring. And that female offspring gave birth to a male offspring. And he slaughtered her and her offspring [on the same day]. Our rabbis reasoned in accord with the principle that we do take into account the seed of the sire. And the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] even if it is partly a sheep. And R. Eliezer reasoned in accord with the principle that we do not take into account the seed of the sire. And the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do not say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included].
F. But why not stipulate that the dispute [hinges on whether the authorities hold the principle that] they take into account the seed of the sire as in the dispute between Hananiah and the rabbis [I.1 U]? [And say that according to Eliezer it does not apply to males and according to the rabbis it does apply (Rashi).]
G. If we stipulate that they disputed regarding this [principle], I would have reasoned that in this case even the rabbis agreed that the specification that it be a sheep [means] we do not say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included in the prohibition]. It makes the novel point [that this is not the case].
H. But lo it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: A koy... they may not slaughter it on a festival. But if one slaughters it [on a festival], they do not cover up its blood [since it is only partly a wild animal, cf. M. 6:1 and M. Bik. 2:9 C-D]. In that case what are we dealing with? If we maintain that it is a case of a goat that mated with a [female] deer and it gave birth, then in accord with the views of both the rabbis and R. Eliezer he should be permitted to slaughter it and obligated to cover its blood. [The Torah stipulated (Lev. 17:13) that one must cover the blood of] a deer and that means even [an animal that is] partly a deer.
I. Rather it must be that it is a case of a deer that mated with a [female] goat and it gave birth. If we hold in accord with the view of the rabbis, then he should be permitted to slaughter it and obligated to cover its blood [since in regard to the law, it is part wild animal]. And if we hold in accord with the view of R. Eliezer, then he should be permitted to slaughter it and not obligated to cover its blood [since in regard to the law, it is not a wild animal at all].
J. It is consistent to maintain that it is a case of deer that mated with a [female] goat. And the rabbis were in doubt whether or not we take into account the seed of the sire. And since we say that the rabbis were in doubt about this, [is it fair to assume that] R. Eliezer holds the view that it is obvious [that we do not take into account the seed of the sire in the determination of the offspring].
K. And [consider] what was taught on Tannaite authority: [The requirement to give to the priest] the shoulder, the two cheeks, and the maw [M. Hul. 10:1 A] applies to hybrid beasts and to the koy. R. Eleazar says, “To the hybrid beast born of ewe and the goat it does apply. To that of the koy — it is exempt from the gifts. [He who lays claim against his fellow must bring proof of the validity of his claim]” [T. 9:1]. What case are we dealing with? If we maintain that it is a case of a goat that mated with a [female] deer and gave birth, it makes perfect sense in accord with the view of R. Eliezer that it be exempt [it from the gifts]. He would reason that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do not say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included].
L. But in accord with the view of the rabbis, let it be the case that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means we do say that an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included]. It makes perfect sense that they do not give half [the gifts the derive from the deer to the Priest]. Regarding the other half [of the gifts that derive from the sheep] let us say to him [the Priest] that he should bring evidence that we do take account of the seed of the sire and take [the gifts].
M. Rather it must be [that the case is] a deer that mated with a [female] goat and it gave birth. It makes perfect sense in accord with the view of the rabbis. What is he obligated to give? Half of the gifts. But in accord with the view of R. Eliezer let him be obligated to give all of the gifts! [We do not take into account the seed of the sire.]
N. It is consistent to say [that the case is] a deer that mated with a [female] goat and it gave birth. And R. Eliezer is also in doubt as to whether or not we take into account the seed of the sire. But if according to the view of the rabbis we are in doubt about this, and according to the view of R. Eliezer we are in doubt about this, then in what case then do they dispute?
O. [They dispute over the issue of whether] the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included]. The rabbis reason that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included]. And R. Eliezer reasons that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do not say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included].
P. Said R. Pappa, “Therefore with regard to the matter of covering the blood and gifts [to the Priest] we find only [that the obligation applies for a koy in the case of] a deer that mated with a [female] goat. For both in accord with the view of the rabbis and of R. Eliezer there is a doubt about whether or not we take into account the seed of the sire. And they dispute over whether or not we say the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included].”
Q. Regarding the matter of [the prohibition of slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” we find that [they dispute] both in the case of a goat that mated with a [female] deer and in the case of a deer that mated with a [female] goat.
R. In the case of a goat that mated with a [female] deer [they dispute] regarding the prohibition. For the rabbis reason that perhaps we do take account of the seed of the sire and that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included] and it is prohibited.
S. And R. Eliezer reasons that we allow also that we take account of the seed of the sire but that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do not say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included].
T. And in the case of a deer that mated with a [female] goat [they dispute] regarding whether they flog [the violator]. The rabbis reason the we allow that we take account of the seed of the sire and that the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included] and they flog him.
U. And R. Eliezer reasons that there is a prohibition [against slaughtering them on the same day] but they do not flog him [for violating it]. There is a prohibition because perhaps we do not take account of the seed of the sire and then this [animal] is a perfectly complete sheep. They do not flog him because perhaps we do take account of the seed of the sire and the specification that it be a sheep [to be liable to the prohibition means] we do not say that [an animal that is] partly a sheep [is included].
I.6
A. Said R. Judah, “The koy is another category of creature unto itself. And the sages did not decide whether it is a kind of beast or a kind of wild animal.”
B. Said R. Nahman, “The koy is the wild ram.” And this accords with the Tannaite [dispute]: The koy is the wild ram. And some say that it is the offspring of the goat that mates with the [female] deer. R. Yosé says, “The koy is another category of creature unto itself. And the sages did not decide whether it is a kind of beast or a kind of wild animal.” Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “It is a kind of beast and the people of Bet Doshai raised many flocks of them” [cf. T. Bekh. 2:9].
I.7
A. Said R. Zira, said R. Safra, said R. Hamnuna, “These goats of Lebanon are valid to be brought upon the altar.” He reasons regarding this in accord with what R. Yitzhak said, “Scripture enumerated ten kinds of beasts [that are valid for slaughtering and eating].” And no more. And these [goats], since they were not understood to be classed together with the wild beasts, we derive from this that they are [in the general category of] goat.
B. R. Aha bar Jacob raised a contradiction to this: It makes sense to say that [the verse], “The hart, the gazelle, [the roebuck, the wild goat, the ibex, the antelope, and the mountain-sheep]” (Deut. 14:5) — is a specification [of the rule]. [The verse], “Every animal [that parts the hoof and has the hoof cloven in two, and chews the cud, among the animals, you may eat]” (Deut. 14:6) — is a general rule. [Where there is] a specification and a general rule, it is the case that the general rule adds on to the specification.
C. There are many [kinds of beasts that are valid that are not enumerated by Scripture]. If this is the case, then why do I need these specifications [in the verse at all]?
D. R. Aha the son of R. Iqa raised a contradiction: But perhaps [this goat of Lebanon] is a kind of the wild goat (Deut. 14:5). Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi, but some say that R. Aha the son of R. Avya said to R. Ashi, “Perhaps it is a kind of antelope or mountain-sheep.” Said R. Hanan to R. Ashi, “Amemar permitted [them to eat] the fat [of these goats, as if they were wild beasts].”
E. Abba the son of R. Minyamin bar Hiyya posed a question to R. Huna bar Hiyya, “These goats of Lebanon, what is the law regarding whether they may be brought upon the altar?”
F. He said to him, “On this point R. Yosé and the rabbis disputed only with regard to the wild ox.” As it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority: A wild ox is [considered] a kind of domesticated animal. And R. Yosé says, “[It is considered] a kind of wild animal” [M. Kil. 8:6 A-B].
G. For the rabbis reason that since “wild ox” was translated into the Aramaic equivalent of “goat of Lebanon,” it is deemed to be a [domesticated] beast. And R. Yosé reasons that since it was understood to be classed together with those wild beasts, it is a kind of wild beast. But these [goats of Lebanon] according to all views are a kind of goat.
H. R. Aha the son of R. Iqa raised a contradiction: But perhaps they are a kind of “wild goat”? Said Rabina to R. Ashi, “But perhaps they are a kind of `antelope' or `mountain-sheep'”? Said R. Nahman to R. Ashi, “Amemar permitted [them to eat] the fat [of these goats, as if they were wild beasts].”
II.1
A. How so? He who slaughters [it and its offspring, (1) which are unconsecrated, (2) outside [the Temple courtyard] — both of them are valid. And [for slaughtering] the second he incurs forty stripes] [M. 5:1 B-C]. Said R. Oshaia, “The entire Mishnah does not accord with the view of R. Simeon.”
B. In what way is this the case? Since it teaches, [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things (2) outside — [for] the first is he liable to extirpation, and both of them are invalid, and [for] both of them he incurs forty stripes [M. 5:1 D]. Consider and take note that R. Simeon said, “An act of slaughter that is improper, is not a valid act of slaughter.”
C. [80b] [On the basis of this principle we may reason that] the first [animal he slaughtered] he just killed it [because the act was not deemed valid]. The second one should be acceptable inside [the Temple]. He should be liable to extirpation [for slaughtering it outside] as well.
D. [He who slaughters] (1) unconsecrated beasts (2) inside [the Temple courtyard] — both of them are invalid, and [for] the second he incurs forty stripes [M. 5:1 E]. Consider and take note that R. Simeon said, “An act of slaughter that is improper, is not a valid act of slaughter.”
E. [On the basis of this principle we may reason that] the first [animal he slaughtered] he just killed it [because the act was not deemed valid]. For the second one then why should he incur forty stripes?
F. [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things (2) inside — the first is valid, and he is exempt [from any punishment], and [for] the second he incurs forty stripes, and it is invalid [M. 5:1 F]. Consider and take note that R. Simeon said, “An act of slaughter that is improper, is not a valid act of slaughter.”
G. [On the basis of this principle we may reason that] the slaughter of Holy Things is also deemed improper. For as long as he did not sprinkle the blood [on the altar], the meat is not permitted [for eating]. For the second one then why should he incur forty stripes?
H. Rather we must derive from this [line of reasoning] that the law does not follow in accord with R. Simeon. But this is obvious. But because we deal here with an act of slaughtering Holy Things we needed to state the matter. I might have thought that it makes sense to say that this act of slaughter of a Holy Thing is a proper act. For lo, if he pierced [the organs] and sprinkled the blood, the meat would not be permitted [for eating]. And now that he performed an act of slaughter [and sprinkled the blood], the meat is permitted and it is a proper act of slaughter. It makes the novel point [that this is not the case].
II.2
A. And should he not incur stripes also on account of [offering a sacrifice] at the wrong time? For it was taught on Tannaite authority: On what basis do they rule that all invalid [animals that are offered as sacrifices] of oxen or sheep are subsumed under the prohibition [established by the phrase], “It cannot be accepted” (Lev. 22:23)? It comes to teach [in the verse], “A bull or a lamb which has a part too long or too short you may present for a freewill offering; but for a votive offering it cannot be accepted” (Lev. 22:23). This teaches us about the invalid [animals that are offered as sacrifices] of oxen or sheep that they are subsumed under the prohibition [established by the phrase], “It cannot be accepted.” [Why then does the Mishnah not specify that he be liable for stripes for this violation?]
B. What was understood [as pertinent to the Mishnah] were the prohibitions against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day. Other prohibitions were not understood [as pertinent to the concerns of the Mishnah here].
C. But this is not so. For lo, [the case of slaughtering] Holy Things outside involves other prohibitions and it was understood [as pertinent to the Mishnah]. For it was taught in the Mishnah: [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things (2) outside — [for] the first is he liable to extirpation, and both of them are invalid, and [for] both of them he incurs forty stripes [M. 5:1 D]. Now it makes perfect sense [that he incurs stripes for slaughtering] the second one on account of the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day. [And the Mishnah is justified in specifying it.] But for the first one, why does he incur stripes? Is it not because of the prohibition against slaughtering [Holy Things] outside? [Why then does the Mishnah specify it?]
D. [We can explain it as follows.] In any instance where there is no prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day, it is understood that the other prohibitions are not [pertinent to the concerns of Mishnah]. And in any instance where there is a prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on the same day, it is understood that the other prohibitions are [pertinent to the concerns of Mishnah].
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