A. Lo [from the rule of Mishnah we may deduce that mixing the flesh of] fowl [with milk] is prohibited based on the authority of the Torah.
B. In accord with whose view [is this premise]? It is not in accord with the view of R. Aqiba. For if it were in accord with the view of R. Aqiba, lo he said [explicitly], “Wild beasts and fowl are not prohibited on the authority of the Torah [to be mixed with milk] [M. 8:4 E].”
C. Consider the [implication of the] latter text of the Mishnah: He who vows [to abstain] from flesh is permitted [to make use of] the flesh of fish and locusts [E]. Lo [this implies that one who makes such a vow] is prohibited [to eat the flesh of] fowl.
D. This [latter text] follows in accord with the view of R. Aqiba who said, “In every instance that a messenger [has a doubt about the object of his mission and] would consult [the person who sent him about whether an item fits the description of the object he was sent for because he has sufficient grounds to do so — concerning that item we are justified to say] it is of the same category [as the item specified at the outset. The fact that the messenger had enough of a doubt to inquire shows that most people would deem the item to be subsumed under the original category.]”
E. For it was taught on Tannaite authority: He who vows not to eat vegetables is permitted to eat gourds. And R. Aqiba prohibits [him from eating gourds]. They said to R. Aqiba, “And does not a man say to his messenger, `Buy me vegetables,' to which the other replies [upon his return home], `I found only gourds'?” He said to them, “That is just how things are! But would he say to him, `I found only pulse'? But gourds are in the general category of vegetables, while pulse is not in the general category of vegetables [M. Ned. 7:1 A-E].” [Thus the latter text is in accord with the view of R. Aqiba.]
F. [Is it consistent to say that] the former text of the Mishnah is in accord with the view of the rabbis and the latter text is in accord with the view of R. Aqiba? [Yes it is consistent to say this because] said R. Joseph, “This is the method of Rabbi [Judah the Prince in redacting the Mishnah]. And he followed in accord with various Tannaite authorities. Regarding the rule concerning vows he followed in accord with the view of R. Aqiba. Regarding the rule of mixing flesh and milk he followed in accord with the view of the rabbis.”
G. R. Ashi said, “All [of the Mishnah] is in accord with the view of R. Aqiba. And here is how you should state the matter: Every [kind of] flesh [i.e., meat, of cattle, wild beast, and fowl] is it prohibited to cook in milk, some of them [are prohibited] based on the authority of the words of the Torah and some of them [are prohibited] based on the authority of the words of the scribes, except for the flesh of fish and locusts, that are [prohibited] neither by the words of the Torah nor by the words of the scribes.”
A. And it is prohibited to serve it up onto the table with cheese, [except for the flesh of fish and locusts (C-D)]. Said R. Joseph, “We may derive from this the conclusion that [cooking] the flesh of fowl with milk is prohibited based on the authority of the Torah. Because if you concluded that it was prohibited based on the authority of the rabbis, [then that means] that the act of eating it was itself prohibited as a [rabbinic] decree. Would we then have the power to prohibit by decree serving [fowl and cheese on the same table] lest he come to eat [fowl and cheese together]? [This would amount to a rabbinic decree imposed upon another such prohibition.]
B. And what is the source of the statement that they do not enact a [rabbinic] decree [as a precaution to prevent a person from violating another rabbinic] decree? As it was taught on Tannaite authority: Dough offering separated [from produce that comes from] outside the Land of Israel... [104b] may be eaten at the same table with a nonpriest. And it may be given to any priest [not only to one who keeps the laws of purity][M. Hal. 4:8 L-M].
C. Said to him Abayye,“This is consistent [to draw this parallel to the rule of our Mishnah] if we were instructed [about this rule] concerning the case of dough offering separated [from produce that comes from] outside the Land of Israel that was now in the Land of Israel. For in that case there is reason to prohibit by decree [eating it at the same table with a nonpriest] lest [he come to eat] dough offering separated [from produce that comes from] inside the Land of Israel which [a nonpriest is prohibited to eat] based on the authority of the Torah. And we do not prohibit that by [rabbinic] decree. You may derive from this the conclusion [that we do not enact a rabbinic decree to prevent a person from violating another decree].
D. “But if the case concerns [dough offering] outside the Land of Israel [the reason they do not prohibit eating it at the same table with a nonpriest is] because there is no basis for making this decree.
E. “But here [in the case of the rule of our Mishnah] if you permit him to put fowl and cheese [on the same table] he will come to put [animal] flesh and cheese [on the same table] and will [possibly end up] eating flesh and milk [together] which is prohibited based on the authority of the Torah.”
A. R. Sheshet posed an objection [to the rule of Mishnah]: In the final analysis this is a case of one cold food [at worst touching] another cold food [which does not result in a forbidden mixture].
B. Said Abayye, “They made a decree [against this practice of bringing cold food to the table] lest one bring [the flesh and milk together (Cashdan: to the table)] in a boiling stew-pot [which is a forbidden mixture of milk and meat].”
C. But in the final analysis [a boiling stew-pot] is a secondary vessel [that is not in contact with the fire]. And [we have a principle that in regard to the law] a secondary vessel does not cook food [no matter how hot it gets. So we do not have here a case of milk cooked together with meat.]
D. Rather [we must then say that] they made a decree [against this practice] lest one bring [the flesh and milk together (Cashdan: to the table) in a boiling stew-pot that is] a primary vessel [i.e., like a fondue pot in contact with a fire because that certainly is a prohibited means of cooking milk together with meat].
Unit I.1 initiates an inquiry into the premises and authorship of the M.-passage. II.1 deduces the authoritative basis for a prohibition in M. Unit II.2 establishes the basis for a decree that extends the prohibition of milk and meat and discusses its implications.
F. “Fowl goes up onto the table with cheese, but it is not eaten,” the words of the House of Shammai.
G. And the House of Hillel say, “It does not go up, and it is not eaten,”
H. Said R. Yosé, “This is one of the lenient rulings of the House of Shammai and the strict rulings of the House of Hillel” [M. Ed. 4:1, 5:2].
I. Concerning what sort of table did they speak?
J. Concerning a table on which one eats. But as to a table on which one lays out [foods to prepare them for] cooking, one puts this [flesh] beside that [cheese] and does not scruple.
A. [It appears that the view in H of] R. Yosé is identical to that of the first Tanna [of the Mishnah]. But if you wish to maintain that the difference between them is whether they may actually eat [fowl and cheese at the same table — then this is what the views would imply]: The first Tanna would hold the view that they disputed about the rule of whether they may bring up [flesh and milk to the table]. With regard to whether they may eat [flesh and cheese at the same table] they did not dispute. And R. Yosé would say to him that whether they may eat is one of the rules that are classified as a leniency of the House of Shammai and a stringency of the House of Hillel.
B. [But if this is your line of reasoning then consider that] lo it was taught on Tannaite authority, R. Yosé says, “[There are] six opinions of the House of Shammai's more lenient [rulings] and the House of Hillel's more stringent [rulings] and this is one of them: `Fowl may be served up on the table together with cheese, but it may not be eaten,' the words of the House of Shammai. And the House of Hillel say, `It may neither be served up with it nor eaten with it [M. Ed. 5:2 A-C].'”
C. Lo this [argument] makes the novel point that whose view is [expressed as the view of] the first Tanna? The view of R. Yosé. [And why does the Mishnah repeat the view?] Because anyone who states a matter in the name of its original author brings redemption to the world. As it states, “[And this came to the knowledge of Mordecai, and he told it to Queen Esther,] and Esther told the king in the name of Mordecai” (Esther 2:22).
A. Agra the father-in-law of R. Abba taught, “Fowl and cheese may be eaten without compunction.” He taught this principle and he stated its intent: [One may eat fowl and cheese in the same meal] without washing one's hands and without wiping one's mouth [between eating the fowl and the cheese].
B. R. Yitzhak the son of R. Mesharshayya visited the house of R. Ashi. They brought before him cheese and he ate it. They brought before him meat and he ate it without first washing his hands.
C. They said to him, “But lo did not Agra the father-in-law of R. Abba teach, `Fowl and cheese may be eaten without compunction.' [This implies that] fowl and cheese may be eaten, but that flesh and cheese may not be eaten [at the same meal unless one washes and wipes his mouth between eating them].”
D. He said to them, “This concern applies at night. But during the day, lo he can see [if his hands are clean or if there is food stuck to them].
A. It was taught on Tannaite authority: “The House of Shammai say he must wipe [his mouth between eating meat and cheese]. And the House of Hillel say he must wash it out.”
B. What does the rule that he must `wipe' entail? And what does the rule that he must `wash' entail?