I.1 objects to Mishnah on the basis of Tosefta and works out the issue.
J. He who slaughters on the Sabbath or on the Day of Atonement, even though he [thereby] becomes liable for his life —
K. his act of slaughter is valid.
A. Said R. Huna, “R. Hiyya bar Abba interpreted [the rule] in the name of Rab, `[The meat] is prohibited to be eaten for that [Sabbath] day.'” And his associates proposed to say that [this view corresponds with] that of R. Judah.
B. Which view of R. Judah? Said R. Abba, “It [corresponds with the view of] R. Judah with regard to preparation [of foods for use on the Sabbath day].” For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, They cut up gourds [for consumption] before cattle and [may cut up] carrion meat before dogs. R. Judah says, “If it was not carrion on the eve of the Sabbath, it is prohibited [to feed to dogs on the Sabbath day] because it is not something which has been made ready [before the Sabbath for use on the Sabbath] [M. Shab. 24:4].”
C. It seems [logical to conclude] that since it was not ready the previous day, it is prohibited [to make use of the animal]. Here as well, since [the animal] was not ready [for eating] the previous day, it is prohibited [to make use of the animal on the Sabbath].
D. Said to him Abayye, “How can you compare the cases? There [in the case of carrion the animal] was originally ready for [consumption by] humans. And now it is ready for dogs. Here [in the case of an animal slaughtered on the Sabbath the animal] was originally ready for [consumption by] humans. And now it is ready for humans.”
E. Who reasons that an animal in its lifetime stands ready for eating? An animal in its lifetime stands ready for breeding. If that is the case then why according to the view of R. Judah may they slaughter an animal on the festival? He said to him, “It stands ready for eating and stands ready for breeding. Once it is slaughtered it is then clarified that it stood ready for eating. If it was not slaughtered then it was clarified that it stood ready for breeding.”
F. But lo, R. Judah does not accept the principle of clarification. Based on what do we derive this? If we say [we derive it from] that which was taught on Tannaite authority [then we seem to have a contradiction], “He who purchases wine from among the Samaritans [and does not have the means to immediately separate heave-offering and tithes from it but wishes to drink the wine] says, `Two logs that I [later] will separate, behold these are made heave-offering; ten [logs] are made first tithes; nine are made second tithes' [M. Demai 7:4]. And he redeems [the second tithes, transferring the sanctity to coins] and he drinks,” the words of R. Meir. R. Judah, R. Yosé and R. Simeon prohibit [this course of action because they do not accept the principle of clarification] [T. Demai 8:7].
G. [14b] [This contradiction cannot be sustained. The reason they do not apply the principle of clarification] there is, as they taught, on this basis: they said to R. Meir, “Do you not admit [the possibility] that perhaps the cask [of wine] will break [after he drinks from it but before he has the chance to separate the offerings] and it turns out retroactively that he drank untithed produce?” He said to them, “[I do not worry about such a possibility] until it actually breaks [because it is so unlikely]” (b. Erub. 37b). [The case here does not conclusively demonstrate Judah's view.]
H. Rather [we may derive the view of Judah regarding the principle of clarification from what] Ayyo taught: For Ayyo taught, “R. Judah says, `A person does not make a conditional statement about two conflicting matters at the same time. Rather [he may stipulate] that if a sage comes to the east then his Sabbath boundary is to the east [so that he may go to greet the sage]. Or if a sage comes to the west, then his Sabbath boundary is to the west. But if [he stipulates that the boundary will be] either in one direction or the other [for the purpose of greeting one of two sages, depending on which he chooses], it is not [a valid stipulation because we do not apply the principle of clarification. He may make a conditional statement about the status of his Sabbath boundary but not one that depends on his own later clarification].'”
I. But they contended with that conclusion: What is the difference [between the case of stipulating that he will greet one of two sages] in one direction or the other, where we say that he may not [make such a stipulation] because we do not apply the principle of clarification [and the case of one who stipulates that his boundary will be] to the east or the west, where we also should not apply the principle of clarification?
J. But said R. Yohanan, “[In the latter case the circumstance was that] the sage had already come [to either the east or the west before the Sabbath and on the Sabbath he simply was determining the facts].” [Judah, in any case, does not apply the principle of clarification. If the view that the meat is not permitted because it is not prepared before the Sabbath accords with the view of Judah (above, A), we must find a different precedent.]
K. Rather, said R. Joseph, “[The statement at A above accords with the view of] R. Judah with regard to utensils.” For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, All utensils that may be handled on the Sabbath [if they were to break on the Sabbath] — the shards of such utensils may be handled on the Sabbath, as long as you can perform some sort of useful work with them [even if it is not what they did when they were whole]. The shards of a kneading trough that can be used to cover the mouth of a barrel, shards of glass that can be used to cover the mouth of a flask [can be carried on the Sabbath because they function as utensils].
L. R. Judah says, “[You may carry the shards on the Sabbath] as long as they may be used to perform the same function as the original utensil. Shards of a kneading trough that can be used to pour through it a porridge, shards of glass that can be used to pour through them oil [can be carried on the Sabbath because they function in the same way as the original utensils]” [M. Shab. 17:5].
M. [According to Judah if they serve to perform] their original functions, we may [carry them on the Sabbath]. But if they serve to carry out some other function, we may not. It seems logical to conclude that since they [the shards] were not prepared from the preceding day for this function, you are prohibited [to use them on the Sabbath]. Here too [regarding the meat] since it was not prepared from the preceding day [for consumption] it is prohibited [to eat the meat on the Sabbath].
N. Said to him Abayye, “How can you compare the cases?” There it was formerly a utensil and now it is a shard of a utensil. And that is a case of the origination [of an object on the Sabbath day] and it is prohibited. Here [in our Mishnah] it was formerly food and now it is food.
O. It is like food that was disjoined [into components and reassembled]. And we were taught regarding this that R. Judah said food that was disjoined is perfectly acceptable. For it was taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah, They do not squeeze fruits to extract juice [on the Sabbath]. But if it seeped out on its own it is prohibited [to use the juice on the Sabbath]. R. Judah says, “If [the fruit was intended for use] as food, that which exudes from it is permitted [because he does not desire that the juice seep from fruit intended for eating]. And if [the fruit was intended for] drink, that which exudes from it is prohibited [because producing juice is the purpose of the fruit] [M. Shabbat 22:1 E-H].” [So food that was separated into its constituent elements is deemed permissible.]
P. [R. Joseph replied (Cashdan):] It was stated concerning this matter: said R. Judah, said Samuel, “R. Judah would agree with the sages [that the juice that seeps out is prohibited] in the case of baskets of olives and grapes [set aside for eating, because they are usually pressed for their oil and juice] (b. Shab. 143b).”
Q. It seems [logical to conclude] that since they are [generally] kept for pressing, he will be inclined [to accept that the juice seeps from them even though he designated them for eating]. [So we enjoin him from using it.] Here too [regarding an animal that was slaughtered on the Sabbath] since it is kept for slaughtering, he will be inclined [to accept that it was slaughtered and eat from it]. [So we enjoin him from eating the meat.]
R. [Abayye replied (Cashdan):] This matter [of reply] has a basis in accord with Rab [who originally said that according to R. Judah the animal slaughtered on the Sabbath is prohibited for the day (above at A).] But lo did not Rab say that R. Judah disputed [and permitted consumption of the juice that seeped] even in the case of baskets of olives and grapes? [Why prohibit the animal in our Mishnah?]
S. But said R. Sheshet the son of R. Idi, “[The view of R. Judah regarding the animal slaughtered on the Sabbath at A is in accord with the view of] R. Judah regarding [moving] lamps [on the Sabbath day].”
T. For it was taught on Tannaite authority, “They may carry about a new lamp, but not an old one,” the words of R. Judah [T. Shab. 3:13 A] [because the new one may be used for other purposes but the thought of using the old one for another purpose is disgusting].
U. Let us say [you can argue] we may deduce that R. Judah holds the view [that one may not use a lamp because] it is an object restricted [in its handling on the Sabbath] because it is disgusting. Do we draw the same conclusion regarding a case of an object restricted [in its handling on the Sabbath] on account of a prohibition? Yes we do.