C. For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, The pomegranate, the acorn, or the nut which the children have fashioned [as a toy so as] to measure the dirt with them, or which they have adapted as a pair of scales — it is [susceptible to becoming] unclean [as a utensil], because they have [the capacity of] deed [i.e., they can fashion them into utensils by hollowing them out] [13a] but they do not have [the capacity of] deliberation [i.e., to transform a hollow object that they find into a utensil merely by their intention to use it as such] [M. Kel. 17:15 D-E].
D. He [Hiyya] said to him, “Simple deliberation [by a minor] poses no question for us [because we do not take it into account]. What poses a question for us is when his [the minor's] deliberation is discerned from his deeds.”
E. For example: If [the animal to be used for] a whole burnt-offering was situated to the south [of the altar] and he [a minor] took it to the north and slaughtered it there, what is the law? Since he took it to the north side and slaughtered it there [do we say that] he had intention [to perform the proper act for this offering, i.e., to slaughter it on the north side]? Or perhaps he just did not favor the other place [and we cannot infer from his action anything regarding his intention].
F. Lo, R. Yohanan already said one time [what his view is in this instance]. For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, He who brings his produce up to the roof because of the maggots [Jastrow: vermin], and dew fell upon it, it is not under the rule of `If water be put' (Lev 11:38). But if he had intention for this [dew to fall upon it] then it is under the rule of `If water be put'. If a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor brought it up [to the roof], even though he may have intended for this [dew to fall upon it, the produce] is not under the rule of `If water be put' because they have [the capacity for] deed but they do not have [the capacity for] deliberation [M. Maksh. 6:1].
G. And said R. Yohanan, “This was taught only where they did not arrange them. But if they [e.g., the minor] did arrange them, lo they are subject to the rule of `If water be put.'” [What then was the question that R. Yohanan posed?]
H. This is the question that he posed: [Is the law concerning the minor's deliberation that is discerned from his deeds] based on the authority of the Torah or based on the authority of the rabbis?
I. R. Nahman bar Yitzhak taught as follows [an alternate to the preceding, A-H]: Said R. Hiyya bar Abba, “R. Yohanan posed this question: a minor — does he have [the capacity of] deed [necessary for the performance of a ritual act] or does he not have [the capacity of] deed?”
J. Said to him R. Ammi, “Let him pose the question regarding [the status of a minor's] deliberation.” What is the difference [between these objections — both are settled elsewhere]? With regard to deliberation there can be no question, for it was taught on Tannaite authority that they do not have [the capacity of] deliberation. With regard to deed there also can be no question, for it was taught on Tannaite authority that they have [the capacity of] deed.
K. This is the question that he posed: [Is the law concerning the validity of a minor's deeds] based on the authority of the Torah or based on the authority of the rabbis?
L. And he answered that they have [the capacity for] deed even in instances that rest on the authority of the Torah. And they do not have [the capacity for deliberation] even in instances that rest only on the authority of the rabbis.
M. [And in a case where the minor's] deliberation is discerned from his deeds — in instances that rest on the authority of the Torah, we say that he does not [have the capacity of deliberation] and in instances that rest on the authority of the rabbis, we say that he has [the capacity of deliberation].
N. Samuel posed the question to R. Huna, “On what basis do we say that one who is spontaneously involved in preparing sacrifices [i.e., without having any deliberation in his actions for the sake of a sacrifice] that it renders [the sacrifices] unfit?” For Scripture states, “Then he shall kill the bull” (Lev. 1:5) [implying] that the killing must be for the sake of a [sacrificial] bull.
O. He said to him, “We have this [part of the rule, that he must do it deliberately for the sake of a sacrifice] in our hands. What is the basis for [the other side of the rule, that if he does not have the proper intention then that] invalidates [the sacrifice]?” [Scripture teaches], “You shall offer it so that you may be accepted” (Lev. 19:5). [This implies that] you must offer it with your full knowledge. [Wherever Scripture repeats the requirement, we may deduce that it means it to be both sufficient and necessary. So without deliberation a sacrifice is invalid.]
E. The act of slaughter of a gentile [produces] carrion.
F. And it [the meat] imparts uncleanness through being carried.
A. [Does the act of slaughter of a gentile produce] carrion? Yes, [but does it produce meat whose] benefit is forbidden? No.
B. Who is the Tannaite authority behind this teaching? Said R. Hiyya b. R. Abba, said R. Yohanan, “It does not accord with the view of R. Eliezer. For if it did accord with the view of R. Eliezer, lo, he said that the ordinary thoughts of a gentile are to [serve] idolatry [cf. b. ul. 38b]. [Accordingly deriving any benefit from the meat should be forbidden.]”
C. R. Ammi said, “Teach matters as follows: The act of slaughter of a gentile [produces] carrion. That of a heretic [we presume] is to [serve] idolatry.”
D. It was taught as follows, our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: The act of slaughter of a heretic is to [serve] idolatry. His bread is [treated like] the bread of a Samaritan. His wine [is treated like] libation-wine. His scrolls [are treated like] scrolls of the fortune tellers. His produce [is treated like] untithed produce.
E. And some even say [13b] his children [are treated like] illegitimate children [because he permits his wife to engage in relations with other men]. And the first Tanna [who omits the statement about his children holds the view that] he would not be permissive with his wife.
F. Said the master, The act of slaughter of a gentile [produces] carrion — and why do we not suspect that perhaps he was a heretic [i.e., one whose every fundamental belief and action is dedicated to idolatry]?
G. Said R. Nahman, said Rabbah bar Abbuha, “There are no heretics [totally dedicated to idolatry] among the nations of the gentiles.” But we may observe that there are. You should say, “The majority of gentiles are not heretics.”
H. He reasons in accord with the view of R. Hiyya bar Abba: said R. Yohanan, “The gentiles outside of the land of Israel are not [genuine] idolaters. Rather they only [practice idolatry to] observe their ancestral customs.”
I. Said R. Joseph bar Manyomi, said R. Nahman, “There are no heretics [totally dedicated to idolatry] among the nations of the gentiles.” To what [circumstance] should we apply this statement? If to [the issue of] slaughter, here, concerning slaughter by a heretic Israelite, we said that it is forbidden [to use the meat], concerning [the prohibition on meat slaughtered] by a [heretic] gentile do we need [to state another rule]?
J. Rather [apply this statement to the issue of whether, given the opportunity, they] lower them down [into a pit to endanger the heretics, cf. Rashi and b. A.Z. 26b]. Here [the distinction is made]: [regarding a heretic] Israelite, they lower him down; [regarding a heretic] gentile, do we need [to state another rule]?
K. Said R. Uqba bar Hama, “[Apply the statement of I to the issue of whether we] accept from them an offering.” For it was taught on Tannaite authority, “[When any man] of you [brings an offering to the Lord]” (Lev. 1:2) — and not all of you [may bring]. This excludes the apostate. “Of you” — from among you I distinguished [the treatment of the heretic] and not from among the gentiles.
L. On what basis [do you draw this conclusion]? Perhaps this is the way to state matters: From among Israelites — from the righteous we accept [sacrifices], from the wicked we do not accept. But from gentiles, not at all. Not at all! You cannot entertain this notion. For it was taught on Tannaite authority [that the verse repeats the word], “A man” (Lev. 22:18). What does it teach in repeating “A man,” “A man”? It includes gentiles who vow to bring an offering or make a donation [to the Temple in the same category] as an Israelite [who may bring a sacrifice].
A. And it [the meat] imparts uncleanness through being carried. But this is obvious. Because it is carrion it imparts uncleanness through being carried.
B. Said Raba, “This is how you should teach the matter: This one imparts uncleanness through being carried. And there is another [type of carcass] that imparts uncleanness even by [common presence with objects in] a tent.” And what is that? That is [the carcass of an animal] that was offered before idolatry and according to the view of R. Judah b. Betera [as will be explained below].
C. Another version: said Raba, “This one imparts uncleanness through being carried. And there is another [type of carcass] like this one that defiles that imparts uncleanness through being carried but does not [defile] by [common presence with objects in] a tent.” And what is that? That is [the carcass of an animal] that was offered before idolatry and not according to the view of R. Judah b. Betera.
D. For it was taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah b. Betera says, “On what basis do we say that [an animal] that was offered before idolatry imparts uncleanness through a tent? Because it says, `Then they attached themselves to the Baal of Peor, and ate sacrifices offered to the dead' (Ps. 106:28) (b. A.Z. 32b). Just as the dead impart uncleanness through a tent, so too does [the carcass of an animal] offered before idolatry impart uncleanness through a tent.”
I.1 tries to align Mishnah with a Tannaite authority and then it explores the difference with regard to the law between a gentile and a heretic. II.1 contrasts Mishnah's law with another case.
G. He who slaughters at night —
H. and so too a blind person who slaughtered —
I. his act of slaughter is valid.
A. He who slaughters implies that [if he slaughters, then] after the fact it is [valid]. But he may not [slaughter] to begin with.
B. But they raised an objection [to that conclusion from the following]: At any time do they slaughter [M. ul. 1:2 D] — whether by day or by night. [Supply: And in any place do they slaughter] — whether on a ship or whether on a roof [T. ul. 1:4 A-D, the Talmud text reverses the order of the last two phrases].
C. Said R. Pappa, “If there is a torch opposite him [lighting the area, he may slaughter to begin with].”
D. Said R. Ashi, “You may draw an inference also from that which was taught [in the context of each rule]. There [in Tos. the rule for night] is juxtaposed with [a rule for the] day [suggesting that the area was lit up]. Here [in M. the rule for night] is juxtaposed with [a rule for] a blind man [suggesting that he slaughtered in darkness]. Accordingly, we may derive these inferences.” [14a]