Bavli Hullin Chapter Five Folios 78A-83B
5:1
A. [The prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” (Lev. 22:28) applies (1) in the Land and outside the Land, (2) in the time of the Temple and not in the time of the Temple, (3) in the case of unconsecrated beasts and in the case of consecrated beasts.
B. How so?
I C. He who slaughters it and its offspring, (1) which are unconsecrated, (2) outside [the Temple courtyard] — both of them are valid. And [for slaughtering] the second he incurs forty stripes.
II D. [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things (2) outside — [for] the first is he liable to extirpation, and both of them are invalid, and [for] both of them he incurs forty stripes.
III E. [He who slaughters] (1) unconsecrated beasts (2) inside [the Temple courtyard] — both of them are invalid, and [for] the second he incurs forty stripes.
IV F. [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things (2) inside — the first is valid, and he is exempt [from any punishment], and [for] the second he incurs forty stripes, and it is invalid.
5:2
V A. [He who slaughters] (1) unconsecrated beasts and (2) Holy Things outside [the Temple courtyard], the first is valid, and he is free [on its account of the penalty of extirpation], and [for] the second he incurs forty stripes, and it is invalid.
VI B. [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things and (2) unconsecrated beasts outside, [for] the first he is liable to extirpation, and it is invalid. And the second is valid. And [for] both of them he incurs forty stripes.
VII C. [He who slaughters] (1) unconsecrated beasts and (2) Holy Things inside [the Temple], both of them are invalid. And [for] the second he incurs forty stripes.
VIII D. [He who slaughters] (1) Holy Things and (2) unconsecrated beasts inside, the first is valid. And he is free [on its account of the penalty of extirpation]. And [for] the second he incurs forty stripes, and it is invalid.
IX E. [He who slaughters] unconsecrated beasts (1) outside and (2) inside, the first is valid, and he is free [of the penalty of extirpation]. And [for the second] he incurs forty stripes, and it is invalid.
X F. [He who slaughters] Holy Things (1) outside and (2) inside, [for] the first he is liable to extirpation, and both of them are invalid. And [for] both of them he incurs forty stripes.
XI G. [He who slaughters] unconsecrated beasts (1) inside and (2) outside, the first is invalid. And he is free [of the penalty of extirpation]. And [for] the second he incurs forty stripes. And it is valid.
XII H. [He who slaughters] Holy Things (1) inside and (2) outside, the first is valid. And he is free [of the penalty of extirpation]. And [for] the second he incurs forty stripes, and it is invalid.
I.1
A. Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: Based on what source do we say that [the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” applies to Holy Things? it comes to teach us [in the verse], “When a bull or sheep or goat is born, [it shall remain seven days with its mother; and from the eighth day on it shall be acceptable as an offering by fire to the Lord]” (Lev. 22:27). And it is written after that, “And whether the mother is a cow or a ewe, you shall not kill both her and her young in one day” (Lev. 22:28). This teaches us that [the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” applies to Holy Things.
B. But it should makes sense to maintain [that the prohibition does apply] to Holy Things and not to unconsecrated beasts. [The repetition of the introductory phrase] “[And whether the mother is] a cow” breaks in to the matter. [The added phrase in the second verse suggests it deals with a separate subject.]
C. But then it should make sense to maintain [that the prohibition does apply] to unconsecrated beasts and not to Holy Things. It is written, “And [whether the mother is] a cow.” The conjunctive-vav [“And”] adds on to the original matter. [The conjunction suggests that the second verse stipulates the prohibition in the case of the first and second circumstances.]
D. If this is so [that there is a conjunction between the rules for Holy Things and unconsecrated beasts, then we should reason as follows]: What is the case with regard to Holy Things? A hybrid animal may not [become Holy]. So too with regard to [the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” — a hybrid animal should not be [subject to the rule].
E. Why then was this taught on Tannaite authority: [The prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its offspring” applies to hybrid animals and to the koy [T. 5:1 A]? And moreover, it is written [in the verse], “a sheep.” And said Raba, [78b] “This is a basic principle. Anywhere it says `sheep' it is only to exclude [from the rule] a hybrid animal.”
F. [But we do include a hybrid in the rule.] Scripture said, “or” to include [in the rule] a hybrid animal. [But is this the case?] This use of “or” is needed in order to indicate a separation of the cases. For you might have said that it makes sense to maintain that until one slaughters [both] a cow and its offspring and a sheep and it offspring [on the same day] he is not liable to punishment. It comes to make the novel point [that we separate the cases].
G. We could derive that we separate the cases from [the term] “its offspring.” [The word “or” then would be extraneous and could be used to include a hybrid in the rule.] But we still need [“or”] in accord with what was taught on Tannaite authority: If it stated, “A cow or a ewe and its offspring” I would have said [you are not liable] until you slaughter a cow, a ewe and the offspring [of one of them]. It comes to teach us, “And whether the mother is a cow or a ewe, [you shall not kill] both her and her young [in one day].”
H. Is it not the case that we derive [that conclusion from the word] “or?” No. [It is just as reasonable to conclude that] we derive it from [the word] “it.”
I. This would settle the matter in accord with the view of the rabbis who say that the word “it” is extraneous. But in accord with the view of Hananiah who does not say the word “it” is extraneous, based on what then would I conclude that we should separate the cases?
J. To separate the cases he does not need a scriptural basis. For he reasons in accord with the view of R. Jonathan. As it was taught on Tannaite authority: “For every one who curses his father or [lit. `and'] his mother [shall be put to death; he has cursed his father or his mother, his blood is upon him]” (Lev. 20:9). [From this verse] I could deduce that [he is liable] only if he [curses] his father and his mother. What is the source of the rule for [one who curses] his father, but not his mother, or his mother, but not his father?
K. It comes to teach us [the additional phrase], “He has cursed his father or his mother.” “[He is liable if] he cursed his father [or if] he cursed his mother,” the words of R. Oshaia. R. Jonathan says, “This implies [that he is liable if he curses] the two of them at the same time. And it implies [that he is liable if he curses] one of them unless Scripture specifies [that they be] `together.'”
L. What is [the view of] Hananiah and what is [the view of] the rabbis [referred to in I above]? As it was taught on Tannaite authority: [The prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” applies to females but not to males [i.e., dams, but not sires and their offspring]. Hananiah says, “It applies to both males and females.”
M. What is the basis for the view of the rabbis. As it was taught on Tannaite authority: You might want to infer that [the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” applies to both males and females. But it is logical [to argue that this is not the case]. You are liable here [for transgressing the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] and you are liable for [taking the mother from the nest in the presence of the offspring, as it is written, “If you chance to come upon a bird's nest, in any tree or on the ground, with young ones or eggs and the mother sitting upon the young or upon the eggs, you shall not take] the mother with the young” (Deut. 22:6). What is the case where you are liable for [taking] “the mother with the young”? It is for females and not for males. So too the case where you are liable here [for the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day it is logical to argue that] it is for females and not for males.
N. No. [This is not the case.] You may say regarding [the prohibition of taking] “the mother with its young” that [the rule] does not apply to [birds that are] already captured as it does to those that are not already captured. You will say that [with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering on the same day] “it and its young” [the parameters of the law are different] because it equates [the cases of animals that are] already captured and animals that are not already captured.
O. It comes to teach [the word], “It.” [He needs to slaughter] one [parent] and not two. Now that Scripture has separated the cases I am warranted to draw a logical conclusion [in the other direction]. He is liable here [if he slaughters the mother and offspring on the same day] and he is liable in the case where he takes “the mother with its young.” What is the case? Where he is liable for taking “the mother with its young” [the prohibition applies] to females and not to males. So too where he is liable here [if he slaughters the mother and offspring on the same day], [he is liable] for females and not for males [i.e., for the mother and offspring].
P. And if you wish, you may say [that the verse specifies the prohibition for] “its young” [and that implies] one [animal] whose young trails after it [i.e., the mother], that excludes a male [parent] whose young do not trail after it.
Q. What does it mean: `And if you wish, you may say'? Will you maintain that “it” [masculine pronoun] implies it is a male? Lo it says, “its young.” [And that implies] one [animal] whose young trails after it [i.e., the mother], that excludes a male [parent] whose young do not trail after it.
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