7/8/11

Talmud Bavli Hullin 12a-b translation of Tzvee Zahavy

CC.         And if you say that is the case [12a] [what about] the paschal-offering and other sacrifices? [Meir must have fulfilled his obligation to eat such meat.] What can you then say [he must have done]? Rather, where it was possible [to examine the animal], it is possible [that he did require that they examine it]. And where it was not possible, it was not possible. Here too [in general he must have held] where it is possible [to examine the animal], it is possible [that we do require that they examine it]. And where it is not possible, it is not possible.

II.1
A.            Said R. Nahman, said Rab, “One who watched an individual slaughter — if he watched him from beginning to end, it is permissible to eat [meat from an animal prepared] from that act of slaughtering. And if not, it is forbidden to eat [meat from an animal prepared] from that act of slaughtering.”

B.            What are the circumstances [concerning the individual who slaughtered]? If we know that he was knowledgeable [in the laws of slaughtering], why do I need to know if someone watched him? And if he was not knowledgeable, it is obvious [that someone must watch over him if he slaughters to see that he performs the actions correctly].

C.            Rather it must be that he did not know if he was or was not knowledgeable. Why not say [that we have a principle], “The majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts.” Was it not taught on Tannaite authority, He who finds a slaughtered chicken in the market place, and so too: he who gave his chicken to someone in the marketplace for slaughter and does not know the character of the person [to whom he gave it] — they follow the status of the majority [of slaughterers in the market place] [T. ul. 2:6]? [The Talmud's version: Behold if he found a slaughtered chicken in the marketplace or if he said to his agent, “Go and slaughter this for me and he went and found it slaughtered, the presumption concerning it is that it was slaughtered [properly].”] We may infer from this [the principle that] the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts.

D.            Here too let us say that the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts. Actually [we do not say this because the circumstances are that] he knew that he was not knowledgeable [in the laws of slaughtering]. And the case is where he slaughtered before us one of the organs correctly. What would I have wanted to say? Since [he slaughtered] this one correctly, he also [slaughtered] the other correctly. It comes to teach us [to the contrary that we may make no such assumption]. That [organ] which he happened [to cut correctly], so it happened [by chance and not due to his expertise]. And concerning the other [organ we fear] perhaps he paused or perhaps he pressed [and cut it incorrectly].

E.            R. Dimi bar Joseph posed this question to R. Nahman, “He who says to his agent, `Go and slaughter this for me' and he went and found it slaughtered — what is the law?” He said to him, “The presumption is that it was slaughtered [properly].”

F.             [He asked further,] “He who said to his agent, `Go and separate heave-offering for me' and he went and found heave-offering separated — what is the law?” He said to him, “There is no presumption heave-offering was separated [properly].” [He, Dimi, said to him,] “Make up your mind. If there is a presumption that an agent performs his charge, then regarding even the tithes we should [accept the presumption that it was separated correctly]. And if there is no presumption that an agent performs his charge, then regarding even the slaughtering also we should not [accept the presumption that he slaughtered properly].”

G.            He [Nahman] said to him, “What's in it for me to explain this simple matter to you? [Lit.: If you will measure out for it a kor of salt (Cashdan).] Actually [we hold the view that the presumption is that] an agent does not perform his charge [properly]. And regarding slaughtering [the reason we say that the meat was slaughtered properly is not because the agent performed his charge]. But rather, perhaps another person heard [him instruct his agent] and went and slaughtered. [And we have the principle that] the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts.

H.           “[Now with regard to] heave-offering, [we could likewise say] perhaps another person heard him and went and separated heave-offering. This would be a case of one who separated heave-offering without the knowledge [of the owner of the produce]. [And we have a principle]: one who separates heave-offering without the knowledge [of the owner of the produce] — his heave-offering is not valid heave-offering.”

II.2
A.            Let us say [that the validity of the principle] the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts, is a dispute between two Tannaite authorities. For it was taught on Tannaite authority, [If] one's chicken was stolen and he came and found it slaughtered, [or if] one's beast was stolen and he came and found it slaughtered — R. Hanania, the son of R. Yosé the Galilean, permits. And R. Judah prohibits. Said Rabbi, “The opinion of R. Hanania, the son of R. Yosé the Galilean, appears preferable in the case of his finding the carcass inside his house, and the opinion of R. Judah in the case of his finding the carcass in the rubbish heap” [T. ul. 2:5]. [The Talmud's version has Hanina instead of Hanania and varies slightly in the text.]

B.            Why not say that this is the dispute? One authority [Hanina] holds the view that the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts. The other authority [Judah] holds the view that we do not say that the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts.

C.            Said R. Nahman bar Yitzhak, “No. All agree that the majority of those who engage in slaughtering are experts. And [regarding meat found] in the house all agree that it is permitted. And [regarding meat found] in the rubbish heap in the marketplace that it is forbidden. Over what do they dispute? [Over the case of meat found] in the rubbish heap in the house. One authority [Judah] holds the view that a person is apt to throw his carrion into the rubbish heap in his house. And the other authority [Hanina] holds the view that a person is not apt to throw his carrion into the rubbish heap in his house.”

D.            Said Mar, said Rabbi, “The opinion of R. Judah appears preferable in the case of his finding the carcass in the rubbish heap.” Which rubbish heap? If we say he means the rubbish heap in the marketplace, lo we said that everyone agrees that it is prohibited [to eat the meat found there]. Rather it is obvious that it means the rubbish heap in the house. Then consider the end of the text, The opinion of R. Hanania, the son of R. Yosé the Galilean, appears preferable in the case of his finding the carcass inside his house. Which house? If it means literally in the house, lo we said that everyone agrees that [meat found] in the house is permitted. Rather it is obvious that it means the rubbish heap in the house. There is an inherent contradiction between the opinions of Rabbi.

E.            This [12b] is what he [Rabbi] meant to say, “The view of R. Judah appears acceptable to R. Hanina the son of R. Yosé the Galilean [in the case of a carcass found] in the rubbish heap in the marketplace. For R. Hanina the son of R. Yosé the Galilean only disputed with him [in the case of the carcass found] in the rubbish heap in the house. But with regard to [a carcass found] in the rubbish heap in the marketplace he agrees with him. And the view [of R. Hanina the son of R. Yosé the Galilean is acceptable, etc.].”

III.1
                B.            Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,
(C.           lest they impair [the fitness of the carcass] through their act of slaughter) [M. 1:1].

A.            “Lest they did impair” is not taught [in the perfect tense] but “Lest they impair” [in the imperfect]. Said Raba, “This means that they do not give to them unconsecrated [animals to slaughter] to begin with.”

IV.1
                D.           But all of them [=B] who performed an act of slaughter, with others watching them — their act of slaughter is val.id [M. 1:1].

A.            Who is the Tannaite authority who taught that you do not need intention during the act of slaughtering [to make it a valid act]?

B.            Said Raba, “It is R. Nathan.” For so taught Oshaia, the youngest of the fellows [alt.: Zira of Haberya (Cashdan)], “He who threw a knife to impale it on a wall, and it went [and on its path] it slaughtered [an animal] in a proper fashion, R. Nathan declares it fit. And the sages declare it unfit.” He [Oshaia] taught [the pericope] and he said concerning it that the law follows the view of R. Nathan.

C.            But lo, do we not need [that the knife be drawn] back and forth [across the organs of the throat of the animal, lest it be deemed a case of pressing on the knife to cut]? [We refer to a case where] it went back and forth in its normal fashion [by bouncing off the wall and cutting the organs going and coming, as it should].

IV.2
A.            Said R. Hiyya bar Abba, “R. Yohanan posed this question: a minor — does he have [the capacity of] deliberation [necessary for the intention of a ritual act] or does he not have [the capacity of] deliberation?”

B.            Said to him R. Ammi, “Let him pose the [more basic] question regarding [the validity of a minor's] deed.” What is the difference [between these objections — both are settled elsewhere]? With regard to deed there can be no question, for it was taught on Tannaite authority that they have [the capacity to perform a proper] deed. With regard to deliberation there also can be no question, for it was taught on Tannaite authority that they have no [capacity for] deliberation.

C.            For it was taught in the Mishnah on Tannaite authority, The pomegranate, the acorn, or the nut which the children have fashioned [as a toy so as] to measure the dirt with them, or which they have adapted as a pair of scales — it is [susceptible to becoming] unclean [as a utensil], because they have [the capacity of] deed [i.e., they can fashion them into utensils by hollowing them out] [13a] but they do not have [the capacity of] deliberation [i.e., to transform a hollow object that they find into a utensil merely by their intention to use it as such] [M. Kel. 17:15 D-E].

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