7/5/11

Talmud Bavli Hullin 9a-b translation of Tzvee Zahavy


C.            Said Amemar in the name of R. Pappa, “One should not stack the loins [kidneys] on top of [other] meat because the fat [from the loins] will drip and the meat will absorb it.” If so when they [the loins] lie naturally we also [ought to fear] that the fat will drip and the meat will absorb it. [No.] The membrane [around the fat] separates it from [the meat] underneath it. If so, [9a] when [the loins] are on top [of other meat] there is also a membrane [to separate the fats from the meat]. [We cannot say this.] Since the butcher handles it [the membrane] disintegrates.

I.17
A.            Said R. Judah, said Rab, “A disciple of the sages must learn three things: writing [i.e., to sign his name (Rashi)], slaughtering, and circumcision.” And R. Hananiah bar Shalmaya in the name of Rab said, “Also to make the knot in tefillin, and the blessings for a wedding, and [tying the knots in] fringes.” And [why does not] the other [authority, i.e., Rab, list these items]? Because they are common.

B.            And said R. Judah, said Samuel, “Any butcher who does not know the [primary] laws of slaughtering — it is forbidden to eat meat from an animal he slaughtered.” And these are the [primary] laws of slaughtering: pausing, pressing [i.e., chopping without back and forth motion], thrusting [i.e., stabbing], deflecting [outside the prescribed location for the incision], and tearing [rather than cutting]. What novel point does this make? All of these are taught [elsewhere]? No. It is necessary [to teach so we would know the law for the case of] one who slaughtered before us two or three times and he slaughtered correctly. It would make sense to say that since he slaughtered the other times correctly, he slaughtered this time correctly. It makes the point that since he did not learn [the laws of slaughtering] sometimes he will pause or press and not know [that he has acted improperly].

C.            And said R. Judah, said Samuel, “The butcher must inspect the organs after slaughtering.” Said R. Joseph, “We also were taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah: R. Simeon says, `[That is the rule] if the delay was sufficient for examining ...' [M. ul. 2:3 W].” What does this mean? [The time it takes] to inspect the organs. Said to him Abayye, “No. Accordingly said R. Yohanan, `[As much time as it takes] a sage to inspect [the knife for imperfections].'” If so your specification is too arbitrary. [It may take time to find a sage to inspect.] Rather [say, as much time as it takes a butcher who is a sage [to inspect the knife].

I.18
A.            If he did not inspect [the organs after he slaughtered] what [is the law]? R. Eliezer b. Antigonus in the name of R. Eleazar b. R. Yannai said, “It [i.e., the animal] is terefah and it is forbidden to eat it.” On Tannaite authority it was taught, [Whatever is made carrion during the act of slaughtering] is deemed carrion and imparts uncleanness to the one who carries it [T. 2:9 G]. Over what principle do they dispute? Over that of R. Huna, who said, “An animal in its lifetime remains in the presumptive status of forbidden [food] until it is known to you how it was slaughtered. Once it was slaughtered it remains in the presumptive status of permitted [food] until it is known to you how it became terefah.” One authority reasons that [the animal] is in a presumptive status of forbidden [food] and now it has died [and has the status of carrion]. The other authority reasons we say [the animal] is in a presumptive state of forbidden [food]. We do not say that [the animal] is in a presumptive state of uncleanness.

B.            Reverting to the body of the prior text: said R. Huna, “An animal in its lifetime remains in the presumptive status of forbidden [food] until it is known to you how it was slaughtered. Once it was slaughtered it remains in the presumptive status of permitted [food] until it is known to you how it became terefah.” But let him say, “Once it was slaughtered, it is permitted. [The issue of presumption need not enter in.]”

C.            Lo, it makes the point that [it remains permitted] even though some deficiency may have developed. As the question was raised by R. Abba to R. Huna, “If a wolf came and carried away the intestines, what is the rule?” If he carried them away, lo they are not here [so how can there be any suspicion of a deficiency]? Rather [it must be that he meant], “[If a wolf came and] punctured the intestines, what is the rule?” [Why should we suspect a deficiency in the animal? It says that the wolf] punctured [them]. Lo, we see that he punctured them. Rather [if the circumstance was] he carried them off and returned them punctured, what is the rule? Do we suspect that perhaps he punctured them in a place they had already been punctured [i.e., a defect that would render the animal unfit]? Or do we not suspect this? He [Huna] said to him, “We do not suspect that in the place they had been punctured, he punctured them. [It is too far-fetched.]”

D.            He [R. Abba] raised an objection: If one saw a bird peck at a fig or a mouse gnaw at a melon, [9b] [both are forbidden on account of the law of food with snakebites on it [M. Ter. 8:6]. We suspect that perhaps they were pecking at a place that had already been punctured [T. Ter. 7:17]. He [Huna] said to him, “Can you compare a case involving a [rule based on a] prohibition to a case involving [a rule based on the fear of] danger. A case involving [a rule based on the fear of] danger is different.”

E.            Said Raba, “What is the difference? [A case involving] doubt in a matter of danger is judged according to the more stringent alternative. [A case involving] doubt in a matter of a prohibition [of law] is also judged according to the more stringent alternative.”

F.             Said to him Abayye, “And is there no difference between a matter of prohibition and a matter of danger? But lo consider if it is: A case of doubt regarding uncleanness in a public domain — this doubt is deemed clean [M. Toh. 4:11]. But if it is a case of doubt regarding [danger of poisoning in an instance of] uncovered water, it is prohibited.

G.            He said to him, “There we derived the law from a comparison to the laws of the suspected woman. Just as the suspected woman [is a case of doubt] in a private domain [and we judge her to be forbidden to her husband on that account], so too [in a case of doubt concerning] uncleanness in a private domain [we judge to be unclean].”

H.           R. Shimi raised this objection, “[In a case in a private domain where] there is a dead creeping thing in the mouth of a weasel and the weasel is walking on top of loaves of Heave-offering — if there is doubt whether it touched or not, the [case of] doubt is judged clean [M. Toh. 4:2, M. Ed. 2:7]. But if it is a case of doubt regarding [danger of poisoning in an instance of] uncovered water, it is prohibited.

I.              There too we derive the law from a comparison with the laws of the suspected woman. Just as the suspected woman has comprehension and can be interrogated, so here too [we decide that it is unclean only in a matter where the subject] has comprehension and can be interrogated [and not in the case of the weasel on the loaves].

I.19
A.            Said R. Ashi. “Come and take note: A pitcher [of water of purification] that he left uncovered and he came and found it covered — it is unclean [cf. M. Parah 11:1].” For I may say that an unclean person came in there and covered it up. But if he left it covered and came in and found it uncovered — if a weasel could drink from it, or [if] a serpent [could drink from it] according to R. Gamaliel, or if dew could have fallen in it at night — it is unfit [for use as purification water, but it is not deemed unclean].

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