[39a] And R. Eliezer comes along to say that we do derive [principles regarding the validity of acts] outside the Temple from [the rules that regulate acts] inside the Temple.
F. And R. Yosé comes along to say that even inside the Temple we do not say that this one thinks [to invalidate] and this other one performs the service [that is thereby invalidated].
I.2
A. It was stated: He who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idolatry, or to burn its fats for idolatry — R. Yohanan said, “It is invalid.” R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “It is permitted.”
B. R. Yohanan said, “It is invalid.” [He holds the principles that] (1) we do take account of [the intentions he has] for one service [i.e., sprinkling for idolatry, and we apply it] to another service [i.e., the act of slaughter]. And (2) we do derive [principles regarding the validity of acts] outside the Temple from [the rules that regulate acts] inside the Temple.
C. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “It is valid.” [He holds the principles that] (1) we do not take account of [the intentions he has] for one service [i.e., sprinkling for idolatry, and apply it] to another service [i.e., the act of slaughter]. And (2) we do not derive [principles regarding the validity of acts] outside the Temple from [the rules that regulate acts] inside the Temple.
D. And they are consistent with their views elsewhere. For it was stated: If he slaughtered [a sin-offering] for its own sake with intention to sprinkle the blood for some other purpose — R. Yohanan said, “It is invalid.” R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “It is valid.”
E. R. Yohanan said, “It is invalid.” [He holds the principles that:] (1) we do take account of [the intentions he has] for one service [i.e., sprinkling for idolatry, and we apply it] to another service [i.e., the act of slaughter]. And (2) we do derive [the rule for this situation] from [the rule for] improper intention that invalidates a sacrifice.
F. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “It is valid.” [He holds the principles that:] (1) we do not take account of [the intentions he has] for one service [i.e., sprinkling for idolatry, and we apply it] to another service [i.e., the act of slaughter]. And (2) we do not derive [the rule for this situation] from [the rule for] improper intention that invalidates a sacrifice.
G. And we need to state both [instances of dispute between Yohanan and Simeon b. Laqish]. For if we had stated only the dispute in this [first instance, A-C, I might have reasoned that] in this instance R. Simeon b. Laqish stated matters [according to his view] because we do not derive [principles regarding the validity of acts] outside the Temple from [the rules that regulate acts] inside the Temple. But [in a case where we would derive principles regarding the validity of acts] inside the Temple from [rules that regulate other acts] inside the Temple it would make sense to say that he accepts the view of R. Yohanan.
H. And if you stated matters [of dispute between the authorities] in this one [D-F, I might have reasoned that] in this one did R. Yohanan state matters [according to his view] but in the other circumstance it would make sense to say that he accepts the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish. It is necessary to state both disputes.
I.3
A. R. Sheshet objected: Said R. Yosé, “It [the proposition of M. 2:7 A-B] is an argument from the less to the greater: `Now if in a situation in which intention invalidates, namely, in the case of Holy Things, all matters follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the rites [required in the offering], in a situation in which [improper] intention does not invalidate, namely, in the case of unconsecrated things, is it not logical that all matters should follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the act of slaughter?'” [M. 2:7 F-H].
B. What is the meaning of the rule: [improper] intention does not invalidate in the case of unconsecrated things? If we say it means that it does not invalidate at all, then what do we do with the prohibition we find for one who slaughters to idolatry?
C. Rather it is obvious [that the rule applies to the issue of whether improper intention invalidates] from one act of service to another. And this is how you should state matters [adding explanations to the statements of our M.]: Now if in a situation in which intention invalidates, namely, in the case of Holy Things, [even] from one act of service to another, all matters follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the rites [required in the offering], in a situation in which [improper] intention does not invalidate, namely, in the case of unconsecrated things, from one act of service to another, but only invalidates within the selfsame service, is it not logical that all matters should follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the act of slaughter?
D. [The rule for invalidating because of any improper intention for actions] inside the Temple leads to a contradiction according to the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish. [The rule for invalidating because of any improper intention for actions] outside the Temple leads to a contradiction according to the view of R. Yohanan.
E. It makes sense to say that [the rule for invalidating because of any improper intention for actions] inside the Temple is not a contradiction according to the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish. This view he stated before he heard the ruling of R. Yohanan [his teacher] and this view he stated after he heard the ruling of R. Yohanan.
F. But [regarding the rule for invalidating because of any improper intention for actions] outside the Temple that leads to a contradiction according to the view of R. Yohanan, he [Sheshet, in A] posed the objection and he resolved it. [The Mishnah pertains to a case of one of the main] four services. And this is how you should state matters [adding explanations to the statements of our M.]: Now if in a situation in which intention invalidates, namely, in the case of Holy Things, in the four main services [i.e., slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood, and sprinkling the blood], all matters follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the rites [required in the offering], [39b] in a situation in which [improper] intention does not invalidate, namely, in the case of unconsecrated things, only in two acts of service [i.e., slaughtering and sprinkling], is it not logical that all matters should follow only [the intention] of the one who performs the act of slaughter?
I.4
A. It was taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view of R. Yohanan, He who slaughters a beast [intending] to toss its blood for the purposes of idolatry and to burn its fat for the purposes of idolatry, lo, this is meat of the sacrifices of corpses. If after one slaughtered it, he tossed its blood for the purposes of idolatry or burned its fat for the purposes of idolatry, lo, this was an actual case in Caesarea. So they came and asked sages, who did not rule either to prohibit or to permit [the meat] [T. ul. 2:13].
B. Said R. Hisda, “They did not rule either to prohibit out of respect to the rabbis [M. 2:7 B] or to permit [the meat] out of respect to R. Eliezer [M. 2:7 C].”
C. Why say this? Perhaps on this point the rabbis only stated their view there [in M. that it is valid] because [it was a case where] they did not hear [that the idolater who slaughters] thought [to sacrifice for the sake of idolatry]. But here [in the case in T. where] they did hear [that the one who slaughters] thought [to sacrifice for the sake of idolatry, we should say that] the final intent clarifies the status of the initial intent [i.e., that it is invalid because he intended the act of slaughter for the purposes of idolatry].
D. Alternatively, you are forced to admit that R. Eliezer only stated his view here [in M. that it is invalid] regarding an idolater [who slaughters] because [he holds the principle that] the ordinary intention of an idolater is to [slaughter for the sake of] idolatry. But [in the case of] an Israelite [who slaughters] we do not say that the final intent clarifies the status of the initial intent [i.e., that it is invalid because he intended the act of slaughter for the purposes of idolatry].
E. Rather said R. Shizbi, “They did not rule to permit out of respect to Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel.” Which [ruling of] R. Simeon b. Gamaliel? If [you say] it is the [ruling of] Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel regarding writs of divorce [below we shall raise an objection to that assertion]: A healthy man who said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife” — his intention was to tease her. Once: A healthy man said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife,” and then went up on the rooftop and fell off and died — said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “Said sages, `If he fell because of his own action, lo, this is a [valid] writ of divorce. If the wind pushed him off, it is no writ of divorce” [M. Gittin 6:6 C-F].
F. And we may bring up the question: this precedent [in second part of the text of M. Gittin] contradicts the rule [of the first part of the text of M.].
G. You must say that there is a lacuna in the text and this is how you should teach it: [A healthy man who said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife” — his intention was to tease her.] But if the end result proves that the initial [intention was serious], lo this is a [valid] writ. Once: A healthy man said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife,” and then went up on the rooftop and fell off and died — said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “Said sages, `If he fell because of his own action, lo, this is a [valid] writ of divorce. If the wind pushed him off, it is no writ of divorce” [M. Gittin 6:6 C-F].
H. But perhaps [we can draw no inference from this case to ours]. This case is different because he said [initially] “Write [a writ].”[Based on that we could argue that his intention from the outset was that the writ be given to his wife. However, in our case regarding slaughter for idolatry we have no indication from the outset that he wanted to slaughter for that purpose. So the cases are not analogous.]
I. Rather said Rabina, “[They did not rule to prohibit] out of respect to Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel in this [ruling]: as was taught on Tannaite authority, He who writes a document to leave his possessions to others, and there were among them slaves, and this one [who received them as a bequest] said, `I do not want them,' if the second master was a priest, behold they [the slaves] may eat heave-offering. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, `As soon as this one [who received them as a bequest] said, `I do not want them,' the heirs have already taken legal possession of them.”
J. And we may bring up the question: according to the first Tanna even if he is standing and protesting [that he does not want them, do you say that he takes possession of the slaves]? Said Rabbah, and some say R. Yohanan, “If he had been protesting from the outset [that he does not want them] everyone would agree that he did not legally acquire them. If he had been quiet at first and then he protested at the end, everyone would agree that he legally acquired them. Where is there a dispute? Where he assigned possession to him through another party and he was quiet at first and then he protested at the end. The first Tanna reasoned that when he was quiet he acquired possession of them. And now that he is protesting he is reversing his decision. And Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel reasoned the end result proves that the initial [intention was to reject them]. And the reason he did not protest at first was because he reasoned that since they have not yet come into my possession, why should I protest.”
K. Said R. Judah, said Samuel, “The law follows in accord with R. Yosé.”
II.1
A. Certain Arabs came to Zikonia [in Babylonia]. They gave their rams to Israelite butchers [to slaughter]. They said to them, “The blood and the fat will be for us. The hides and the meat will be for you.”
B. R. Tobi bar Rab sent a gift to R. Joseph [and asked], “In a case like this what is the law?” He sent back this [reply], “Said R. Judah, said Samuel, `The law is in accord with the view of R. Yosé.'”
II.2
A. Said R. Aha the son of R. Avya to R. Ashi, “According to R. Eliezer, if he [i.e., an idolater] gave a zuz to an Israelite butcher [to purchase meat from an animal that he was going to slaughter] what is the law?”
B. He said to him, “Let us take a look. If he is a strong person who could not be put off [by the Israelite], it is forbidden [to eat meat from this animal. Since an idolater had an interest in it the whole animal is prohibited]. If he is not [strong the Israelite could tell him], `Go hit your head against a rock.'” [Because the Israelite retains control over the animal, you are permitted to eat its meat.]
I.1 aligns the law of Mishnah with a Tannaite authority. It explains the operative principles of the dispute. No. 2 elucidates the underlying considerations of a related Amoraic dispute. No. 3 performs the closest textual reading of Mishnah that we have seen thus far in the tractate, working out matters in light of the dispute in no. 2. No. 4 seeks out precedents for those views. II.1 provides examples of cases illustrative of Mishnah's concerns. No. 2 expands on a related scenario and its consequences.
2:8
A. He who slaughters (1) for the sake of mountains, (2) for the sake of valleys, (3) for the sake of seas, (4) for the sake of rivers, (5) for the sake of deserts —
B. his act of slaughter is invalid.
C. [40a] [If] two take hold of a knife and perform an act of slaughter,
D. one for the sake of any of the forenamed, and one for the sake of a valid purpose,
E. their act of slaughter is invalid.
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